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Over the past two decades, researchers have shown that human memory is not as 
accurate as we would like to believe. Sometimes we recall the gist of a particular event, but 
the details of that event are incorrect and sometimes we report entirely false memories for an 
event that never occurred. On many occasions, our false memories are of little significance, 
but sometimes they can have dire consequences, particularly if those false memories are 
reported in court. Given these consequences, it is important to understand the conditions 
under which memory errors are most likely to occur.  The most widely-used procedure to 
investigate false memories in the laboratory is the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm; in this paradigm, participants who study lists of words (e.g., bed, rest, pillow) in 
which each word on the list is related to a critical lure (e.g., sleep) often report having seen 
that critical lure even though it did not appear on the original list. In fact, the false recognition 
rate of critical lures is nearly as high as the correct recognition rate of studied words.  
In many cases in which false memories really matter (e.g., eyewitness testimony or 
traumatic memories), the memories themselves are emotionally charged and are retrieved in a 
distinctive emotional context (mood). The overarching goal of my PhD research was to use 
the DRM procedure to investigate the effects of emotion on true and false memories in both 
children and adults, and to explore methods that might be used to reduce emotional false 
memories in laboratory settings. The first step in the research was to compile pure emotional 
DRM word lists in which all of the list words were semantically-related to the corresponding 
critical lure, and the list words and the critical lure share the same emotional valence (Chapter 
4). The next step was to compare the magnitude of false memory produced by the new lists 
with the magnitude of false memory produced by hybrid emotional word lists used in 
previous research, and then to explore the effect of emotional content (i.e., new emotional 
word lists) on false recall (Chapter 5). To assess the effect of both emotional content and 
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emotional state (i.e., mood) on false memory, I then used mood induction procedures to elicit 
a particular mood and asked participants to learn the new emotional DRM word lists (Chapter 
6). In Chapter 7, I tested different theoretical predictions regarding the effect of participants’ 
mood on age-related increases in DRM false memories for emotional word lists. In the last 
two empirical chapters, I assessed whether warnings about the false memory phenomenon 
would reduce adults’ emotional false memories (Chapter 8), and whether directed-forgetting 
cues would reduce children’s emotional false memories (Chapter 9). 
Generally, I found that 1) pure emotional lists generated more true recognition but 
less false recognition, compared to the hybrid emotional lists; 2) false memories were higher 
for negative word lists than for positive or neutral word lists, regardless of the type of 
memory test; 3) there was a negative mood-congruent false memory effect; 4) the age-related 
increase in false memories was eliminated in positive moods, whereas this increase was 
maintained in negative moods for negative information; 5) warnings had no impact on true 
recognition, but could reduce false recognition, no matter whether warnings were presented 
before study, or after study but before test; 6) directed forgetting reduced only children’s true 
memory, but it did not influence either children’ or adults’ false memory. I also found that no 
single theory could account for all of these findings. In some cases, associative theories (i.e., 
Implicit Associative Response Theory, Spreading Activation Theory, Associative Activation 
Theory, and Activation-Monitoring Theory) provide the most suitable explanation for the 
findings, in some cases, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) is better and in other cases, both 
associative theories and FTT account for the findings. Taken together, the present findings 
not only have important theoretical implications for understanding the development of 
emotional false memories, but also have practical implications for understanding the 
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False Memory in the DRM Paradigm 
“Yet, although cautious, we should not let the pendulum swing too far because in 
psychology (as in other science) much of what we learn about remembering (or any other 
topic) in the lab can provide important information about remembering in situations outside 
the lab.”   
(Roediger & McDermott, 1996, p. 815) 
In July 1984, a man broke into 22-year-old university student, Jennifer Thompson-
Cannino’s apartment and sexually assaulted her. At the time, Jennifer was a 22-year-old 
university student.  During the brutal attack, she made every effort to remember the attacker’s 
face.  As she subsequently reported, “I was just trying to pay attention to a detail, so that if I 
survived… I’d be able to help the police catch him” (“Ronald Cotton Time Served: 10 
Years,” n.d.). A suspect was arrested. During both a photo graph line-up and a live line-up, 
Jennifer identified a man by the name of Ronald Cotton as her rapist. In court, she stated that 
she was 100% certain that he was the right man. In November 1987, Ronald Cotton was 
convicted of rape and was sentenced to life in prison. Eight years later, in the spring of 1995, 
he was exonerated on the basis of DNA test results. The governor of North Carolina officially 
pardoned Ronald Cotton in July 1995, but by that time, he had served more than 10 years in 
prison.   
The story of Jennifer Thomson-Cannino and Ronald Cotton is compelling, but it is not 
rare. Often we adamantly believe that we remember something that, in the end, turns out to 
be entirely false. Developmental psychologists have known this for a long time. Jean Piaget, 
the famous developmental theorist often told the story of his own, strongly held, false 
memory. Piaget recounted that one of the clearest memories from his early childhood was 
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about being kidnapped when he was 2-years old. He had a vivid recollection of someone 
trying to abduct him from his pram while his nanny fought off the would-be kidnapper. At 
the age of 15 Piaget learned that the whole story of the failed kidnapping had been invented 
by his nanny in an attempt to get a financial reward. How did his false and highly-detailed 
memory develop? Piaget proposed that he must have heard the story being discussed as a 
child, imagined what it would have been like, and then retrieved the imagined version from 
his memory, claiming it as a real experience (Piaget, 1962). Taken together, the false 
memories of Jennifer Thomson-Cannino and Jean Piaget clearly illustrate that our memory 
does not work like a tape recorder faithfully storing an identical record of our actual 
experience, but rather, is prone to distortion; the subsequent distorted or entirely false 
memory is often detailed, vivid, and emotionally-laden.  
The earliest empirical investigation of the phenomenon of false memory was 
conducted by Frederic Bartlett. In his research, participants were asked to read the narrative, 
The War of the Ghosts, twice at normal pace. Fifteen minutes later, they were required to 
write down what they had read, and then again after a few hours, a few days, or after an even 
longer delay. Bartlett found that, although the narrative that participants recalled became 
more and more logical and concise, the information that they recalled was not necessarily 
accurate. For example, some participants recalled that the events in the narrative happened 
during the day, but in fact, they occurred at night. Other participants recalled information 
such as “the Indian was wounded by an arrow” (Bartlett, 1932). This information was not 
actually part of the original narrative; instead, participants drew the inference based on what 
they had read and retained over a long delay. In other words, although accurate information 
from the original narrative was omitted, the false information that had initially been generated 
by the participants themselves was maintained (Bartlett, 1932). Although Bartlett did not use 
the term “false memory” in his original paper, his classic study clearly demonstrated that 
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human memory is highly fallible. We sometimes recall key parts of an event, but also, we 
sometimes remember things that never actually happened. 
On many occasions, our false memories are of little significance. For example, we 
might remember drinking a bottle of orange juice when it was actually apple juice. On other 
occasions, however, our false memories can have dire consequences, for example, if memory 
errors like those of Jennifer Thompson-Cannino, are produced in court. In some cases, an 
individual’s eyewitness testimony may be the only information available regarding the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, so errors in the witness’s testimony may lead to irreparable 
consequences for an innocent person (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 
2001). Given the real-life consequences of some false memories, researchers have 
investigated various aspects of false memory to understand how they emerge. There are two 
paradigms that are used most often in the laboratory settings to study false memory: the 
misinformation paradigm (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Loftus & 
Zanni, 1975) and the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995). 
Misinformation Paradigm 
Elizabeth Loftus was one of the first researchers to systematically study the conditions 
under which false memories occur. In Loftus’ misinformation paradigm, participants watch a 
video depicting an event, such as a car accident. Some of the participants then receive 
misleading information about the target event (e.g., the car which caused the accident was 
white, when actually the car was blue). When asked about the color of the car that they saw in 
the original video, participants who received the misleading information tended to report that 
the car was white; their false recall rates were much higher than that of participants who had 
not been exposed to the misleading information (for a review, see Loftus, 2005). 
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The primary goal of research like that conducted by Loftus and her colleagues is to 
examine whether memory can be modified by exposure to misinformation about an event that 
has occurred. On the basis of more than three decades of research, we now know that it is 
fairly easy to alter the details of a previously established memory (Belli, 1989; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989; Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Zhu et al., 
2010). In one study, Lindsay and Johnson (1989) asked participants to initially study a slide 
that depicted an office scene, and then asked them to read a narrative description of the scene. 
For half of the participants (controls), the narrative contained only accurate information, 
whereas for the other half of the participants, the narrative included eight objects that were 
related to the theme of the scene but had not been presented in the slide. Half of the 
participants in each group completed a recognition test and half completed a source-
monitoring test. Both tests consisted of 32 items: 8 items that had been presented in the slide, 
8 items that had been presented in both the slide and the text, 8 items that had been presented 
only in the misleading text, and 8 new items. The recognition test required participants to 
judge whether each item was present in the slide, whereas the source-monitoring test required 
participants to indicate whether each item was present in the slide, present in the text, present 
in both the slide and the text, or present in neither the slide nor the text.  
Lindsay and Johnson found that misled participants given the recognition test were 
more likely to falsely attribute unpresented objects to the slide, while misled participants 
given the source-monitoring test were more likely to attribute those objects to the text which 
was their actual source. Thus, although memory can easily be distorted, making source-
monitoring judgments may help misled people to reduce or eliminate their false memories. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence has also shown that individual differences in susceptibility 
to misinformation are reliably related to cognitive abilities; people with low intelligence and 
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poor perceptual abilities are more likely to be influenced by misinformation (Zhu et al., 
2010). 
In another line of research, Loftus and her colleagues (1995) have also examined 
whether it is possible to implant a memory for an entire event that never occurred. To explore 
this possibility, the researchers interviewed the relatives of their participants to garner 
information about three real experiences that had happened to the participant when he or she 
was 4- to 6-years old. The relatives also provided information about a typical shopping trip, 
and the researchers used this information to fabricate a false event (e.g., getting lost in a 
mall). In the experiment, participants were asked to recall the four events (three true, one 
false). One to 2 weeks later, they were interviewed again and were asked to recall each event 
in as much detail as possible. They were also asked to rate the clarity and their confidence in 
their memory for each event. Although the clarity and confidence ratings for the false events 
were lower than for the true events, at least 25% of the participants claimed to remember the 
false event. As Loftus and Pickrell (1995) noted, this was the first experimental 
demonstration that our memory not only could be distorted by exposure to misleading 
information about an event that actually happened, it could also be distorted by implanting a 
memory for an entire event that the participant never experienced. 
In reviewing the results of research using her misinformation paradigm, Loftus (2005) 
has identified three factors that influence the probability that a false memory will occur. First, 
the time interval between the original event and exposure to misinformation is associated 
with susceptibility to misinformation; the longer the time interval, the greater the 
susceptibility (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). This finding makes sense considering that, with the 
passage of time, the memory for the original event becomes weaker and participants find it 
increasingly difficult to detect the difference between the original memory and the 
misinformation. Second, warning people that they may be exposed to misinformation in the 
6 
 
future may enhance their ability to resist the misinformation. However, warning people that 
they may have been exposed to misinformation in the past (post-misinformation warnings) 
may not have same effect in terms of resisting the misinformation. Third, the age of the 
participant also influences his or her susceptibility to misinformation. Generally, older 
children and young adults are less susceptible to misinformation than are younger children 
(Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Additionally, older adults are more susceptible to misinformation than 
are young adults (Davis & Loftus, 2005; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001; Wylie et al., 2014). 
In addition to providing misinformation to directly induce participants’ false 
memories, sometimes false memories can be generated by our own cognitive system, such as 
through imagination. Some researchers have predicted that imagining a childhood event 
might increase the confidence that the event actually happened (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996). To test this hypothesis, researchers designed a three-step procedure. First, 
participants were asked to complete a 40-item Life Events Inventory (LEI), in which they 
assessed their confidence in whether each of 40 events had happened or not before age ten (1 
= definitely did not happen; 8 = definitely did happen). Based on participants’ assessment, 
three judges selected eight events that probably did not happen. Next, participants were asked 
to imagine half of the selected events and the other half were regarded as control items. 
Finally, participants were told that their original assessments had been lost and they had to do 
the LEI again. The key finding was that participants who first believed that an event had not 
happened were more likely to increase their confidence that the event had happened after they 
imagined the event (Garry et al., 1996; Garry & Polaschek, 2000). This finding raises 
concerns for evidential interviewers and clinical psychologists who use guided imagery as a 
way to collect relevant information from victims, witnesses, and clients. What these people 
report following this imagery might not necessarily be accurate. 
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Some reserchers have criticised the use of imagination to investigate false memories. 
Their key concern has been that it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the target life 
event did or did not happen during the life of the participant. That is, it is possible that 
imagination might not induce false memories, but rather may make a memory of an actual 
event more accessible. To avoid this possibility, researchers have used a video clip of an 
event rather than the LEI so that they can be certain that a scene that participants later report 
was indeed true or false. For example, Wright, Loftus, and Hall (2001) showed adult 
participants a video clip of a car accident caused by drink driving, which included several 
scenes. The critical scene was that a policeman drove the drunk man away from the scene. 
This scene was critical because it actually did not happen in the video clip. Some participants 
were instructed to imagine this critical scene and then completed a recall test, whereas other 
participants imagined the critical scene followed by a recognition test. The results again 
supported the argument that imagination can distort our memory; 15% and 40% of 
participants who were asked to imagine the critical scene either falsely recalled or falsely 
recognised this unpresented scene during the test, respectively. 
DRM Paradigm 
The misinformation paradigm has yielded valuable insights into the establishment of 
false memories, but the most widely-used paradigm to study false memory in laboratory 
settings is the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Compared to false memories 
generated by suggestive information, DRM false memories occur spontaneously. That is, 
participants generate false memories themselves, rather than through exposure to additional 
information.  
The DRM paradigm is based on an early study by Deese (1959), the primary goal of 
which was to investigate the effect of associations on false recall of unpresented, but 
semantically-related, words. These unpresented but semantically-related words were later 
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referred to as critical lures. In Deese’s study, participants were given 36 lists of words from 
Russell and Jenkins (1954). Each list contained 12 words that were shown to participants, but 
a critical lure for each list was not. For instance, for the critical lure sleep, participants heard 
the list words: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, night, comfort, eat, sound, slumber, 
snore. After hearing each list, participants were asked to recall as many words as they could 
remember from the list. Deese found that the ability of the list words to elicit critical lures 
varied considerably across lists; 44% of the participants falsely recalled the critical lure sleep 
while no one falsely recalled the critical lure butterfly after hearing its list words. He also 
found that the associative strength between the list words and the critical lure could explain 
76% of the variance in the false recall rates; the correlation between associative strength and 
false recall was very high (r = .87). That is, the more likely it was that the list words could 
generate the critical lure on a free-association test, the more likely it was that the critical lure 
would be falsely recalled. Deese was the first researcher to document the relation between 
free association and false recall, but the significance of his findings went unnoticed until 
Roediger and McDermott replicated and extended his study using a similar procedure in 
1995. Since then, this experimental procedure has been referred to as the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm. 
There were two experiments in Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) seminal study. The 
goal of the first experiment was to replicate Deese’s (1959) original findings for recall, and to 
extend Deese’s recall test to include a recognition test. Thirty-six participants heard 6, 12-
word lists, which were selected from Deese’s study. After hearing each list, participants were 
asked to write down as many words as they could remember without guessing. Once the sixth 
list was finished, participants completed a 42-word recognition task by rating each word 
based on their confidence that it had been presented on the list using a 4-point rating scale (1 
= sure that the item was new; 4 = sure that the item was old). On the recall test, the true 
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recall rate for the studied words was .65, which was higher than the false recall rate for the 
critical lures (.40). On the recognition test, the results indicated that even for unpresented 
critical lures, participants were very confident that the word had appeared; 86% of the studied 
words and 84% of the critical lures were given a rating of 3 (probably old) or 4 (sure old). 
Taken together, the first experiment of Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) study indicated 
that false recall and false recognition were robust using Deese’s method. 
In their second experiment of the same study, Roediger and McDermott (1995) had 
four aims. First, they wanted to examine the DRM procedure with a larger set of word lists; 
to do this, they developed 24, 15-word lists. Second, they wanted to investigate whether prior 
recall would boost recognition rates. To this end, after learning half of the lists, participants 
were randomly assigned to do either a recall task or a math task. By comparing the 
recognition rates between these two groups, Roediger and McDermott could test whether 
prior recall had an effect on subsequent recognition. Third, they wanted to determine whether 
the false memories for the critical lures still occurred when the corresponding list words had 
not been presented. To test this idea, the critical lures of unstudied word lists were included in 
the recognition task. Finally, they wanted to obtain some measure of the subjective 
experience of false memories. To achieve this goal, Roediger and McDermott drew on a 
procedure developed by Tulving (1985). First, participants made an old/new judgment for 
each word. For words that participants deemed to be “old”, they made a further 
“remember/know” judgment. “Remember” indicated that participants had a subjective feeling 
of having seen the word on the list and had a vivid recollection of its details; “Know” 
indicated that participants had an impression of the word, but could not recollect its actual 
presentation (Rajaram, 1993). 
The experimental procedure in Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1, 
except that participants heard 16, 15-word lists, and half of the participants were required to 
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do a recall task after learning half of the word lists. The recognition test consisted of 96 
words, including 48 studied words, 24 critical lures, and a total of 24 words from unstudied 
word lists. These words were randomly presented on the test sheet and participants circled 
old or new for each one. If they indicated that the word was old, they wrote R or K in the 
space next to that word. The false recall rate for critical lures was .55 in Experiment 2, which 
was significantly higher than that in Experiment 1 (.40). Roediger and McDermott concluded 
that this finding was probably due to the increased length of the lists (15 words vs 12 words). 
The recognition data showed that it was very difficult for participants to distinguish the 
studied words that were actually presented, from the critical lures that were not presented. 
That is, there was no significant difference between the true recognition rate for the studied 
words and the false recognition rate for the critical lures. This was especially true when 
participants completed the recall task prior to the recognition task; the false recognition rate 
in the recall condition was .81 while the false recognition rate in the maths condition was .72. 
In terms of fulfilling the last two aims of their study, Roediger and McDermott found that the 
false recognition rate for the critical lures of the unstudied word lists was marginally higher 
than that for the list words of the unstudied word lists. However, these false memories tended 
to be associated with know, rather than remember judgments. In contrast, the false memories 
for the critical lures that were from the studied word lists were associated more with 
remember relative to know judgments. 
In short, Roediger and McDermott found a false memory effect, using both recall and 
recognition tests. More importantly, the false memory effect created by the DRM paradigm 
was so robust that participants even vividly recalled the details of the critical lures’ 





Replications and Extensions of Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
Based on Deese’s (1959) and Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) studies, Stadler, 
Roediger, and McDermott (1999) went on to collect normative information about the 24 lists 
developed by Roediger and McDermott (1995) as well as another 12 lists developed by 
McDermott (1995) (cited in Stadler et al., 1999). Although these word lists were all based on 
Russell and Jenkins (1954) word-association norms, there was a considerable difference 
between the word lists in terms of  producing false memories. More specifically, the false 
recall rate was highest for the window list (.65) while it was lowest for the king list (.10). A 
similar pattern was also found for false recognition rates; the false recognition rate for the 
window list (.84) was significantly higher than that for the king list (.27). The apparent 
variability of word lists in generating false memories was consistent with the findings of 
Deese’s (1959) and Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) original studies, which inspired 
researchers to further investigate the factors that determined this variance. 
In one study, Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) proposed seven factors 
that might account for the variance in false recall rates. These factors were categorised into 
two groups. Three factors pertained to the critical lure itself, and four factors pertained to the 
word lists. The first group of factors consisted of word length ─ the number of letters in each 
critical lure; word frequency ─ the number of times that the critical lure was found in print 
per million words; and concreteness which was based on the ratings obtained from a 7-point 
scale (1 = the least concrete; 7 = the most concrete). The second group of factors consisted of 
forward associative strength (FAS), backward associative strength (BAS), connectivity, and 
true recall. FAS refers to the frequency with which a critical lure (e.g., sleep) generates the 
studied words (e.g., bed, rest) as a response on a word association test. BAS, in contrast, 
refers to the frequency with which the studied words elicit the critical lure as a response on a 
word association test. Connectivity refers to the inter-item associative strength of the studied 
12 
 
words. Finally, true recall denotes the probability of recalling the studied words for each 
word list. Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) initially collected BAS and FAS data for 55 word 
lists from Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber’s (1998) norms. For some words, their BAS scores 
were missing from the existing norms. Roediger and colleagues collected their own norms 
using the same procedure as Nelson et al. (1998). To obtain connectivity data, they initially 
constructed 225 pairs of studied words for each word list, including 15 self-connections. For 
example, in an anger list, the studied words may be rage, enrage, mad, fury. In this case, 
there are 4×4 (16) pairs of studied words, in which rage-rage, enrage-enrage, mad-mad, or 
fury-fury are named as self-connections. They then estimated the associative strength of each 
pair of studied words and calculated the mean connectivity score for each list. 
On the basis of a simultaneous multiple regression analysis, Roediger, Watson, et al. 
(2001) concluded that the seven factors accounted for approximately 68% of the variance in 
false recall. Of the seven factors, three were correlated with false recall. BAS was positively 
correlated with false recall and was the strongest predictor compared to the other factors. 
That is, the closer the associations between the studied words and the critical lure, the more 
likely that false recall would occur. This finding supported Deese’s (1959) and Roediger and 
McDermott’s (1995) inference that it was the backward associative strength (BAS) obtained 
on a word-association task that predicted the magnitude of false memories. Word length and 
true recall were negatively correlated with false recall. This finding indicated that the more 
letters in a critical lure, the less likely that it was falsely recalled, similarily, the more studied 
words that were recalled from a list, the less likely it was that the corresponding critical lure 
was falsely recalled.  
Methodological Variables that Influence DRM False Memories 
Since 1995, the DRM paradigm that was used to produce the spontaneous false 
memory phenomenon has attracted extensive attention by memory researchers. Researchers 
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have manipulated a variety of factors in the DRM procedure to investigate the conditions 
under which false memory rates increase or decrease. Broadly defined, these factors can be 
divided into two categories. One concerns study factors, including BAS variations, list length, 
presentation rate, presentation modality, level of processing, divided attention, and stress. The 
other category concerns test factors, which consist of retention interval, test instructions 
(except warnings), part-list cuing, and language shift (Gallo, 2013). Appendix A provides a 
summary of some representative studies in which researchers have examined these factors. In 
the Appendix A1, studies in which researchers have manipulated study factors are described 
first, followed by studies in which researchers have manipulated test factors (Appendix A2). 
Below I have summarised the main findings of these studies. 
Generally speaking, both study and test factors can influence the magnitude of DRM 
false memories; the influence of some factors is consistent, whereas the influence of some 
others is not. For example, factors including BAS variations, list length, presentation rate, 
presentation modality, level of processing and part-list cuing consistently affect the 
magnitude of false memories. As noted earlier, BAS, as one of the most important factors, is 
positively correlated with DRM false memories; higher BAS scores are associated with a 
higher rate of false memories (Brainerd & Wright, 2005; Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Howe, 
Wimmer, & Blease, 2009; McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999). The length of a list usually 
refers to the number of associations in the list. A consistent finding is that with increasing list 
length, DRM false memories increase (Robinson & Roediger, 1997; Sugrue & Hayne, 2006; 
Sugrue, Strange, & Hayne, 2009). There is also an inverted U-shaped effect of presentation 
rate on false memories. That is, as the presentation rate increases, false memories initially 
increase (e.g., 20 ms or 250 ms per word), and then decrease when the presentation rate 
becomes longer (e.g., 5000 ms per word) (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; McDermott & Watson, 
2001; Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, et al., 2002). In the DRM paradigm, words are presented 
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either visually or aurally; visual presentation tends to reduce false memories compared to 
aural presentation (Cleary & Greene, 2002; Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; 
Kellogg, 2001; Smith & Hunt, 1998). As for level of processing, false memories in the deep-
processing condition (e.g., make a concrete/abstract rating of each studied word; semantic 
processing) are greater than those in the shallow-processing condition (e.g., count the number 
of vowels in each studied word; superficial processing) (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000; Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001; Toglia, 1999). The factors discussed so far are all study factors, which 
play a role at encoding. In contrast, part-list cuing is a test factor, which plays a role at 
retrieval. Experimenters usually provide a subset of studied words or semantically related 
words (i.e., non-critical lures) as a retrieval cue at test. The consistent finding is that part-list 
cuing reduces false memories of critical lures (Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2003; Kimball, Bjork, 
Bjork, & Smith, 2008; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Reysen & Nairne, 2002). 
In contrast to the factors described above, the effect of other factors on DRM false 
memories is mixed. The study factors include divided attention and stress, and the test factors 
include retention interval, test instructions, and language shift. Some researchers have found 
that divided attention at encoding increases false memories (Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 
2002; Seamon et al., 2003), whereas others have found that it decreases false memories 
(Knott & Dewhurst, 2007). Likewise, stress at the time of encoding was initially found to 
increase false memories (e.g., Payne, Nadel, Allen, Thomas, & Jacobs, 2002), but this finding 
has not been replicated in subsequent research (Smeets, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2006; 
Smeets, Otgaar, Candel, & Wolf, 2008; Wenzel, Jostad, Brendle, Ferraro, & Lystad, 2004). 
Studies regarding the effect of retention interval have shown a complex, but inconsistent 
pattern; in some studies, false memories remained or even increased when participants were 
tested again after a delay (i.e., 2 days; McDermott, 1996), while in other studies, retention 
interval either had no effect on false memories (Toglia, 1999) or reduced false memories 
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(Lampinen & Schwartz, 2000). The effect of test instructions on false memories largely 
depends on the instructions used. In particular, instructions emphasising meaning retrieval 
increase false memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 
2001), as do forced instructions (i.e., when participants are required to fill all recall spaces) 
(McKelvie, 1999, 2001). In contrast, instructions emphasising verbatim retrieval decrease 
false memories (Brainerd et al., 2001), as does retrieval practice (i.e., when retrieval of a 
subset of the noncritical lures are practiced before a formal recall or recognition test) (Bäuml 
& Kuhbandner, 2003; Starns & Hicks, 2004). Finally, in terms of language shifts, some 
researchers have found that bilingual participants develop more false memories for critical 
lures in their native language than in the second language (Sahlin, Harding, & Seamon, 
2005), whereas others have found that false memories are higher for critical lures in 
participants’ second language than for those in their native language (Marmolejo, Diliberto-
Macaluso, & Altarriba, 2009). 
Taken together, the results of the studies described above indicate that the mechanism 
of DRM false memories is complex. When conducting research or comparing relevant studies 
on DRM false memories, it is necessary to consider and control some of these factors based 
on the specific research questions of interest.               
Potential Criticisms of the DRM Paradigm 
The most obvious experimental advantage of the DRM paradigm is that it is easy to 
manipulate and false memories generated by the DRM paradigm are robust. Despite these 
advantages, some researchers have criticised the ecological validity of false memories 
produced by the DRM paradigm and their relevance to real-world false memories (DePrince, 
Allard, Oh, & Freyd, 2004; Freyd & Gleaves, 1996; Pezdek & Lam, 2007). These researchers 
have argued that the false memories generated in the DRM paradigm are not the same as real-
world false memories, such as memories of child abuse. Although reasonable, this concern is 
16 
 
not supported by the data. In a review, Gallo (2013) summarised three lines of research that 
provide evidence that DRM false memories  are similar to false autobiographical memories. 
That is, Gallo has shown that some of the cognitive processes that contribute to DRM false 
memories also play a role in false autobiographical memories. 
First, brain damage that affects autobiographical memories can also affect DRM false 
memories. For example, evidence from neuroimaging studies has shown that people who 
have suffered medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage exhibit autobiographical memory 
amnesia, and a corresponding decrease in DRM false memories (e.g., Schacter et al., 1996; 
Van Damme & d'Ydewalle, 2009). Conversely, people who have suffered prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) damage exhibit autobiographical confabulations, and an increase in DRM false 
memories (e.g., Basden, Reysen, & Basden, 2002; Budson et al., 2002; Ciaramelli, Ghetti, & 
Borsotti, 2009). Second, researchers have also shown that there is a positive correlation 
between DRM false memories and false autobiographical memories (Clancy, McNally, 
Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002; Meyersburg, Bogdan, Gallo, & McNally, 2009; 
Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998). Platt and colleagues (1998) were the first to report a 
relation between DRM false memories and autobiographical memories. In their study, 
participants were contacted on the night of the verdict in the O. J. Simpson trial, and were 
asked to complete a questionnaire regarding the details of when they heard about the verdict, 
such as where they were, what they were doing, and how they learned the news. Either 6, 12, 
or 18 months later, participants were contacted again and asked to complete the same 
questionnaire. In this way, the accuracy of their subsequent recollection could be established 
on the basis of their orginal answers. Approximately 18 months after the O. J. Simpson 
verdict, 82 participants who had participated in the original study were recruited to participate 
in a DRM study. Platt et al. found that there was a significant negative correlation between 
the degree of false recall in the DRM task and the accuracy of their autobiographical memory 
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for the Simpson verdict (r = -.30, p < .05), and a marginally significant negative correlation 
between the degree of false recognition in the DRM task and accuracy on the 
autobiographical memory task (r = -.23, p = .05). 
The final line of research in the Gallo (2013) review regarding the relation between 
autobiographical false memories and DRM false memories involved the issue of recovered 
memories. As mentioned earlier, although the authenticity of recovered memories is 
impossible to determine, evidence has shown that it is more likely for people who claim to 
have recovered memories to make DRM memory errors than those who do not claim to have 
recovered memories. For example, Clancy et al. (2002) recruited 11 participants (5 women) 
who reported recovering memories of an alien abduction and 13 participants ( 6 women) who 
never claimed to have experienced alien abduction and tested both groups on the same DRM 
task. Clancy et al. found that individuals who had recovered memories of an alien abduction 
were more likely to make DRM false memories than were control participants who did not 
claim to have experienced alien abduction. 
In summary, the three lines of research outlined by Gallo (2013) challenge criticisms 
of the DRM task as a model of autobiographical memory errors. Although caution is 
necessary when generalising the results of any laboratory research, the false memories 
generated by the DRM paradigm provide some insight into false memories that develop in the 
real world.  
Theoretical Accounts for DRM False Memories 
How are false memories in the DRM task generated? The answer to this question 
reflects two perspectives. One perspective is the decision-based perspective, which includes 
Shifting Criterion Theory and Demand Characteristics Accounts. The other perspective is the 
memory-based perspective, which includes Implicit Associative Response Theory (IAR), 
Spreading Activation Theory (SAT), Associative Activation Theory (AAT), Activation-
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Monitoring Theory (AMT), and Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) (Gallo, 2013). According to the 
decision-based perspective, the reason why false memories are generated in the DRM task is 
that participants do not believe that the critical lure is part of the study list based on the 
memory of the corresponding studied words (e.g., a memory signal; Gallo, 2013). Rather, 
they believe that the critical lure shares the theme of the list so that they simply rely on their 
knowledge of the studied words to infer that all the theme-related words (i.e., critical lures) 
should be presented too. According to the memory-based perspective, on the other hand, 
participants believe that the critical lure is part of the study list based on their memory of the 
corresponding studied words, or their subjective experience that the critical lure has been 
presented in the study phase. Each of the current theoretical explanations for the generation 
of false memories in the DRM task are reviewed below. 
Decision-Based Perspectives 
Shifting criterion theory. Miller and Wolford (1999) proposed shifting criterion 
theory to account for the generation of false memories in the DRM paradigm. According to 
this theory, the generation of false memories could only be due to responding strategies; 
participants strategically use a more liberal response criterion to any theme-related words 
(i.e., critical lures) than to unrelated words so as to maximise their test scores (i.e., more old 
responses to critical lures than unrelated words) because participants infer that the theme-
related words are more likely to be presented than are unrelated words. To test this idea, 
Miller and Wolford designed two experiments where critical lures, related words (weakly 
related to list words), and unrelated words were either studied or unstudied. In the recognition 
test, the studied critical lures, related words, and unrelated words were regarded as targets 
while the unstudied critical lures, related words, and unrelated words were regarded as lures. 
This manipulation allowed for the assessment of sensitivity and response bias based on signal 
detection theory. The key finding was that the response bias for critical lures was more liberal 
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than that for related words and unrelated words (-1.19, -.35, and .42, respectively, with lower 
scores indicating more liberal bias), whereas no significant difference in sensitivity scores 
was found across different types of words (1.37, 1.63, and 1.34). This finding directly 
supported the idea that DRM false memories can be generated only through liberal criterion 
shifts in the retrieval process. 
Despite Miller and Wolford’s (1999) findings, shifting criterion theory cannot explain 
why participants who are encouraged to use a very strict criterion still show a high level of 
false memory. For example, Gallo, Roberts, and Seamon (1997) informed some participants 
about the false memory phenomenon and strongly encouraged them to avoid making errors. 
McDermott and Roediger (1998) went further with the same manipulation and provided an 
example to help participants understand the instructions and avoid false memories. However, 
in both studies, participants still developed false memories for critical lures and the false 
memory rate of critical lures was significantly higher than that of unrelated words. These data 
challenge Miller and Wolford’s (1999) shifting criterion theory to account for the generation 
of false memories in the DRM paradigm.  
Demand characteristics account. According to the demand characteristics account, 
the generation of false memories is due to participants’ tendency to comply with 
experimental demands (Orne, 1962). Lampinen, Nenschatz, and Payne (1999) drew on 
Payne, Elie, Blackwell, and Neuschatz’s (1996) study in which participants were asked to 
recall words that had been presented via a videotape by two speakers. Participants were 
required to assign a source (e.g., one of the two speakers) to the words they recalled without 
guessing. Payne et al. found that participants tended to attribute a source to the unpresented 
critical lures 87% of the time, which was slightly less often than they attributed a source to 
the presented words (94%). Lampinen and colleagues (1999) predicted that this result was 
due to demand characteristics effect. That is, although participants were told not to guess 
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when they made source attributions, it is very likely that they still made source attributions 
even when they could not actually recall the source because they believed that this was what 
the experimenter wanted them to do (i.e., demand characteristics). If the source decisions 
about the critical lures were made in response to demand characteristics, Lampinen et al. 
(1999) further predicted that participants would change their source attributions at a rate 
which should be similar to the rate at which they changed their source attributions for 
unrelated words because, in both cases, the attributions should be mainly based on guessing. 
To test this idea, Lampinen et al. told participants that some of their source responses were 
incorrect and then asked them to change a specified number of the responses. Contrary to the 
prediction of the demand characteristics account, Lampinen et al. found that participants 
actually changed fewer attributions for the critical lures and for the studied words than they 
did for unrelated words. The finding reflected that source attributions made for critical lures 
seem to be more similar to source attributions made for studied words than to source 
attributions made for unrelated words. The finding further suggests that false memories 
cannot be simply accounted for by demand characteristics. 
Taken together, neither of the decision-based accounts of DRM false memories are 
supported by empirical evidence. The rationale behind these accounts is controversial 
because it simply implies that false memories generated by the DRM paradigm do not reflect 
true memory errors but rather reflect participants’ reporting strategies; participants 
strategically guess or infer that the strongly-related words (i.e., critical lures) were presented, 
therefore they can achieve good test scores by simply using a liberal response criterion for all 
words. Alternatively, participants assume that making source attributions for the unpresented 
critical lures may be the experimental goal, so they succumb to the demand characteristics by 
doing what they think that experimenter wants them to. Although we cannot deny that 
retrieval processes or retrieval strategies are an important part of the DRM task, they are 
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definitely not the only cognitive mechanism that determines the production of false 
memories.  
Memory-Based Perspectives 
Implicit associative response theory (IAR). Underwood (1965) offered one of the 
earliest theoretical accounts of associative-based false memories. He demonstrated that there 
were two kinds of implicit responses that are made to the to-be-remembered words. One is 
called the representational response, which refers to the response made directly to the words 
themselves; the other one is called the implicit associative response (IAR), which refers to the 
response made to the unpresented words that are associated with the presented words. For 
example, the unpresented word sleep is associated with the presented word bed, if 
participants later report that sleep has been presented, according to IAR theory, sleep has 
occurred as an IAR to the representational response to the presented word bed. According to 
IAR theory, the generation of false memories occurs because people confuse an implicit 
associative response with a representational response. Drawing on Deese’s (1959) idea on the 
crucial role of associative strength in false memories, IAR theory also proposes that an IAR 
occurring multiple times (e.g., three times) should confuse participants significantly more 
than an IAR occurring only once. That is, if the list includes not only bed but also rest, awake 
et al., and rest and awake induce the same IAR (i.e., sleep), it is more likely to yield false 
memories of sleep than a list that includes only bed. 
The IAR account was first supported by Underwood (1965). He asked adult participants 
to listen to 100 words, one at a time, and for each word, participants had to judge whether or 
not it had been heard earlier. The key manipulation was that some unpresented words (e.g., 
critical lures) were related to the words that had been presented previously (e.g., sweet was a 
critical lure associated to the studied word sugar). Underwood’s findings supported the 
predictions of IAR theory; participants were more likely to falsely recognise the critical lures 
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than the unrelated words, and the greater the number of the studied words, the greater the 
false memory effect (e.g., hearing sugar, bitter, and candy led to higher recognition rates for 
the critical lure sweet than did hearing only sugar). 
Robinson and Roediger (1997) later designed two experiments to further test IAR 
theory. In their first experiment, participants were asked to learn 20 word lists with different 
numbers of studied words (e.g., 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-, or 15-word lists). After learning each word 
list, participants were required to recall as many of the words as they could. A recognition 
test was administered following recall of all 20 word lists. Robinson and Roediger found that 
as the number of studied words increased, both false recall and false recognition rates 
increased. They argued that the effect might be due to the list length rather than the number 
of associative words (note: the number of studied words equalled the number of associative 
words here), and the two factors were confounded in Experiment 1. To rule out this 
possibility in Experiment 2, Robinson and Roediger held the list length constant while 
varying the number of associative words within each list. They used the same lists from 
Experiment 1 but added unrelated words to some lists to make all lists 15 words in length. 
The false recall and false recognition rates again increased as the number of associative 
words increased. In short, the study supported IAR theory, and indicated that false memories 
elicited by the DRM task might occur because the critical lure was implicitly activated as an 
implicit associative response to the studied words; the more studied words, the easier it was 
to confuse the unpresented critical lure with the presented studied words, resulting in a more 
robust false memory effect. 
Another line of research providing more direct evidence for IAR theory is that false 
memories occur even in a very fast presentation condition. For example, Seamon, Luo, and 
Gallo (1998) conducted two experiments in which participants studied eight DRM word lists 
presented at a fast rate of 20 ms per word, or a slow rate of 2 s per word. They found that 
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even in the fast presentation condition where participants can hardly remember the studied 
words, they still falsely recognised the critical lures either in a between-subjects design 
(Experiment 1) or in a within-subjects design (Experiment 2). Seamon et al. concluded that 
the generation of false memories at test was mainly due to the process of implicit associative 
responses to the semantically-related studied words at study. 
Although there is considerable empirical evidence to support IAR theory, this 
theoretical explanation cannot account for the persistence of false memories over time 
(McDermott, 1996; Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, et al., 2002), especially given that implicit 
associative activation is thought to decay quickly (Anderson, 1983). Given this, researchers 
have proposed that the critical lures might not only be activated through implicit association, 
but also through semantic memory-based processes, which could have a more long-lasting 
effect (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). 
Spreading activation theory (SAT). Drawing on a spreading activation theory of 
semantic processing (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975), Roediger, Balota et al. (2001) 
proposed spreading activation theory to explain the generation of false memories. According 
to this theory, there is a mental dictionary (or lexicon) that stores words and concepts. These 
words and concepts are thought to be semantically organised so that words with similar 
meanings have stronger associations than do words that are weakly related. Every word has 
its corresponding node in the mental lexicon. Processing one word activates the 
corresponding node, and the activation then spreads to surrounding nodes (Anderson, 1983; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975). This process results in the activation of semantically-related words 
and concepts. According to SAT, the generation of false memories in the DRM paradigm 
occurs because studied words are initially semantically activated, the activation then spreads 
to semantically-related, but non-presented critical lures. That is, learning the word bed in the 
study phase activates its semantic meaning. The semantic activation of bed spreads to the 
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semantically-associated, but non-presented word, sleep, so that sleep is also activated and is 
more likely to be falsely recalled and recognised during the test phase. 
Spreading activation theory has been supported by ample evidence (e.g., Howe, 
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). More importantly, the spreading-activation process between conceptual 
representations (i.e., nodes) is regarded as the basis of other associative theories, including 
associative activation theory and activation monitoring theory. 
Associative-activation theory (AAT). Spreading activation theory emphasises the 
role of semantic or conceptual association between studied words and critical lures in the 
production of false memories, whereas the concept of “association” in associative-activation 
theory (AAT) is more broad, including not only conceptual associations, but also 
phonological association, orthographic association, property association, and so forth. 
According to AAT, backward associative strength, which has been shown to be one of the 
main predictors of false memories, is determined by the relation between studied words and 
critical lures on the basis of any one dimension of these associations or many overlapping 
associations (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, et al., 2009). AAT resonates with SAT in terms of 
emphasising the important role of the mental lexicon on false memory production. The 
related concepts are organised together in the mental lexicon so that one activated concept 
could further activate its related concepts. Because of their close links, some of these related 
concepts have not been presented, but are still erroneously activated, resulting in false 
memories (Gallo, 2013; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, et al., 2009). Based on AAT, by 
continuously learning a series of related words, activation of the critical lures becomes so 
strong that the critical lures come to mind, and are encoded together with the studied words 
during the study phase. The process of the summation of activation may be one of the 
mechanisms that accounts for the long-lasting effect of false memories. That is, the 
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reprensentation of critical lures could persist over a period of time, especially if participants 
falsely rehearse the critical lures as having been presented. Alternatively, the long-lasting 
effect of false memories may also reflect the possibility that the associative activation of 
critical lures could occur at test (e.g., Coane & McBride, 2006; Marsh & Dolan, 2007). 
According to this idea, the critical lure could be activated by recalling the studied words in 
the recall test or by presenting studied words in the recognition test. 
AAT also provides an explanation for the age-related increase in false memories. 
According to AAT, false memories increase with age due to changes in the content and 
structure of children’s knowledge base (e.g., reorganisation of knowledge, increase of 
associations). This, combined with increasing experience in using concepts, causes increases 
in the level of automaticity with which children access or activate associative information. In 
other words, with increased knowledge and experience, the difference in false memories 
between children and adults is mainly due to the different degree of automaticity with which 
they access or activate associative information in their knowlege base. As children develop 
knowledge through learning and practice, they develop a better memory network in which the 
associative links among related concepts become better organised and integrated. As this 
happens, related concepts are easier to access (Howe, 2005, 2006; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, 
et al., 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 2014). Evidence supporting the AAT 
explanation of the age-related increase in false memories will be reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 2.  
Because AAT derives from earlier associative theories (Deese, 1959; Underwood, 
1965), evidence showing a positive correlation between false memories and associative 
strength, especially backward associative strength, also supports AAT (Brainerd, Yang, 
Reyna, Howe, & Mills, 2008; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). For example, 
Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) found that among seven factors that potentially predicted the 
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creation of false memories, BAS was the strongest predictor, exhibiting a significant positive 
correlation with false memories. Additional research has also shown that associative strength 
is even more important than semantic gist in terms of producing false memories (Buchanan, 
Brown, Cabeza, & Maitson, 1999; Dewhurst, 2001; Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009; 
Hutchison & Balota, 2005; Park, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2005; Pierce, Gallo, Weiss, & 
Schacter, 2005; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene, & Goldenberg, 2000). In one study, for 
example, Buchanan et al. (1999) directly compared the false recognition rate produced by the 
DRM lists and by categorised lists (e.g., dog, cat, and sheep are the list words for the critical 
lure animal in a categorised list), which were established to be high in semantic gist. They 
found that the false recognition rate for critical lures was higher in the DRM lists (.37) than in 
the categorised lists (.19). Likewise, in the word-stem completion task, participants are 
usually instructed to complete stems with the first word that comes to mind. In one study 
using this task, Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, and Choi, (2002) employed 8 of the 28 stems 
corresponding to the critical lures (e.g., if the critical lure is sleep, the corresponding stem 
may be sle). Smith et al. (2002) found that the implicit priming effects resulting from the 
word-stem completion task were shown only for the DRM lists rather than for the categorised 
lists. They argued that the finding was because the word-stem completion task somehow 
reflected the associative activation of critical lures; the DRM lists had higher associative 
strength than did the categorised lists, therefore the corresponding priming effects were only 
observed for DRM lists. 
Park et al. (2005) has also argued that, in addition to the associative strength of the 
DRM word lists, associative structure is also crucial in the production of false memories. 
There are at least two types of associative structures in our memory: coordinate (or 
horizontal) associative words at the same level of categorisation (e.g., window, door, and 
pane); and subordinate (or vertical) associative words at different levels of categorisation 
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(e.g., apple, orange, and fruit) (Mandler, 1979). Park et al. (2005) found that false memory 
was greater when studied words and critical lures were at a coordinate level (e.g., thread, pin 
and eye for the critical lure needle) than at a subordinate level (e.g., apple, orange, and kiwi 
for the critical lure fruit), in the absence of any difference in associative strength. 
As mentioned above, AAT extends earlier associative theories by proposing that not 
only conceptual associations, but also phonological associations, orthographic associations, 
and so on, can result in the production of false memories. False memories can be elicited by 
one dimension of these associations or by associations that overlap. According to AAT, the 
rate of false memory should be greater if it is caused by overlapping associations than if it 
results from only one dimension of associations. Watson, Balota, and Roediger (2003) 
provided direct evidence to support this assumption. In their first experiment, words were 
added to the four original DRM word lists. Take the sleep list, for example, the original 
associative words included bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, scrub, wake, snooze, dazzle, 
blanket, doze, and slumber. In the control condition, three unrelated words, load, file, and 
honor, were added to the original list, increasing the list length to 15. In the SR1 condition, 
the unrelated word load was replaced by the phonologically-related word, keep. Similarily, in 
the SR2 condition, the other two unrelated words, file and honor, were changed to weep and 
steep; in the SR3 condition, the hybrid list consisted of the 12 original words and the three 
phonologically-related words, weep, keep, and steep. Correspondingly, on the basis of the 
words in the control condition, in the SS1 condition, the word load was changed to the 
semantically-related word snore; in the SS2 condition, the words file and honor were 
replaced by drowsy and pillow, and finally, in the SS3 condition, the three semantically-
related words drowsy, snore, and pillow replaced the unrelated words, file, load, and honor. 
Watson et al. reported that there was a greater increase in false recall when 
phonologically-related words were added to the original DRM word list than when 
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semantically-related words were added. This outcome was especially true when the lists 
involved three phonologically-related words: the false recall rate for critical lures (.49) was 
almost double the false recall rate produced by lists with pure semantically-related words 
(.24). Watson et al. replicated these findings in two additional experiments where they 
compared the degree of false memory created by the pure lists (either semantic or 
phonological) with that produced by the hybrid lists. They argued that these over-additive 
effects might be due to the overlapping associative activation; that is, in addition to semantic 
activation, phonological activation occuring in the hybrid lists might provide additional 
access to the critical lures. 
Although there is ample evidence to support AAT’s propositions, there are three 
limitations that should be noted here. The first involves the limited scope of the AAT 
explanation. For example, Brainerd, Reyna, and Ceci (2008) argued that the main explanation 
of AAT is confined to word-list based tasks (i.e., the DRM task); that is, AAT cannot account 
for the mechanism of false memories produced by other materials (e.g., pictures; Israel & 
Schacter, 1997). Second, AAT explains the mechanism under which false memories occur, 
however, it does not provide any prediction for the ways in which false memories would 
decrease or be eliminated (error-suppression mechanisms; Brainerd, Reyna et al., 2008). 
Finally, AAT ignore the role that retrieval strategies (i.e., monitoring) in the test phase have 
on the generation of false memories. It is worth noting that retrieval strategies differ from the 
ones that are proposed by decision-based theories of the generation of false memories. Here, 
the use of retrieval strategies, especially referring to monitoring processes, initially rely on 
encoding and storage of to-be-remembered information. Based on encoding of information, 
monitoring processes may play a role in inhibiting the production of false memories. On this 
point, the activation-monitoring theory (AMT) to be discussed next, makes up for AAT. 
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Activation-monitoring theory (AMT). Activation-monitoring theory, as its name 
suggests, emphasises the combined effect of both activation and monitoring processes on the 
generation of false memories (Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). The activation component 
derives from Underwood’s (1965) IAR theory, which contends that activation occurs during 
the presentation of studied words and spreads to concepts that are not presented, but that are 
semantically related to studied words (i.e., critical lures) throughout the semantic network. 
Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) argue that this activation alone cannot guarantee the 
generation of false memories because monitoring of memories might also play a role. The 
idea of monitoring was adapted from Johnson’s source-monitoring framework (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). According to Johnson and colleagues, 
there are differences between events that actually happen and those that are internally-
generated. For example, events that we actually experience have more perceptual details and 
contextual information, whereas internally-generated events are less likely to have these 
features, but are more likely to include more cognitive operations (i.e., imagining; Johnson et 
al., 1993). The goal of monitoring is to take advantage of these differences to distinguish 
between events that actually happened from those that did not. Moreover, the activation 
process and monitoring process are not independent. Strong activation may lead unpresented 
information to share many of the features related to presented information. In this 
circumstance, monitoring becomes difficult and souce-monitoring errors may arise, 
increasing false memories. In contrast, if the perceptual details and features of the to-be-
remembered information are very distinctive, source monitoring becomes easy, decreasing 
false memoies. Although the monitoring process is typically discussed with respect to 
retrieval, Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) contend that monitoring of encoding processes 
might also exist. Research has shown that explicit warnings about the generation of DRM 
false memories are more effective when those warnings are presented prior to study than 
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when those warnings are presented just prior to test. Researchers have argued that this finding 
is obtained because monitoring processes may occur both at encoding and at retrieval in the 
warning-before-study condition, but monitoring processes may only occur at retrieval in the 
warning-after-study condition (Gallo et al., 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998). 
There is considerable experimental support for AMT. For instance, researchers 
manipulating the presentation duration of studied words have found that false memories are 
reduced when word presentation duration is increased (McDermott & Watson, 2001; Seamon 
et al., 2000). According to AMT, this finding occurs because monitoring processes are more 
effective at reducing false memories when people are given more time to process 
information. Likewise, false memories are reduced when the studied words are presented 
several times (i.e., five times) rather than once (Benjamin, 2001; McDermott, 1996; Seamon, 
Luo, Schwartz, et al., 2002). It has been argued that increasing the number of learning trials 
enhances the opportunity for participants to distinguish the words that have actually been 
presented from the words that are internally generated. 
Although AMT provides solid theoretical accounts for the results of a large number of 
studies, it does not account for all of the findings. In particular, AMT does not account for the 
finding that false memories are more persistent than true memories over a delay; this 
limitation is a common feature of all associative theories except AAT (Brainerd & Reyna, 
2005; Knott, Dewhurst, & Howe, 2012). For example, McDermott’s (1996) participants in 
first experiment, were asked to do a typical DRM false recall task. The key manipulation was 
that participants were required to return 2 days later to recall the words again. No matter 
whether the word had been recalled during the original test or not, participants were still 
required to recall as many words as they could. McDermott (1996) found that, although true 
and false recall rates were both reduced after the 2-day delay, the false recall rate for critical 
lures (.20) was still higher than that for studied words (.12). This persistent effect of false 
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memories cannot be accounted for by AMT. In fact, it leaves some space for another 
important theory ─ fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). 
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). According to Brainerd, Reyna, et al. (2008), AAT is a 
one-process account of false memory and cannot explain “error-suppression mechanisms,” 
however, fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), as a dual-process theory, can explain the mechanism 
under which false memories would be reduced. According to FTT, there are two 
representations of information (or traces) in memory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Verbatim 
traces represent the specificity of information (e.g., the position, pronunciation, and word 
length of each studied word in the DRM paradigm) (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Gist traces, on 
the other hand, refer to the general semantic meaning of information (e.g., gist-related critical 
lures in DRM word lists). According to FTT, the generation of false memories is mainly due 
to gist extraction. Gist extraction is a key term in FTT and denotes the process by which the 
gist or theme of a word list is encoded and all of the words in a list can be linked together. 
DRM false memories primarily reflect a process of gist extraction because a critical lure can 
be regarded as the gist of a word list and all of the words in the list are semantically related to 
the critical lure. In this sense, the extraction of the gist traces equals the retrieval of the 
critical lure in the DRM paradigm. True memories, on the other hand, rely on retrieval of 
both verbatim and gist traces because presented information tends to possess perceptual 
details as well as the semantic gist of information at the same time. 
FTT proposes four principles to predict and account for the various effects found in 
empirical studies. First, verbatim and gist traces are stored in parallel, which means the 
processing and storage of verbatim traces proceeds simultaneously with the processing and 
storage of gist traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Because of this, participants can store the 
gist of information irrespective of whether they already retain surface details of information. 
Second, verbatim and gist traces are retrieved separately; which verbatim or gist traces are 
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finally accessed, depends on the retrieval cues provided. For example, Brainerd and Reyna 
(2002) suggested that providing a presented word is an effective retrieval cue for verbatim 
traces, whereas providing a new word consistent with a gist or theme of a presented word list 
is an effective retrieval cue for gist traces. Third, verbatim traces decline much more rapidly 
than gist traces as time goes by. This is because verbatim traces are representations of surface 
details of information, which becomes more and more obscure over time while the 
representations of gist information fade relatively slowly (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Payne et 
al., 1996; Toglia, 1999). Finally, although AAT provides a solid theoretical explanation for 
age-related changes in false memory, in fact FTT was the first to predict the counterintuitive 
age-related increase in false memory in the DRM paradigm, widely known as developmental 
reversals in DRM false memories. According to FTT, the age-related increase in DRM false 
memories is due to the ability to access and extract the gist of DRM word lists developing 
with age. In essence, young children’s immature gist memory protects them from false 
memory errors in the DRM paradigm. So far, a number of studies have been confirmed the 
age-related increase in false memories between early childhood and young adulthood in the 
DRM paradigm (for a review, see Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008). In Chapter 2, I will review 
more extensively the relevant studies that support the FTT explanation of the age-related 
increase in false memories. 
As mentioned earlier, the explanation for the persistence of false memories confers 
FTT an advantage over associative theories. In addition, FTT explains other research 
findings, where the experimental manipulations are thought to encourage gist extraction. In 
one study, for example, Gunter, Ivanko, and Bodner (2005) included some related lures 
(words from each studied word list) and unrelated lures (words from each nonstudied word 
list) in their recognition test. They found that the false recognition rate for critical lures was 
much higher in the unrelated-lure context (.72) than it was in the related-lure context (.57). 
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According to FTT, this finding occurs because including unrelated words in the recognition 
test largely encourages gist-based responding, which is assumed to increase false memories 
(Gallo, 2013), but false memories also occur for abstract pictures which are thought to be 
perceptually similar but without preexisting semantic associations (Hutchison, 2003; 
Hutchison & Balota, 2005; Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, Brenner, & Jackson, 1999). For 
example, to obtain perceptually-similar abstract pictures, Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, et 
al. (1999) initially created prototypes for different categories of pictures according to a set of 
construction rules and exemplars belonging to the same category were created. There were 
four category sizes (one, three, six, or nine) in terms of the number of pictures presented at 
study. In the study phase, participants were asked to rate the complexity of each picture on a 
9-point scale. After a 5-minute distraction task, participants completed a old/new recognition 
test. Koutstaal and colleagues found that participants falsely recognised the perceptually-
similar abstract pictures, and levels of false recognition were lower when the number of 
studied pictures was smaller (i.e., one or three) compared to when the number of studied 
pictures was relatively larger (i.e., six or nine). Although Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, et 
al. (1999) did not use the typical DRM word lists, their findings suggested that the generation 
of false memories is due to gist extraction of information, irrespective of whether the gist of 
the information is semantically-based or perceptually-based. 
In spite of its explanatory power, however, FTT does not adequately explain all of the 
research findings. For example, FTT cannot explain why false memories for critical lures are 
accompanied by a strong subjective experience (i.e., remember judgments) (Payne et al., 
1996; Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson., 1998), particularly as Brainerd and Reyna (2002) 
stipulated that true memories should be accompanied by recollection of surface details (i.e., 
remember) while false memories should be accompanied by a feeling of familiarity (i.e., 
know). To respond to this criticism, Brainerd et al. (2001) proposed the term, “phantom 
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recollection,” to account for the strong subjective experience associated with false memories. 
The procedure conducted to investigate phantom recollection is called conjoint recognition; 
participants are instructed to answer a verbatim question, a gist question, or a verbatim-plus-
gist question for each test word (Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008). The general pattern of 
answers suggests that critical lures are experienced as if they were studied words (Brainerd et 
al., 2001). 
In addition, FTT does not provide an operational definition of gist so it cannot explain 
why some word lists cause high levels of false memories while others do not (Gallo, 2013; 
Roediger, Balota, et al., 2001). It is likely that some word lists have more gist relative to 
others, however, this raises another question: why do these word lists have so much gist? 
Roediger, Balota, et al. (2001) has suggested that the interpretation of gist might be related to 
backward associative strength (BAS): “The more the list items are associated to the critical 
item, the more a gist representation of the crtical item is created” (p. 395). Likewise, Gallo 
(2013) believed that to account for false recall effects, FTT has to rely on associative 
accounts to explain how critical lures are mentally generated in mind. In this sense, the 
difference between associative theories of false memory (e.g., AAT) and FTT becomes 
blurred.  
Based on the literature reviewed above, I have summarised in Table 1.1 the main 
evidence for and against each associative theory and the fuzzy-trace theory. Recall that 
associative theories are closely related to each other. Thus, evidence supporting or 
contradicting one associative theory can also be seen as evidence for or against another 
associative theory. Taken together, the review of memory-based theories of false memory 
indicates that so far there is no single theory that can explain all of the effects reported in the 
DRM paradigm; in some cases, associative theories (i.e., IAR, SAT, AAT, and AMT) provide a 
more suitable explanation for the false memory phenomenon, while in other cases, fuzzy-
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trace theory provides a better explanation. Perhaps more importantly though, it is worth 
noting that these theories are not mutually exclusive; it might be possible to incorporate 
associative theories with fuzzy-trace theory to some extent to provide a better understanding 
of the mechanism responsible for false memories in the DRM paradigm.  
Table 1.1.  
The Evidence For and Against Each Associative Theory and The Fuzzy-Trace Theory 






 As the number of studied 
words (associative words) 
increase, false memories 
increase (Robinson & 
Roediger, 1997; 
Underwood, 1965). 
 False memories occur even 
during a very fast 
presentation condition 
(Seamon et al., 1998). 
 Given that implicit associative 
activation should decay quickly, 
IAR cannot explain the 
persistence of false memories 
(McDermott, 1996; Seamon, 





 A positive correlation 
between BAS and false 
memories (Brainerd, 
Young, et al., 2008; 
Roediger, Watson, et al., 
2001). 
 DRM lists produce higher 
false memories than do 
categorised lists (Park et 
al., 2005; Pierce et al., 
2005). 
 Increasing the presentation 
duration of studied words may 
not necessarily increase false 
memories (McDermott & 
Watson, 2001). 
 Repetition of studied words may 
not necessarily increase false 
memories (e.g., Seamon, Luo, 





 Associative strength is 
more important than 
semantic gist in the 
generation of false 
memories (Dewhurst, 
2001; Howe, Wimmer, & 
Blease, 2009; Hutchison & 
Balota, 2005; Seamon et 
 False memories can be created 
by other materials for which 
there are no preexisting semantic 
associations (e.g., abstract 
pictures; Israel & Schacter, 1997; 
Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, 




 Associative structures play 
a role in producing false 
memories (Park et al., 
2005). 
 Overlapping associative 
activations increase false 







 Warnings reduce false 
memories, especially when 
warnings are presented 
prior to study (Gallo et al., 
1997; McDermott & 
Roediger, 1998). 
 False memories are 
reduced as the presentation 
duration increases 
(McDermott & Watson, 
2001; Seamon et al., 
2000). 
 False memories are 
reduced when the studied 
words are presented 
multiple times (Benjamin, 
2001; Seamon, Luo, 
Schwartz, et al., 2002). 
 False memories are more 
persistent than true memories 
over a delay (Brainerd & Reyna, 





 Over time, false memories 
are more persistent than 
true memories because 
verbatim traces decline 
much more rapidly than do 
gist traces (Payne et al., 
1996; Toglia, 1999). 
 Part-list cuing reduces 
false memories of critical 
lures (Brainerd & Reyna, 
2002; Kimball et al., 2008; 
Kimball & Bjork, 2002). 
 Manipulations that 
encourage gist extraction 
increase false memories 
(Brainerd et al., 2001; 
Gunter et al., 2005). 
 False memories of critical lures 
usually occur along with a strong 
subjective experience (Payne et 
al., 1996; Roediger et al., 1998). 
 No operational definition of the 
term “gist” and cannot explain 
how critical lures are mentally 
generated in mind (Gallo, 2013; 





Age-Related Differences in DRM False Memory 
 “Children are the most dangerous of all witnesses.” 
(Whipple, 1911, p. 308)  
“…cognitive aging is often associated with increased susceptibility to 
various kinds of false recollections.” 
    (Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997, p. 229) 
Despite a large volume of research, the cognitive mechanism responsible for false 
memories in the DRM paradigm has not yet been determined. In general, associative theorists 
(i.e., IAR, SAT, AAT, and AMT) believe that the DRM false memory effect is primarily due 
to associative-activation processes. Furthermore, theorists who support AMT emphasise the 
role of retrieval strategies (i.e., monitoring processes) on the generation of false memories. 
Alternatively, theorists who support FTT believe that the DRM false memory effect is 
primarily due to encoding and retrieval of thematic or gist information.  
What all theorists share in common, however, is an appreciation that these cognitive 
processes, including associative activation, monitoring, and gist processing, change with age. 
Relative to young adults, associative processes are not well developed in children, but are 
intact in older adults; monitoring processes are limited in children, but are impaired in older 
adults; gist processing is immature in children, but is either intact or enhanced in older adults 
(e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Schacter, 2006; 
Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Howe, 2005, 2006; Tun, Wingfield, Rosen, & 
Blanchard, 1998). Because the cognitive processes that are involved in false memories 
change with age, associative theories and FTT may make different predictions regarding age-
related differences in DRM false memories. In this sense, developmental studies may provide 
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an opportunity to pit one theory against the other, and yield additional insights about why 
spontaneous false memory might occur. In Chapter 2, I will review what we know about age-
related changes in DRM performance and what those studies contribute to our understanding 
of the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in the creation of DRM false memories. 
Studies with Older Adults 
A large body of research has shown that older adults (i.e., 60- to 85-year-olds) exhibit 
an increase in false memories in the DRM paradigm (for a review, see Gallo et al., 2006). At 
least two cognitive mechanisms are assumed to underpin this age-related increase. First, older 
adults’ ability to process the general features or gist of information may be equivalent or 
superior to that of young adults (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Koutstaal & Schacter, 
1997; Koutstaal, Schacter, Galluccio, & Stofer, 1999; Tun et al., 1998). Second, older adults’ 
ability to monitor whether an event happened or not may be impaired relative to that of 
younger adults (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Butler, Mcdaniel, Dornburg, Price, & Roediger, 
2004; Raz et al., 1997).  Taken together, either one or both of these mechanisms are 
hypothesised to make the older adults more susceptible to false memories. 
In one study with older adults, Tun et al. (1998) manipulated the requirements of the 
DRM recognition test in such a way that in some circumstances, participants were 
encouraged to rely on a gist-based strategy (Expt. 1), whereas in other circumstances, 
participants were required to make verbatim processing responses based on item-specific 
information (Expt. 2). The authors hypothesised that there would be no reliable difference in 
the magnitude of false memories when the test condition promoted a gist-based strategy, but 
that older adults would produce more false memories than younger adults when they were 
encouraged to use a verbatim-based strategy because under this condition, older adults would 
be more likely to continue to rely on the general features or semantic gist of information, 
compared to younger adults.  
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In Experiment 1, participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 years (younger adults) and 
from 60 to 85 years (older adults). Participants were asked to remember 10 word lists, each of 
which contained 12 words. After hearing each list, participants were asked to recall as many 
words as they could remember from the list and they were then given a 14-word recognition 
test. Half of the test words had been presented during the study phase while the other half 
consisted of the corresponding critical lure and unrelated words, which had not been 
presented. In contrast to a typical recognition test, the key manipulation here was that 
participants were allowed to use a gist-based strategy; they could respond yes to all of the 
words that were consistent with the theme of the list, and no to all of the words that were 
inconsistent with the theme of the list. In addition to accuracy, the researchers also recorded 
response latency during the recognition test.  
During the recall test, Tun et al. found that older adults recalled fewer studied words 
than did younger adults, but older adults recalled as many critical lures as did younger adults. 
Moreover, the level of true and false recognition was consistent between young and older 
adults. As for response latency, participants in both age groups made yes responses to critical 
lures as fast as those to studied words. However, both younger and older adults took longer to 
reject critical lures than to reject unrelated words. These findings are consistent with the view 
that when the DRM task requires gist processing, older adults perform equivalently to 
younger adults. 
In Tun et al.’s (1998) second experiment, the strategy was changed to encourage 
participants to focus on item-specific information rather than gist-based information.  To do 
this, the test words that had not been presented during the study phase consisted of not only 
the critical lure and unrelated words, but also three unpresented words that were weakly 
associated with the studied words. The inclusion of the weakly-associated words encouraged 
participants to respond based on the features of the individual words rather than their 
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semantic associations. Tun et al. predicted that older adults would show faster response 
latencies to critical lures and to weakly-associated words than would younger adults, but 
slower response latencies to reject these words. Consistent with the findings from their first 
experiment, Tun et al. found that the older adults recalled fewer studied words than did the 
younger adults but the level of false recall was similar between the two age groups. In 
addition, older adults in the second experiment were more likely than were younger adults to 
falsely recognise critical lures and weakly-associated words. As for response latency, 
younger and older adults showed a different pattern; younger adults took more time to falsely 
recognise critical lures than they did to recognise studied words, whereas there was no 
significant difference in response latency to the two types of words for older adults. 
Inconsistent with the authors’ predictions, there was no reliable difference between the two 
age groups in terms of response latency to falsely recognise critical lures or to reject critical 
lures. 
In a third experiment, instead of manipulating the recognition test, Tun et al. 
manipulated the presentation format of the word lists. More specifically, 20 words from four 
different word lists were presented randomly to make it difficult for participants to find the 
theme. The fact that the words came from different lists further complicated the process of 
gist extraction because there were fewer items to cue a particular theme. Tun et al. predicted 
that the results of Experiment 3 would replicate those of Experiment 2; older adults would 
continue to report more false memories than would younger adults. The recall results were 
consistent with those found in the previous two experiments, with older adults recalling fewer 
studied words, but as many critical lures as the young adults. However, contrary to the 
prediction, although younger adults exhibited higher true recognition for studied words 
compared to older adults, there was no reliable difference in false recognition rates. 
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Although an age-related increase in false recognition was not consistently observed by 
Tun et al. (1998), their general notion that older adults’ tendency to process the gist of 
information results in higher false memories relative to younger adults has been supported by 
a number of subsequent studies (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Koutstaal, Schacter, 
Galluccio, et al., 1999; Thomas & Sommers, 2005). For instance, Kensinger and Schacter 
(1999), drawing on McDermott’s (1996) study, assumed that repetition of studied words 
would increase the accessibility of both gist and item-specific information. On this basis, they 
predicted that older adults’ true memories would be increased because true memories rely on 
retrieval of both gist and item-specific information. If the increase in true memories in older 
adults depended more on gist information, then compared to younger adults, older adults 
would be less likely to use item-specific information to suppress false memories. In this 
sense, the reduction of false memories in older adults as a function of repetition of studied 
words may not be as significant as that in younger adults. 
Consistent with their predictions, Kensinger and Schacter (1999) found that providing 
older adults with five study/test trials did not reduce false recall and false recognition rates 
compared to a single study/test trial. Younger adults, on the other hand, showed a reliable 
decrease of false memories after five study/test trials relative to a single study/test trial. These 
results provide further evidence that older adults are more dependent on gist memory, and 
less able to take advantage of verbatim memory to suppress false memories relative to 
younger adults. 
Gallo et al. (2006) reviewed the results of 18 studies in which false recall rates were 
compared between younger and older adults and 21 studies where false recognition rates 
were compared. They found that, while a third of the 18 studies showed little or no age-
related increase in false recall between younger and older adults, over half of the 21 studies 
showed little or no age-related increase in false recognition between the two age groups. 
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Based on the results of their review, Gallo et al. (2006) argued that the age-related increases 
in false memory might be more pronounced in false recall than in false recognition because 
recognition tests rely on familiarity/gist-based processing, which is intact in the elderly. 
Although the particular memory test (i.e., recognition or recall) may be a factor that 
determines whether age-related increases are found in a given study, the mechanism that 
underlies age-related increases in false memory is likely to be older adults’ tendency to 
process gist information. 
The studies reviewed so far have used a typical recall test and/or an old/new recognition 
test. In other studies, researchers have used measures of recollective experience to investigate 
the mechanism responsible for age-related increases in false memory during adulthood. For 
example, Norman and Schacter (1997) compared the recollective experience of younger 
(Mage = 19 years) and older adults (Mage = 68 years) in response to list words and crucial 
lures. To do this, when participants reported that they remembered a word, the researchers 
asked them to write down what they remembered about the presentation of the word at the 
time of study (e.g., remembering how the word sounded). Norman and Schacter assumed that 
if participants’ false memories relied on feelings of familiarity rather than recollecting 
specific information, asking them to further explain remember responses in detail would help 
them reject their false remember responses. In contrast, if participants indeed recollected 
specific information when they made remember judgments to critical lures, then the 
proportion of remember responses would not change. 
Norman and Schacter (1997) reported three main findings. First, consistent with 
previous studies, older adults were generally more susceptible to false memories than were 
younger adults. Second, both younger and older adults still made remember judgments to 
critical lures even when they were encouraged to focus on the details of their recollections. 
Finally, no reliable difference was detected between younger and older adults in terms of the 
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explanations of remember responses. That is, all participants primarily retrieved associative 
information (e.g., thief: heard word stop, thought of screaming stop thief) rather than sensory 
and contextual details to both studied words and critical lures, although younger adults 
retrieved sensory and contextual details to studied words relatively more frequently than did 
older adults. 
In a second experiment in the same study, Norman and Schacter asked participants to 
answer six questions for each word that they judged as old in the recognition test. These 
questions involved memory for sound, list position, neighbouring words, reactions, 
associations, and thought, respectively. Participants provided their memory assessment by 
using the numbers from 1 to 7, with 1 referring to no memory and 7 referring to vivid 
memories. The results replicated those found in the first experiment; regardless of age, 
participants remembered associative information better than other detailed information (i.e., 
sound, list position, and reactions etc.). Furthermore, younger adults showed larger 
differences in terms of remembering perceptual and contextual details between true and false 
memories than did older adults. These results indicated that older adults might be more likely 
to mistakenly attribute perceptual and contextual details associated with studied words to 
critical lures. In other words, the associative activation process may be intact in older adults, 
but monitoring abilities may deteriorate with age. 
In terms of monitoring processes, researchers have distinguished between two 
monitoring processes, disqualifying monitoring and diagnostic monitoring (Gallo et al., 2006; 
Gallo, Weiss, & Schacter, 2004). Disqualifying monitoring refers to the rejection of false 
memories based on the recollection of logically-inconsistent information (e.g., “I did not see 
the word because I remember that I generated it on my own”). Through this “recall-to-reject” 
process, false memories tend to be reduced. Diagnostic monitoring, on the other hand, refers 
to the rejection of false memories based on the inconsistency of these memories with 
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expectations (e.g., “I did not see the word because I would have some impression if I had 
seen it”). Many studies have investigated these two monitoring processes, and there is 
consensus that older adults are impaired in their ability to adopt disqualifying monitoring to 
suppress the generation of false memories (for a review, see Gallo et al., 2006).  
One method that has been frequently used to investigate a disqualifying recall-to-reject 
process is to warn participants about the nature of false memories and ask them to avoid 
being tricked by the critical lures. Previous studies have shown that warnings prior to study 
significantly reduce young adults’ false memories (Gallo et al., 1997; McDermott & 
Roediger, 1998). More importantly, participants who could effectively take advantage of 
warning instructions later reported that they were able to figure out some critical lures at 
study and tag them as “unpresented” (e.g., “The word was not presented because I remember 
thinking that it was the common word; ” Gallo et al., 1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 
2001; Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003). In this way, participants could easily reject critical 
lures at test. 
Using a similar technique, researchers have also examined age-related differences in 
disqualifying recall-to-reject monitoring. Considering older adults’ impairment in the use of 
recall-to-reject strategies, researchers assumed that older adults would be less successful than 
younger adults in taking advantage of study warnings to reduce their false memories, but it 
turns out that this is not necessarily the case. For example, Watson, McDermott, and Balota 
(2004) asked younger and older adults to study four 15-word lists. For half of the 
participants, the warning instructions were presented prior to study while for the other half, 
no warning cues were provided. Considering only the first study-test trial, Watson et al. 
found that the warnings group exhibited reduced false recall rates both in younger and older 
adults compared to the no-warning group. Inconsistent with the prediction, however, older 
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adults (.25) were as successful as younger adults (.27) in using warnings to reduce their false 
recall rates.  
In another study, McCabe and Smith (2002) conducted recognition tests to investigate 
the effect of aging on the use of warnings. The findings of their first experiment were 
consistent with those found by Watson et al. (2004), showing that both younger and older 
adults were able to use study warnings to reduce false recognition rates and that all 
participants used recall-to-reject strategies during the process. However, in their second 
experiment, McCabe and Smith changed the warning instructions which did not explicitly 
require participants to identify the critical lures during the study. They found that younger 
adults were more likely to take advantage of warnings to reduce false recognition. Gallo et al. 
(2006) later reported a similar age-related increase in impairment in recall-to-reject 
monitoring. 
One possible explanation for the mixed findings on the effect of warnings on reducing 
older adults’ false memories is that younger adults may be more likely than older adults to 
spontaneously monitor their false memories without explicit warnings, while older adults 
may be more reliant on experimenter-provided warnings (Watson et al., 2004). This 
explanation was supported by research conducted by Dehon and Bredart (2004). In their 
study, 30 younger and 30 older adults were required to remember six 15-word lists. The key 
manipulation was that participants were also asked to write down any word that had come to 
mind but that they did not report during the original recall task. The underlying logic of the 
experiment was that if aging influenced the monitoring processes, older adults would be less 
likely than younger adults to recall the critical lures in the post-recall test. Consistent with 
this assumption, older adults recalled fewer critical lures (.33) than did younger adults (.60), 
suggesting that older adults were less likely to spontaneously use the monitoring strategies to 
reduce their false memories without the help of explicit warnings. Dehon and Bredart 
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replicated this finding in a second experiment in which the false recall rates in older adults 
were lower (.40) than those in young adults (.61) in the post-recall test without the help of 
explicit warnings. Moreover, like Experiment 2 of Watson et al.’s (2004) study, Dehon and 
Bredart also found that younger adults were more likely to take advantage of warning 
instructions (no warning vs warning in younger adults: .16 vs. .04), whereas older adults’ 
false memories were not reliably reduced in the warning condition compared to in the no 
warning condition (.34 vs. .39). This finding again supports the idea that age-related increases 
in false memories are somehow due to age-related increases in impairment for recall-to-reject 
monitoring. 
Based on the literature reviewed thus far, it is possible to conclude that age-related 
increases in false memories between younger adults and older adults may be due to older 
adults’ tendency to process the gist of information, and/or due to older adults’ impairment in 
disqualifying recall-to-reject monitoring. Empirical evidence for the latter explanation is 
sometimes found, but not always. In terms of the mechanism responsible, one important 
variable ─ frontal lobe functioning ─ may be worth considering. Frontal lobe functioning has 
long been thought to be associated with retrieval monitoring (Butler et al., 2004; Lyle, Bloise, 
& Johnson, 2006; Schacter et al., 1996).  For example, in one experiment, Butler and 
colleagues (2004) assigned older participants to high- and low-frontal-lobe functioning 
groups based on the results of additional tests (e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sort test), which are 
thought to depend heavily on frontal lobe function (Gallo et al., 2006). They then conducted a 
typical DRM procedure, comparing the performance of the older adults to the performance of 
a group of younger adults. Consistent with previous studies, younger adults showed a higher 
rate of true memories (.62) than did older adults (.53). The key question was whether older 
adults’ performance relied on frontal lobe functioning. As expected, true recall rates in the 
high-frontal-lobe function group (.57) were significantly higher than those in the low-frontal-
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lobe function group (.47), whereas the opposite was true for false recall; the high-frontal-lobe 
function group recalled fewer critical lures (.23) than did the low-frontal-lobe function group 
(.35). Furthermore, by comparing older adults in low- or high-frontal-lobe function groups 
with younger adults, Butler et al. found that the age-related differences in either true 
memories or false memories were only obtained when comparing younger adults and older 
adults with low frontal-lobe function, but not when comparing younger adults and older 
adults with high frontal-lobe function. These findings suggest that whether age-related 
increases in false memories are found is contingent on whether aging has impaired frontal 
lobe function within a given sample. 
Studies with Children 
Although frontal lobe functions are impaired with advancing age, they are not fully 
developed in younger children. Moreover, younger children’s memory performance for 
studied information is not as good as that of older children or young adults. Both of these 
factors may make younger children more prone to false memories. In fact, the consequences 
of children’s false memories were proposed a century ago by Whipple who published a series 
of remarkable reviews concluding that young children’s memories were so susceptible to 
distortion that it caused their testimony to be unreliable and prejudicial (Whipple, 1909, 1911, 
1912, 1914). Considering the significance of children’s memories in legal situations, a 
considerable amount of contemporary research has been designed to emulate legal 
interviewing practices in an attempt to investigate the effect of suggestive information on the 
authenticity of children’s reports (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995; Ceci, Papierno, & 
Kulkofsky, 2007; Goodman, 2006). The most frequently used procedure in this line of 
research is based on the misinformation paradigm where suggestive information is provided 
during an interview about events or objects (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). The 
consistent finding in research of this kind is that there is an age-related decline in false 
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memories between childhood and adolescence (e.g., Chae & Ceci, 2005; McFarlane, Powell, 
& Dudgeon, 2002; Young, Powell, & Dudgeon, 2003).  
Although studies of this ilk have forensic significance ─ guiding investigative 
interviewing protocols to maximise the generation of true memories while minimising the 
production of false memories ─ the cognitive mechanisms of false memories caused by 
suggestive misinformation involve a combination of both an endogenous distortion process 
(i.e., a process where false memories are caused by participants themselves) and an 
exogenous distortion process (i.e., a process where false memories are caused by external 
manipulations, such as providing suggestive misinformation). In that way, the use of external 
suggestive information and the age-related increase in these false memories reflects an age-
related increase in both mechanisms (Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008). By comparison, in 
studies of spontaneous DRM false memories, no exogenous process is involved so age-
related changes in false memories can only be due to endogenous distortion processes (e.g., 
associative activation or gist retrieval) (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998b; Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 
2008; Howe, 2005, 2006). In this sense, the cognitive mechanism for DRM false memories is 
more straightforward than that for suggestive false memories. Because of this, the DRM 
paradigm has become the most widely-used paradigm to investigate the developmental 
mechanism of false memories between early childhood and young adulthood. In contrast to 
an age-related decline in false memories found in the misinformation paradigm, children 
typically show fewer spontaneous false memories than do adults in the DRM paradigm. This 
counterintuitive finding is commonly referred to as a developmental reversal effect. What is 
the mechanism of the developmental reversal effect in DRM false memories? Two theories, 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) and 




As described in Chapter 1, FTT was the first theory to predict an age-related increase in 
DRM false memories. According to FTT, the age-related increase in false memory is due to 
an age-related increase in memory for gist while verbatim memory remains relatively 
constant (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). In reality, both verbatim memory and gist memory 
improve between early childhood and young adulthood, and the improvements are 
independent of each other (e.g., Bouwmeester, Vermunt, & Sijtsma, 2007; Brainerd & Reyna, 
2004; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008; Reyna, 1996). 
Therefore, whether false memories decrease with age, increase with age, or remain 
unchanged largely depends on whether a particular paradigm is more sensitive to age-related 
changes in verbatim memory or age-related changes in gist memory (for reviews, see 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2007; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008). Given the 
defining feature of the DRM paradigm ─ that all the list words are related to each other, and 
they are all semantically related to a corresponding critical lure ─ FTT stipulates that the 
DRM paradigm is a paradigm that is more sensitive to age variability in gist memory than to 
age variability in verbatim memory. As such, FTT predicts that there should be an age-related 
increase in spontaneous false memories. 
To test the predictions of FTT, Brainerd and colleagues (2002) conducted a series of 
studies. They initially recruited 60 5-year-old children to examine possible difference in false 
recall between young children and adults. Children heard ten randomly-presented 12-word 
lists. Each word of the list was presented according to its BAS value (from high to low). 
Immediately after the presentation of each list, children were asked to orally recall as many 
words as they could remember. As predicted, 5-year-olds were not susceptible to DRM false 
memories; false memories of critical lures were at near-floor level (i.e., were reported on only 
6% of the lists). By comparison, false memories of the critical lures occurred after 40% of the 
lists in adults who were tested with the same materials (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). This 
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result indicated a quantitative difference in false recall between young children and adults. 
Furthermore, Brainerd and colleagues also observed a qualitative difference between the two 
age groups. Specifically, adults typically recalled very few words unrelated to the theme of 
the lists (e.g., Payne et al., 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). However, for young 
children, the false recall rate for unrelated words (.22) (i.e., words that are weakly related to 
the studied words but not the critical lures) was as high as their true recall rate of studied 
words (.23). This finding suggested that the false memories of 5-year-olds were not 
dominated by an understanding of the theme of information. In other words, young children 
were unable to extract the gist of information. 
Brainerd et al. (2002) had two goals in the second experiment of their study. First, they 
wanted to see whether any differences between the performance of young children and adults 
could be observed under conditions that were known to produce high or low levels of false 
recall in adults. Second, considering the crucial developmental period between 5- and 7-years 
of age in terms of major changes in learning and memory, they wanted to examine possible 
age-related changes in false memories between 5- and 7-year-olds. To do this, they used 16 
word lists; on the basis of research with adults, eight lists were known to yield high levels of 
false recall (i.e., the eight critical lures were window, sleep, smell, doctor, sweet, chair, 
smoke, and rough) and eight lists were known to yield relatively low levels of false recall 
(i.e., the eight critical lures were shirt, high, army, man, thief, lion, fruit, and king). Fifty 5-
year-old children and 50 7-year-old children participated in the experiment and the 
experimental procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1. There were three key 
findings. First, although the high false-recall lists yielded an almost threefold increase in 
adults’ false recall (.58 vs .22; see Stadler, 1999), they had no impact on the false recall rate 
of children (.04 vs .05 and .08 vs .09, for 5- and 7-year-olds, respectively). Second, although 
7-year-olds recalled more studied words than did 5-year-olds, there was no age-related 
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difference in false recall between the two groups of children. Third, similar to the first 
experiment, 5-year-old children were more likely to recall unrelated words than to recall 
critical lures, while 7-year-old children had similar false recall rates for both unrelated words 
and critical lures. These results suggested that both 5- and 7-year-old children have difficulty 
in extracting the gist of the DRM word lists. 
Given that 7-year-old children, like 5-year-old children, are less likely to produce false 
memories in the DRM paradigm, a question arises in terms of at what age does children’s 
false memory begin to be comparable to that of adults? To answer this question, in their third 
experiment, Brainerd et al. (2002) added a sample of 11-year-old adolescents and a sample of 
undergraduate students. They assumed that increased levels of false recall should be observed 
in adolescence because, by that age, many semantic-processing strategies, such as elaboration 
or organization, which are of importance in the generation of false memories, are well 
developed. Furthermore, they also included a recognition test because prior research had 
indicated that recognition tests were more sensitive to gist memory than were recall tests. 
Brainerd et al. predicted that an age-related increase in false memories should be detected at 
least in recognition tests.  
The findings were largely consistent with all of the authors’ predictions. In terms of 
recall performance, false recall rates increased between early childhood and young adulthood. 
Children had similar rates of false recall for high- and low-false-recall lists, whereas 
adolescents and young adults showed higher rates of false recall for high-false-recall lists 
than for low-false-recall lists. Moreover, unlike children, adolescents and adults were more 
likely to recall critical lures relative to unrelated words. Performance on the recognition test 
showed a similar pattern of results. False recognition rates increased between early childhood 
and adolescence, and remained stable between adolescence and adulthood. Additionally, 
children’s false recognition rates did not differ between high and low lists, but adolescents’ 
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and adults’ false recognition rates were reliably higher for high lists than for low lists. 
Brainerd et al. (2002) were the first to document age-related increases in false memories 
between early childhood and young adulthood and their findings mainly supported FTT’s 
argument that the lower false memory rate in children is due to a failure to extract the gist of 
DRM word lists. 
Despite Brainerd et al.’s (2002) findings, age-related increases in false memories 
between early childhood and young adulthood are not always observed. In one study, for 
example, Ghetti, Qin, and Goodman (2002) asked 48 5- and 7- year-olds and 24 young adults 
to learn 15 7-word lists. Half of the participants in each age group studied list words with 
corresponding pictures, and half studied only list words. Ghetti et al. found that 5-year-olds 
exhibited more false recall than did adults but there was no reliable age-related difference in 
false recognition. Directly comparing the two studies is somewhat problematic given that the 
different results might simply be due to differences in experimental procedures, however, 
similar to Brainerd et al. (2002), the participants in Ghetti et al. also consisted of 5- and 7-
year-olds, and young adults, but the studied words were presented pictorially as well as orally 
in Ghetti et al., while the words were only presented orally in Brainerd et al.’s study. It is 
very likely that presenting pictures might reduce false memories in adults by encouraging 
item-specific processing of information (i.e., facilitating verbatim memory). Therefore, in this 
condition, an age-related increase in false memories is less likely to occur.  Moreover, Ghetti 
et al. used ten 7-word lists rather than 12-or 14-word lists.  Prior studies with adults have 
shown that short lists reduce task difficulty and make it easier to extract the gist of 
information relative to long lists. In this sense, it is likely that short lists may be not as 
sensitive as long lists in terms of detecting age-related increases in false memories between 
early childhood and young adulthood.  
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Some researchers have argued that the age-related increase in Brainerd et al.’s (2002) 
study may not be due to the long lists used in the study, but rather due to children’s inability 
to connect the gist of DRM word lists because these lists are normally constructed according 
to free-association norms collected with adults rather than children. A potential problem of 
using word lists normed with adults for children is that children may be unable to understand 
the meaning of some of the studied words, let alone successfully retrieve the gist of studied 
words or associatively activate the semantically-related critical lures (Anastasi & Rhodes, 
2008; Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Metzger et al., 2008). To solve 
this potential problem, researchers initially constructed semantically-associated word lists 
that were normed with children rather than adults, and then used these child-normed lists to 
investigate age-related changes in DRM false memories. For example, Carneiro et al. (2007) 
used 16 critical lures and their corresponding studied words that were selected on the basis of 
free-association norms that were specific to the age of participants. There were four age 
groups: one adult group (64 young adults; M age = 24 years) and three child groups including 
128 pre-schoolers (Mage = 4. 17 years), 64 second-graders (Mage = 7.75 years), and 64 pre-
adolescents (Mage = 12.42 years). The critical lures were the same for the four age groups, but 
the studied words differed across age groups in terms of list length (i.e., 8, 10, 12, and 15 
studied words for pre-schoolers, second graders, pre-adolescents, and adults, respectively). 
All participants received an immediate recall test and a final recognition test. Preschool 
children exhibited the lowest level of false recall and false recognition, compared to the other 
three groups. It should be noted that participants in each age group only learned and were 
tested on their age-specific normed word lists, making it impossible to directly compare the 
performance of children and adults on both child- and adult-normed lists. 
Anastasi and Rhodes (2008) emphasised the importance of directly comparing 
children’s and adults’ performance on child- and adult-normed lists. They hypothesised that 
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if the age-related increase in DRM false memories is due to the use of adult-normed lists, 
then using child-normed lists should increase false memories in children, thus reducing age-
related differences in false memories between children and adults. However, if there is no 
difference in false memories between the adult- and child-normed lists, this would strongly 
support the generality of the reported age-related increase in DRM false memories.  
To test their hypothesis, Anastasi and Rhodes (2008) used 12 15-word lists taken from 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) that had been normed with adults, and 12 15-word lists 
taken from Anastasi, Lewis, and Quinlan (2007) (cited in Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008) that had 
been normed with children. The 12 child-normed lists and the 12 adult-normed lists shared 
the same critical lures. In the study, 30 children between 5- and 8-years old and 32 young 
adults (Mage = 24.7 years) received 6 adult-normed lists and 6 child-normed lists. Overall, 
children exhibited a lower level of false memory than did adults on both recall and 
recognition tests. More importantly, an age-related increase in DRM false memories was 
obtained for both adult- and child-normed lists. Furthermore, adults showed lower levels of 
false recall and false recognition for child-normed lists than for adult-normed lists. 
Taken together, these findings indicated that the typical age-related increase in DRM 
false memories cannot be simply due to the specific type of lists used, but rather must be due 
to age-related changes in gist retrieval (as suggested by FTT) or to age-related changes in the 
associative activation of information (as suggested by AAT). More specifically, according to 
FTT, the lower level of false memories exhibited by children may be because young children 
are less likely to extract the gist of the word lists. According to AAT, on the other hand, the 
lower probability of false memories for the child-normed lists may be because the associative 
relations between studied words and critical lures are relatively weaker for these lists than for 
adult-normed lists. In addition, it is possible that adults do not activate associative words of 
child-normed lists as automatically as they activate associative words of adult-normed lists in 
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their knowledge base because of the age-inappropriate semantic structure of the child-normed 
lists (Nelson, 1977).  
AAT’s explanation that the developmental changes in false memories are due to the 
level of automaticity of associative activation has been supported by empirical evidence. For 
example, in the third experiment of Metzger et al.’s  (2008) study, the task demands were 
manipulated by presenting long (16 words per list) and short (8 words per list) lists. These 
long and short child-generated lists were presented to second, fifth, and eighth graders (6- to 
14-year-olds) as well as to college students. Metzger et al. found that, regardless of whether 
they were presented with short or long lists, second graders reported the lowest level of false 
memories. The performance of fifth and eighth graders was similar to that of adults when 
they were in the short list (low demand) condition, while their performance was similar to 
younger children when they were in the long list (high demand) condition. Metzger et al. 
argued that relative to the low-demand condition, the high-demand condition required fifth 
and eighth graders to engage in more effortful processing. The findings obtained by Metzger 
et al.’s study support AAT’s argument that younger children’s lower level of false memory 
occurs because they do not activate the associative links between the studied words and 
critical lures as automatically as do older children and adults (Howe, 2005, 2006). 
According to AAT, children’s lower level of false memory in the DRM paradigm may 
be due to the fact that they do not activate the associative links between the words on the 
DRM lists and critical lures, a process that occurs relatively automatically in adults. This 
theoretical explanation was specifically tested in Howe (2005) with 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds. 
Howe’s key manipulation was that children in each age group were provided with either a 
directed-forgetting instruction or a directed-remembering instruction. Although participants 
in both conditions were asked to remember two word lists, those in the directed-forgetting 
group were instructed to forget the studied words on the first list and remember the second 
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word list carefully, and those in the directed-remembering group were told to remember the 
words that had just been presented and to also remember the next ones carefully. Howe 
assumed that if the generation of false memories was relatively effortful, and less automatic 
in children compared to in adults, then the explicit directed-forgetting instruction may reduce 
children’s false memories but have no effect on adults’ false memories. Consistent with their 
prediction, although the true memories of both children and adults were reduced in the 
directed-forgetting condition, only children’s false memories were impaired by the directed-
forgetting instruction compared to the directed-remembering instruction. This finding 
supports the AAT’s theoretical explanation regarding the age-related increase in DRM false 
memories.  
In sum, although FTT and AAT offer different theoretical accounts for the age-related 
increase in false memories between early childhood and young adulthood, both theories have 
received ample empirical support. Generally speaking, studies in which a manipulation is 
conducted to help younger children connect gist information (e.g., providing exemplars or 
labels of word lists) have shown an age-related decrease in false memories. These studies 
support FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 2007; Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 2006; Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2005). On the other hand, studies in which a manipulation is conducted to enhance 
the level of automaticity with which younger children activate associative information have 
shown an age-related decrease in false memories. These studies support AAT (e.g., Howe, 
2005, 2006, 2007). However, one common issue with these studies is that, although the key 
aspects of one theory have been manipulated, key points of another theory have not been 
controlled. As a result, even though some findings are more likely to support one theoretical 
account or the other, they cannot completely rule out the alternative explanation. 
To pit one theory against the other, it is necessary to manipulate either semantic 
connections or the automaticity of associative activation while also controlling either the 
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automaticity of associative activation or semantic connections. To the best of our knowledge, 
only a few developmental studies have taken this approach. For example, in his first 
experiment, Howe (2006) asked 5-, 7-, and 11-year-old children to learn either the standard 
14-word DRM lists (e.g., sweet list: sour, candy, sugar, bitter, etc.) or 14-word category lists 
(e.g., dog list: cat, horse, tiger, cow, etc.). Compared to DRM word lists, the theme-related 
gist of category lists is thought to be easier to retrieve (Gallo, 2013; Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, et al., 2009; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007). Howe (2006) found a consistent age-related 
increase in false memories for both DRM lists and the category lists. However, regardless of 
age, false memories did not differ as a function of list type. In other words, increasing 
relational processing had no impact on children’s false memories, which is inconsistent with 
FTT’s claim.  
As mentioned earlier, one issue with Howe (2006)’s first experiment is that although 
category lists are thought to be high in gist, we have no idea whether the associative strength 
of these lists has been controlled compared to that of DRM word lists. To solve this problem, 
Howe used only category word lists in his second experiment, but half of the children were 
provided with category labels before list presentation (label condition, e.g., “all of the words 
on this list are names of animals,” p. 1116), and the other half of the children were just 
instructed to remember the words presented on the list (no-label condition). By doing so, 
Howe (2006) hypothesised that the associative strength of the lists was controlled across two 
conditions, however, theme-related gist should be easier to retrieve in the label condition than 
in the no-label condition. If children’s ability to retrieve the gist of lists is the case in terms of 
the generation of false memories, as FTT suggests, then children in the label condition should 
exhibit more false memories than those in the no-label condition, regardless of age. In 
addition, the effect of category labels should be more pronounced in younger children than 
older children, thus reducing the age-related increase in false memories in the label condition.  
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Once again, the findings were inconsistent with FTT’s predictions; only a main effect 
of age was found; 11-year-olds falsely recalled more critical lures than did 7-year-olds, who 
in turn, falsely recalled more critical lures than did 5-year-olds, regardless of label condition. 
Taken together, the results of Howe (2006)’s first two experiments indicated that gist 
retrieval (or relational processing) may not be the critical mechanism for children’s false 
memories. To investigate whether associative processing plays a key role in the generation of 
children’s false memories, Howe (2006) conducted a third experiment. Rather than increasing 
theme-related processing, Experiment 3 was designed to reduce associative processing while 
keeping theme-related processing intact. To do this, the 14-item category lists that were used 
in Experiment 2 were presented pictorially in Experiment 3. Pictorial presentation is an ideal 
manipulation because it reduces associative processing, but does not impair semantic 
processing (Hutchison, 2003; Hutchison & Balota, 2005). If associative processing is the 
main mechanism for children’s false memories as AAT suggests, then false memories should 
be reduced in Experiment 3 (pictorial presentation) compared to in Experiment 2 (verbal 
presentation). Consistent with AAT’s predictions, false memories were lower in Experiment 
3 than those in Experiment 2, regardless of age. 
Although the findings of Howe (2006) are more consistent with AAT than FTT, the 
number of developmental studies that have been specifically designed to test the different 
theoretical explanations between AAT and FTT is very limited. Given that, it seems 
impossible to draw the simple conclusion that false memories are due to associative 
activation (as suggested by AAT) rather than gist retrieval (as suggested by FTT). Additional 
studies are required to replicate and expand Howe’s (2006) study, and to further test the 






False Memory and Emotion 
“Music evokes emotion and emotion can bring its memory.”  
−Oliver Sacks  
 Psychologists have long recognised that many factors influence what we remember; 
one important factor is the emotional salience of the information. Events that elicit emotional 
reactions tend to be remembered better than do events that lack emotional significance (for a 
review, see Kensinger, 2009). For example, we have enduring memories for emotional events 
with significant personal significance, such as birthday, celebrations, weddings, the birth of 
children, and the death of loved ones. We can also remember where we were and what we 
were doing when witnessing a serious accident or experiencing a natural disaster (e.g., an 
earthquake). In these situations, emotional reactions play a highly adaptive role in enabling 
the significance of an event to impact the strength of the memories of that event. As William 
James originally hypothesised, “An experience may be so exciting emotionally as to almost 
leave a scar on the cerebral tissue” (James, 1890, p. 670). 
James was concerned about the relation between emotion and true memory, but what 
about the effect of emotion on false memory? To address this question, I will first review the 
experimental methods that have been used to induce emotion in laboratory settings. I will 
then review empirical studies on the effect of emotion on memory. In these studies, some 
researchers have found an interaction between not only emotion and true memory but also 
emotion and false memory. In the last part of Chapter 3, I will review recent studies that have 
been specifically designed to investigate the interaction between emotion and false memory. 
Eliciting Emotions 
Over the past five decades, a number of mood-induction procedures (MIPs) have been 
devised to elicit positive- and negative-emotional states (i.e., moods) under controlled 
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laboratory conditions so that investigators are able to explore the relation among moods, 
cognition, and behaviours without interference from additional extraneous variables.   
The Velten procedure. In 1968, Velten created one of the most popular mood-
induction techniques. In this procedure, participants read 60 self-referent statements 
describing either positive or negative self-evaluations (or 60 neutral statements). For the 
negative-mood-induction group, the statements consisted of two categories: those concerned 
with self-devaluation (e.g., “I’ve doubted that I’m a worthwhile person”) and those concerned 
with somatic states (e.g., “Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I’d rather just 
sit than do anything”). For the positive-mood-induction group, there was only one category 
(e.g., “I am a worthwhile person”). Based on self-reports, Velten found that most participants 
in either the negative- or positive-mood group reported that their mood could be influenced 
by this method.  
Music. In this procedure, participants usually listen to a piece of music while being 
encouraged to get into the mood expressed by the music. Although in the first study using the 
musical induction procedure, Sutherland, Newman, and Rachman (1982) allowed participants 
to choose a piece of music that they believed to be best suited for putting them into the 
intended mood, most of the time, the music has been determined by experimenters who used 
the same piece of music for participants in a particular mood group. For example, Bach’s 
Brandenburg Concerto No. 3 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xq2WTXtKurk) is often chosen 
to induce positive moods, while Prokofiev’s Alexander Nevsky: Russia Under the Mongolian 
Yoke (www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTfWxskmi9c) is often chosen to induce negative moods 
(e.g., Chepenik, Cornew, & Farah, 2007; Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Jiang, Scolaro, Bailey, & 
Chen, 2011; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). Sometimes music alone may not 
automatically induce a desired mood state. To ensure that participants achieve an appropriate 
mood, experimenters either ask participants to use additional methods (e.g., write down 
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something they thought about while listening to the music) or combine music with other 
techniques (e.g., self-imagery) (e.g., Corson & Verrier, 2007). 
Imagery. In this procedure, participants are instructed to imagine situations that 
would make them feel either sad, happy, or neutral. This mood-induction technique is also 
called autobiographical recall if the to-be-imagined situation has actually happened in the 
real life. No matter whether the event is hypothetical or real, the main procedure is the same: 
participants are asked to think about the thoughts they would think and to feel the same 
feelings they would feel in a certain situation (Martin, 1990; Wright & Mischel, 1982). If the 
participants are children, there is an additional step: experimenters ask them to describe the 
event before they begin to imagine to ensure that children recall an event that is likely to be 
associated with negative or positive moods (Brenner, 2000). As for neutral moods, some 
experimenters asked children to count or think about a neutral object for a period of time 
(e.g., Kenrick, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1979; Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974), and 
others ask children to describe their route to school or ask them a series of neutral questions 
(e.g., Barnett, King, & Howard, 1979; Eisenberg et al., 1988). Furthermore, the valence and 
arousal dimensions of a particular mood can be systematically manipulated in the imagery 
mood-induction procedure. For example, children in the positive-high arousal condition can 
be asked to recall an event that made them feel so happy that they wanted to jump up and 
down. In contrast, children in the positive-low arousal condition can be asked to recall an 
event that made them feel so happy that they just wanted to sit and smile (Masters, Barden, & 
Ford, 1979). 
Video clips. In this procedure, participants watch video clips that are often selected 
from TV shows or popular movies. For example, Forgas, Burnham, and Trimboli (1988) 
induced happy and sad moods using segments from TV shows, Gilligan’s Island and Lassie. 
Goldenberg and Forgas (2012) used segments from the comedy, Fawlty Towers, to induce 
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positive moods and segments from the film, Angela’s Ashes, to induce negative moods. 
Recently, to ensure the reliability and validity of the video clip mood-induction procedure, 
Zhang et al. (2017b) selected several excerpts from classic movies and current programs and 
asked an independent group of 24 participants (12 children and 12 young adults) to view the 
clips and then to rate their feelings for each clip. Zhang et al. selected the video clips that 
produced the most consistent and clear-cut mood effects; positive and negative moods were 
induced by two segments from Lion King. These video clips were effective at inducing 
positive and negative moods in both children and adults. In addition to inducing positive, 
negative, and neutral moods in general, video clips can also be used to induce other moods. 
For example, Bland, Howe, and Knott (2016) showed participants a clip from the movie My 
Bodyguard to induce anger and a clip from the film The Shining to induce fear. In terms of 
inducing neutral moods, participants usually watch a nature documentary (e.g., Bland et al., 
2016; Brenner, 2000). Normally the selected video clips are between 4 and 6 min in duration. 
Rebeck and Lohaus (1986) also found that the video clips as brief as 2.5-min long were 
effective in inducing moods in children and adults. 
Effectiveness of Mood-Induction Procedures 
The effectiveness of mood-induction procedures can be evaluated using a number of 
different criteria. Some researchers have been concerned that induced moods are not 
sufficiently intense, while other researchers have been concerned that the observed effects are 
simply due to compliance inherent in the experimental procedure, such as demand 
characteristics (e.g., Brenner, 2000; Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; Westermann, Spies, 
Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  
Demand characteristics. Demand characteristics refer to the possibility that 
participants’ responses in an experiment result from their tendency to comply with 
experimental demands (Orne, 1962). For example, participants may not actually feel in a 
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negative mood (e.g., sad or angry) when they read the negative self-referent statements, but 
when asked how happy or unhappy they were, participants may say they felt negative 
because they assumed that this is what the experimenters expected. In other words, 
participants’ responses are not due to the mood-induction method per se, but simply due to 
participants’ tendency to satisfy experimental demands.  
Although concerns about demand characteristics may apply to all mood-induction 
procedures, most of the discussion regarding the effect of demand characteristics on mood 
induction has focused on the Velten (1968) procedure, where participants read positive or 
negative self-referent statements. Larson and Sinnett (1991), for example, found that the 
effect size for the Velten mood-induction procedure was larger when truthful cover stories 
were provided than when deceptive cover stories were provided. This finding supports the 
assumption that the effect of the Velten procedure might be partially due to demand 
characteristics. In this and other studies that supported the demand-characteristics hypothesis, 
self-report measures of mood were typically used after the mood-induction procedures. In 
fact, the self-report measures themselves might be more susceptible to demand characteristics 
relative to physiological or neural measures.  
Range of induced moods. Generally speaking, all of the mood-induction methods 
that I have reviewed above could be used to induce positive (happy), negative (sad), and 
neutral moods. In this way, each of these methods can be selected to induce participants’ 
moods if the research goal has nothing to do with examing the effect of a specific mood on 
cognition and behaviour. Nevertheless, if a specific mood (i.e., anxiety) is required to test the 
research question, it is necessary to think about the range of these mood-induction 
procedures. It has been demonstrated that imagery and video clips can be used to induce the 
widest range of induced moods, including fear, anger and anxiety, while the Velten 
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procedure and music can be used to induce happy, sad, and neutral moods, in general (Bland 
et al., 2016; Brenner, 2000; Corson & Verrier, 2007; Martin, 1990). 
Intensity of induced moods. Only a few studies have specifically investigated the 
relative intensity of induced moods resulting from different mood-induction procedures. For 
example, Sutherland et al. (1982) found that sad moods were more intense when they were 
induced by music than by self-statements (i.e., Velten procedure), and Brewer, Doughtie, and 
Lubin (1980) found that participants felt happier after happy self-generated imagery than 
those who received self-statements. From a clinical perspective, researchers mainly consider 
whether negatively-induced moods are related to clinical depression. Mixed results have been 
obtained in this line of research. For example, Hertel and Rude (1991) found that scores on 
the Depression Adjective Checklist were higher in a group of negative-mood-induced 
participants who experienced the Velten procedure than were scores in a group of depressed 
patients. Raps, Reinhard, and Seligman (1980), however, found the opposite pattern. Martin 
(1990) used visual analogue scales for clinically-depressed patients and normal individuals to 
rate their level of sadness, anxiety, and happiness before and after two mood-induction 
procedures: self-statement and music. These two procedures produced a level of reported 
depressed moods in normal individuals equivalent to an intermediate clinical level of 
depressed mood (Martin, 1990). 
From the valence-arousal dimensional perspective, on the other hand, mood intensity 
is basically identical to mood arousal (Kensinger, 2004). Whether the induced moods should 
be high or low in arousal largely depends on the specific research question. For instance, to 
investigate the relative influence of valence and arousal on false memories, Corson and 
Verrier (2007) used music combined with guided imagery to induce a positive-high-arousal 
(happy) mood, a positive-low-arousal (serene) mood, a negative-high-arousal (anger) mood, 
and a negative-low-arousal (sad) mood. 
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Success rate. The percentage of participants who actually achieve a particular mood 
following mood induction is a very important factor for research on the effect of emotion on 
memory. Although there is no gold standard in terms of judging the success of a mood-
induction procedure for any individual study, one widely-used criterion is that a mood-
induction procedure is considered to be successful as long as a mood state changes in the 
predicted direction from pre-induction to post-induction. Using this criterion, the success rate 
of procedures involving music, imagery, and video clips is more than 75%, while the success 
rate of the Velten procedure is approximately 50% (Martin, 1990). 
The Effect of Emotion on Memory 
When experimental research on memory initially began, few researchers considered 
the impact of emotion on memory. Hermann Ebbinghaus, who was the first scientist to 
systematically investigate human memory, argued that researchers should examine the 
retention of information stripped of emotional meaning or personal importance to understand 
memory processes. Ebbinghaus examined his own memories of nonsense syllables, which 
were devoid of meaning and personally-relevant information (Ebbinghaus, 1964). Using this 
method, he established a series of now-famous learning and forgetting functions. Although 
Ebbinghaus’ work had a major impact on our understanding of human memory, researchers 
soon turned to memory for materials and procedures that were more relevant to everyday 
memory and forgetting, and much of this remembering and forgetting includes events that are 
emotional in nature. 
Flashbulb memory. Each of us has experienced plenty of events in the course of our 
lives, but the truth is that we only remember a fraction of them. Given this, what kind of 
information is most likely to be remembered? It has been argued that the emotional salience 
of to-be-remembered information might be one of the critical factors that determine whether 
information might be remembered or not. Brown and Kulik (1977) created a term, flashbulb 
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memories, to capture this idea. Flashbulb memories refer to a phenomenon whereby memory 
can be considered to be sometimes like a photograph, taken with a flashbulb that preserves 
everything around us when a highly surprising, emotionally-charged event takes place. In 
their seminal demonstration of this phenomenon, Brown and Kulik capitalised on the 
opportunity to interview participants fourteen years after the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy, which was a highly surprising, highly emotional event. In their study, 40 white 
Americans and 40 black Americans were asked to report everything that they could 
remember about when they learned of the assassination, including where they were, what 
they were doing at that time, how they received the news, etc. Although these reports based 
on participants’ own memories may not be entirely accurate, almost all of them reported the 
details of when they heard of the event, vividly and confidently. Brown and Kulik described 
the indelible, vivid nature of their participants’ memories as Print Now. 
Since Brown and Kulik’s seminal publication in 1977, there have been a number of 
studies replicating and extending their findings in both adults and children (e.g., Bahrick, 
Parker, Fivush, & Levitt, 1998; Christianson, 1989; Peterson & Bell, 1996). In recent years, 
event or autobiographical memories about the 9/11 World Trade Centre attack have attracted 
much research attention, in particular (Budson et al., 2004; Budson et al., 2007; Paradis, 
Florer, Solomon, & Thompson, 2004; Pezdek, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). In one study 
for example, Paradis et al. (2004) examined the consistency of individuals’ recollections of 
their personal circumstances at the time that they learned about the attack (9/11), the day after 
the attack (9/12), and the day before the attack (9/10). All of the participants were recruited 
from a college in Manhattan. They were asked to report what they were doing when they 
learned about or saw the World Trade Centre attack, and also to recall what they were doing 
at the same time on 9/12 and 9/10. Similar questions were asked again twice, one week and 
one year after the attack, respectively. Paradis et al. found that participants’ memories about 
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activities that happened on the day of the attack and the day after the attack (9/11 and 9/12) 
were highly consistent, whereas their memories about activities that happened on the day 
before the attack (9/10) were not. This finding not only replicated previous ones by showing 
that participants established vivid and consistent flashbulb memories about emotionally-
charged events, but also indicated that the consistency may be influenced by their highly-
emotional nature.  
It is worth noting that one common feature of the participants who developed 
flashbulb memories in Paradis et al. (2004) is that they were all highly involved in the attack, 
being that they were recruited from a college in Manhattan. A question arises regarding 
whether flashbulb memories would vary with the extent of participants’ involvement? 
Intuitively, it might be hypothesised that flashbulb memories would be much robust and vivid 
if a participant was personally involved in the experience. This hypothesis has been 
confirmed by empirical evidence (e.g., Pezdek, 2003; Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003). Pezdek 
(2003) assessed adults’ memories for the 9/11 attack in the seventh week after the attack 
using questionnaires. Participants’ degree of personal involvement was indexed by their 
proximity to New York City. University students were recruited from: Manhattan (n = 275; 
high involvement) , California (n = 167; medium involvement), or Hawaii (n = 127; low 
involvement). All participants completed the same questionnaires. Pezdek predicted that, for 
New York students who were more personally involved in the attack, their memories of the 
attack would be more accurate than would the memories of the Californian and Hawaiian 
students. Consistent with the predictions, the accuracy of event memories increased with the 
increase of personal involvement (Pezdek, 2003). Moreover, Pezdek found that participants 
in all three groups constructed false memories of the attack: 73% of the participants falsely 
recalled that they saw the videotape of the first plane striking the first tower on September 11, 
but in fact, it was not broadcast until September 12. This finding is consistent with prior 
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research (e.g., Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002), and suggests that 
even though emotion influences the vividness and the subjective experience of our memories, 
it may not necessarily guarantee their accuracy. 
The Effect of Emotional Arousal on Memory 
One feature of the events that typically lead to flashbulb memories is that they are all 
highly arousing in nature. Although these events also tend to be negatively charged, 
researchers have shown that the memory enhancements are primarily due to emotional 
arousal rather than to the valence of emotions elicited (Hamann, 2001; Mather, 2007; Mather 
& Sutherland, 2009; Phelps, 2006). The relation between emotional arousal and memory 
makes sense considering the adaptive significance of emotional arousal. From an 
evolutionary perspective, an emotionally-arousing event or stimulus is more likely to be 
related to personal survival and reproductive success than a non-emotionally-arousing event 
or stimulus. As such, memory enhancements for emotionally-arousing events or stimuli are 
highly adaptive (Hamann, 2001).  
What is the cognitive mechanism responsible for the memory enhancements that 
sometimes occur for emotionally-arousing information? Prior research has demonstrated that 
emotional arousal may initially influence encoding of to-be-remembered stimuli through the 
modulation of attention (e.g., Kensinger, 2004; Phelps, 2006). In other words, in a sea of 
sensory information, our attention is more likely to be focused on the emotionally-arousing 
information. This idea dates back to 1959 when Easterbrook originally proposed that 
information central to the source of emotional arousal would be encoded and processed while 
memories for the peripheral details would not because emotional arousal would restrict the 
focus of attention to the related stimuli (Easterbrook, 1959). 
The effect of emotional arousal on encoding has been widely known as “weapon-
focus” effect in the literature (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). Weapon-
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focus refers to the fact that witnesses tend to pay attention to a weapon (e.g., a gun or knife) 
at the expense of remembering other details around them (e.g., the perpetrator’s clothing or 
vehicle) during a crime. In one study, Loftus et al. (1987) asked half of their adult 
participants to watch a series of weapon slides where a man pulled a gun on the cashier and 
the cashier gave him some money, whereas the other half of the participants watched a series 
of control slides where a man gave the cashier a check and the cashier gave the man some 
money. Eye movement data were collected while participants watched the slides. Loftus 
found evidence for the weapon-focus effect; participants in the weapon group concentrated 
their looking on the gun significantly more do than participants in the control group 
concentrated their looking on the check. Participants in the weapon group also spent more 
time looking at the gun than participants in the control group spent looking at the check. In 
turn, participants in the weapon group were less likely to identify the perpetrator of the crime, 
and less likely to answer specific questions about the perpetrator accurately relative to 
participants in the control group. That is, memory enhancements for the emotionally-arousing 
information due to selective attention are often at the expense of memory for details of other 
important information that is part of the same event. 
What happens if attention is limited? Limited attention is often achieved in laboratory 
settings by asking participants to engage in two tasks at the same time. Compared to a control 
group who only completes one task, memory for the information in the first task is often 
found to be reduced as a result of the simultaneous presence of the second task (Naveh-
Benjamin & Guez, 2000). That is, memory is impaired by limited attention. What happens if 
the to-be-remembered information is emotionally charged? Kensinger and Corkin (2004) 
asked participants to remember words that were emotionally arousing or non-arousing (i.e., 
neutral), at the same time, they were also asked to complete a discrimination task. Kensinger 
and Corkin found that although memories for the neutral words were reliably reduced by the 
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second task, memories for the emotionally-arousing words were not. This finding indicated 
that emotionally-arousing information is less likely to be influenced by limited attention 
relative to non-emotionally-arousing information. 
In addition to the effect of emotional arousal on encoding, emotional arousal can also 
influence memory consolidation. “Consolidation is a storage process by which memories 
become more stable over time…” (Phelps, 2006, p. 34). Evidence across species has 
demonstrated that the effect of emotional arousal on memory consolidation mainly relies on 
interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus (McGaugh, 2000, 2004; McGaugh & 
Roozendaal, 2002). More specifically, emotional arousal causes the release of norepinephrine 
and activation of beta-adrenoceptors in the amygdala, which in turn influences hippocampal 
processing via the action of stress hormones. This process may finally result in the 
enhancement of memory consolidation for the emotionally-arousing information (McGaugh, 
2000, 2004; McGaugh & Roozendaal, 2002; Phelps, 2006). For instance, Dolcos, LaBar, and 
Cabeza (2004) asked adult participants to view emotionally-arousing and non-arousing 
pictures, and to rate each picture in terms of pleasantness using a 3-point scale. fMRI data 
were collected while participants viewed the pictures. Participants were not aware that their 
memory would be tested. Dolcos et al. found that among the pictures that had been 
remembered, the correlation between activation the amygdala and the hippocampus was 
greater for the aroused pictures than for the non-aroused ones. Further evidence for the 
importance of the interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus in the processing 
of emotionally-arousing information has also been collected in clinical research; patients with 
amygdala damage do not show the normal memory enhancements for emotionally-arousing 
information (e.g., Adolphs, Cahill, Schul, & Babinsky, 1997; Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, 
& McGaugh, 1995), and patients with amygdala damage fail to show memory enhancements 
for emotionally-arousing information over time (e.g., Labar & Phelps, 1998). 
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In sum, emotional arousal affects memory through encoding or consolidation 
processes. With regards to encoding processes, memory enhancements are mainly due to 
selective attention of the emotionally-arousing information. When attention is limited, 
memory enhancements are due to the preferential processing of emotionally-arousing 
information. With regards to consolidation processes, on the other hand, memory 
enhancements for emotionally-arousing information may result from the interaction between 
the amygdala and the hippocampus. One point that should be noted here, however, is that 
although we focus on the effect of emotional arousal on memory enhancements, when the 
level of emotional arousal is too high our memories may be damaged (Hamann, 2001).  
The Effect of Emotional Valence on Memory 
In addition to emotional arousal, empirical evidence has shown that emotional valence 
can also influence memory. The effect of emotional valence on memory is not to boost or 
impair memory performance in general, but to influence memories for the details of 
information (Adelman & Estes, 2013; Kensinger, 2004, 2009; Kensinger, Brierley, Medford, 
Growdon, & Corkin, 2002; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; LaBar & Phelps, 1998). For example, 
Kensinger and Corkin (2003) investigated adult participants’ recognition for negative and 
neutral words in two experiments. They found that negative words were better recognised 
than were neutral words. Moreover, the results from the source memory test showed that 
participants accurately reported more details (i.e., the color of the font that the words were 
presented in) about the negative words than about the neutral words.  
It is important to note, however, that the negative words differed from the neutral 
words in not only emotional valence but also emotional arousal. Therefore, it is impossible to 
determine whether the observed effect was due to valence and arousal or due to only valence 
per se. To tease apart the relative contributions of emotional valence and arousal, in their 
third experiment, Kensinger and Corkin (2003) controlled the arousal of the to-be-
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remembered words by using negative words that were different from the neutral words only 
in valence. The findings with these stimuli replicated the findings of the first two 
experiments: there was a higher recognition rate for negative words than for neutral words, 
and participants accurately remembered more details about the negative words than about the 
neutral words.  
Similar findings have also been reported in studies where memories for negative 
information are compared with those for positive information. These studies have shown that 
participants are more likely to remember the details of negative information, whereas they are 
more likely to know that the positive information was presented (e.g., Dewhurst & Parry, 
2000; Ochsner, 2000); participants remember more visual details about negative information 
(e.g., snake) than about neutral information (e.g., cake; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 
2007); and participants are better able to distinguish presented information from self-
imagined information if the information is negatively charged (e.g., Kensinger, O'Brien, 
Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007). Taken together, all of these studies indicate that 
negative valence promotes memories for the details of information compared to positive or 
neutral valence. 
Although there is consensus that individuals remember more details about negative 
information than about positive or neutral information, we have no idea when during the 
process of encoding or retrieval, emotional valence exerts its influence. Neuroimaging studies 
provide one way to explore this issue. For example, Mickley and Kensinger (2008) asked 20 
adult participants to study negative-high-arousal, positive-high-arousal, and neutral words. 
fMRI data were collected during the time when participants were studying these words. 
Approximately 30 min later, a surprise recognition test was conducted. Participants were 
asked to judge whether they could vividly remember a word, or know a word that had been 
presented but did not recall any details of its presentation, or believed that a word was new. 
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Mickley and Kensinger found that the encoding of negative words that were later 
remembered activated the temporo-occipital regions to a significantly greater extent than did 
the encoding of the positive and neutral words that were later remembered. In contrast, the 
encoding of positive words that were later known activated the cingulate gyrus, the prefrontal 
cortex, and the parietal lobe more than did the negative and neutral words that were later 
known. The temporo-occipital regions are known to be associated with sensory processing 
while the cingulate gyrus, the prefrontal cortex, and the parietal lobe are known to be 
associated with semantic retrieval and self-referential processing. The finding suggested that 
there may be a link between negative valence and sensory processing and a link between 
positive valence and conceptual processing at encoding. Moreover, emotional valence may 
exert at least some of its influence, if not all, on memory encoding. 
In addition to the encoding process, emotional valence may also play a role in the 
retrieval of memories. Researchers have long known that when there is a match between the 
encoding and the retrieval process, retrieval of information is facilitated (e.g., Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Given this, it is reasonable to predict that there 
may be an overlap in the effect of emotional valence on encoding and retrieval processes. 
That is to say, a link between negative valence and sensory processing and a link between 
positive valence and conceptual processing would also be revealed in the process of memory 
retrieval. This prediction has been supported by a few studies, which have shown that the 
retrieval of negative information activates more posterior sensory areas while the retrieval of 
positive information activates more frontal regions associated with conceptual processing 
(Addis, Leclerc, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010; Kensinger, 2009; Markowitsch, 




In sum, both behavioural and neuroimaging data reflect the effect of emotional 
valence on memory: negative valence promotes memory for sensory details while positive 
valence promotes conceptual and semantic memory; and emotional valence exerts its effect at 
memory encoding as well as memory retrieval.  
The Effect of Emotion on False Memory 
In light of the research outlined above, it is reasonable to assume that memories for 
highly emotional events should also be highly accurate. In contrast to this assumption, more 
and more research has shown that emotional memories may not necessarily be accurate. 
Considering the flashbulb memory literature, for example, although participants’ memories 
are associated with emotionality and high confidence, they also show a high rate of errors 
(e.g., Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Ost et al., 2002; Pezdek, 2003). What do we know about the 
relation between emotion and false memory? The DRM paradigm is an ideal method and has 
been extensively used to investigate the effect of emotion on false memory in the laboratory 
settings. There are three categories of research in this area.  
In the first category, researchers have tested participants using emotionally-laden 
word lists in the absence of mood induction (i.e., participants are in their natural mood) 
(Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & 
Reyna, 2008; Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010). The purpose 
of these studies is to examine the effect of the emotional content of the target material on 
false memories. For example, Brainerd, Stein, et al. (2008) initially analysed the emotional 
word lists used in prior research (e.g., Budson et al., 2006) for emotional arousal and valence, 
and found that these lists not only differed in valence but in arousal as well. To control the 
emotional arousal of word lists, they created a pool of 6 positive, 6 negative, and 6 neutral 
15-word lists varying in valence but not in arousal using Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber’s 
(2004) norms of word association and the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) 
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database. Adult participants were asked to learn 12 lists (4 lists of each valence), followed by 
a 5-min distraction task, and finally, to complete a conjoint-recognition test in which 
participants judged studied words, critical lures, and unrelated words on whether each word 
had been presented. Moreover, each word was accompanied by a verbatim question (i.e., 
“Was it presented earlier?”), a gist question (i.e., “Is it an unpresented item with the same 
meaning as presented items?”), or a verbatim-plus-gist question (i.e., “Is it either a presented 
item or an unpresented item with the same meaning as presented items?”) (Brainerd, Stein, et 
al., 2008, p. 920). Brainerd, Stein, et al. found that participants exhibited higher false 
recognition rates for critical lures associated with negative word lists than for those 
associated with positive or neutral word lists. Through conjoint-recognition analyses, 
Brainerd, Stein, et al. argued that the high false recognition rate for negative lists was because 
the negatively-charged lists generated high levels of meaning familiarity, and participants 
were less able to use item-specific true memories to inhibit false recognition of negative lists.  
Brainerd, Stein et al. (2008)’s findings were replicated and further extended in their 
developmental research where Brainerd et al. (2010) systematically varied emotional arousal 
(high vs low) and emotional valence (positive vs negative) of word lists for 7-year-olds, 11-
year-olds, and young adults. Each child learned a total of 12 lists (3 lists of each of the four 
arousal × valence combinations). There were four steps for children. For each step, children 
learned 3 word lists, followed by a 30s distractor task, and finally they completed a 
recognition test. In contrast, each young adult learned a total of 24 lists (6 lists of each of the 
four arousal × valence combinations) and there were 8 steps for them. The DRM procedure 
for each of the 8 steps was identical to that used for children. Negative lists yielded more 
false recognition than did positive lists, regardless of age. The typical age-related increase in 
false recognition was also found: young adults made more false recognition errors than did 
11-year-olds, who in turn made more false recognition errors than did 7-year-olds. More 
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importantly, Brainerd et al. (2010) found an interaction between valence and age, that is, the 
age-related increase in false memory was greater for negative lists than for positive lists. 
These findings suggested that emotional valence of to-be-remembered information may 
influence the typical age-related increase in false memories. 
In the second category of research investigating the effect of emotion on false 
memory, researchers have induced a particular mood in participants and then tested them 
using traditional, non-emotional, DRM word lists (Corson & Verrier, 2007; Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005). The purpose of these studies is to examine the effect of the emotional state of 
the rememberer on false memories. For example, Storbeck and Clore (2005) drew on the 
affect-as-information hypothesis which proposes that positive moods encourage relational 
processing while negative moods encourage item-specific processing. They predicted that 
relational processing of positive moods may promote gist retrieval, thus increasing false 
memory. In contrast,  item-specific processing of negative moods may reduce false memory. 
To test their hypothesis, Storbeck and Clore randomly allocated adult participants either to a 
positive-mood group or to a negative-mood group. Positive moods were induced by listening 
to Eine Kleine Nacht Musik by Mozart while negative moods were induced by listening to 
Adagietto by Mahler. Each piece of music was played for 8 min. When the music ended, 
participants learned a word list, followed by an immediate recall test. The study-recall 
procedure was repeated for all 36 lists. After the DRM task, participants were required to 
complete a questionnaire assessing the mood manipulation. Consistent with their prediction, 
Storbeck and Clore found that participants in a positive mood had a higher false recall rate for 
critical lures than did those in a negative mood. 
In the third category of research, researchers have manipulated both the emotional 
content of the word lists and participants’ mood (Bland et al., 2016; Knott & Thorley, 2014; 
Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009). In some cases, the participants’ mood is not manipulated by 
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experimenters but is naturally occurring (i.e., depression; Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann, 
Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009; Moritz, Gläscher, & Brassen, 2005). The third category of 
research is inspired by practical situations (i.e., in the courtroom or the clinic) where the to-
be-remembered information is usually emotionally charged and is often retrieved when the 
participant is in a certain mood. The purpose of these studies was to explore the impact of 
emotional content and emotional state on the generation of false memories. In one study, for 
example, Howe and Malone (2011) recruited 24 participants with clinical depression as an 
experimental group and 24 normal participants as a control group. Participants in both groups 
learned neutral, negative, positive, and depression-relevant lists. A recognition test was 
conducted after all the lists had been presented. Howe and Malone found that for participants 
with depression, negative and depressed word lists were better remembered than were neutral 
and positive lists. Furthermore, participants with depression tended to falsely recognise more 
depression-relevant lures than other non-depressed lures, showing a mood-congruent effect in 
false memories. 
Bower (1981) was the first to investigate the mood-congruent memory effect. In his 
seminal study, participants were induced in a happy or sad mood and were required to read a 
story about two fictional characters, Jack and Andre. Jack is an unhappy character who has a 
series of sad experiences (e.g., losing his girlfriend), whereas Andre is a happy character who 
has many positive experiences (e.g., winning at tennis). Participants reported as much of the 
story as they could remember, 24 hours later. Bower found that participants who were 
induced in a sad mood recalled more about sad Jack than about happy Andre, whereas 
participants who were induced in a happy mood recalled more about happy Andre than about 
sad Jack. This finding suggested that people tend to remember more information that is 
consistent with their mood than information that is inconsistent with their mood. The 
phenomenon is widely known as the mood-congruent memory effect.  
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Bower (1981) explained the mood-congruent memory effect using associative 
network theory. According to the theory, there is an associative network between mood and 
memory. In this network, a certain mood, such as sadness or happiness, is represented as a 
node in memory that collects many other aspects of the mood, such as the verbal labels. 
When the node is activated, all related aspects are activated in the associative network. Due 
to the associative activation process, people in a certain mood tend to retrieve the 
corresponding mood-related information, thus generating the mood-congruent memory effect 
(Bower, 1981). According to Bower’s theory, moods may act as a source of activation that 
combines with semantic activation in the associative network of mood and memory, finally 
resulting in more mood-congruent information than mood-incongruent information being 
retrieved at test. However, is only the encoded information activated and retrieved during the 
process? According to spreading activation theory, the answer is no; the activation of studied 
information may also spread to semantically-related but unpresented information (i.e., critical 
lures). In other words, if the unpresented information is mood-congruent and semantically-
related information, this kind of information is also very likely to be retrieved at test, 
resulting in a mood-congruent false memory effect. 
The mood-congruent false memory effect has captured the attention of researchers in 
recent years. In contrast to the body of work with clinical populations, in only a few studies 
have researchers examined the effect of mood on false memories of emotional word lists in 
non-depressed participants. For example, Ruci et al. (2009) induced normal adult participants 
in a happy or sad mood using a narrative, “The Lottery Ticket,” and then asked them to learn 
three negative, three positive, and three neutral word lists. Immediately after learning each 
list, participants had 1 min to recall the words that they remembered from the list. The 81-
word recognition test was finally conducted after the ninth study-recall cycle. Participants 
were also asked to make remember/know judgments for the words they judged as old. Ruci 
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and colleagues found that when the valence of the critical lures matched their mood, 
participants were more likely to falsely recall or recognise the critical lures, showing a robust 
mood-congruent false memory effect. Moreover, participants were more likely to believe that 
they could remember rather than just know these critical lures.  
In another study, Knott and Thorley (2014) wanted to explore whether mood-
congruent false memories, as false memories, would persist for a period of time. To answer 
this question, they randomly assigned adult participants to either a negative or a neutral mood 
condition. The negative mood was induced by the video clip of Dancer in the Dark, and the 
neutral mood was induced by a wildlife documentary. Each participant learned 6 neutral and 
6 negative lists, followed by the recognition test that was administered twice. The first 
recognition test took place immediately after learning 12 lists, while the delayed recognition 
test took place one week later. As in Ruci et al. (2009), participants were asked to make 
further remember/know judgments for the words they judged as old. Consistent with the 
finding of Ruci et al. (2009), the mood-congruent false memory effect was found for 
remember judgments in the immediate recognition test. In addition, this effect was also found 
when the test occurred one week later, which indicated that mood-congruent false memories, 
like false memories, can persist over time. 
It should be noted that both in Ruci et al.’s (2009) and Knott and Thorley’s (2014) 
studies, moods were categorised as positive, negative, and neutral from a dimensional 
perspective. Bland et al. (2016) wanted to see whether there would be a discrete mood-
congruent false memory effect when moods were categorised into fear and anger. To this 
end, adult participants were randomly assigned to either the fear group or the anger group. 
Fear and anger were induced by film clips. Participants learned two 10-word lists that were 
related to fear and two 10-word lists that were related to anger. Following this, the neutral 
video clip was presented to both mood groups to recover participants’ moods so that the 
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moods differed only at encoding, but not at retrieval. Finally, participants completed the 
old/new recognition test, followed by remember/know/guess judgments. The mood-congruent 
false memory effect was observed for discrete emotions; participants in the fear group had a 
higher false remember rate for fear lists than for anger lists, whereas participants in the anger 
group had a higher false remember rate for anger lists than for fear lists. In summary, 
although a few studies have shown that false memories tend to be higher when the valence of 
to-be-remembered word lists matches the participant’s mood state in the DRM paradigm, this 
branch of research is still in its infancy.  
The overarching goal of my PhD is to further investigate the effect of emotional 
content and emotional state on spontaneous DRM false memory in both children and adults, 
and to explore the methods that might be used to reduce emotional false memories in 
laboratory settings. To these ends, In Experiment 1 (Chapter 4), I set up the normed 
emotional DRM word lists in which all the list words and the corresponding critical lure 
share the same emotional valence, with controlling BAS and emotional arousal. I then 
compared the magnitude of false memory produced by these normed emotional DRM word 
lists with that produced by the word lists used in previous studies in Experiment 2, and 
further explored the effect of emotional content (i.e., normed emotional DRM word lists) on 
false recall in Experiment 3(Chapter 5). In Experiment 4 (Chapter 6), I used mood induction 
procedures to elicit a particular mood and asked young adults to learn the normed emotional 
DRM word lists to assess the effect of emotional content and emotional state on false 
memory. In Experiment 5 (Chapter 7), I tested different theoretical predictions regarding the 
effect of participants’ mood on the age-related increase in DRM false memories for 
emotional word lists. In the last two experiments, I assessed whether warnings about the false 
memory phenomenon would reduce adults’ emotional false memories (Chapter 8), and 
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Emotional DRM Word Lists 
As described earlier, the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995) is the most widely-used procedure to investigate false memories in the laboratory. In 
this paradigm, participants learn a number of DRM word lists in which all the studied words 
(e.g., bed, rest, pillow) are semantically associated with a critical lure (e.g., sleep) that is not 
presented as part of the list. On subsequent testing, participants often falsely recall and 
recognise critical lures as frequently as they do studied words. Moreover, when participants 
are asked to make remember/know judgments about those words that they believe they have 
remembered in the study phase, they tend to make more “remember” than “know” judgments 
for the critical lures (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).   
In the studies where false memories were first found to be produced by the word lists 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), the creation of the word lists were originally 
based on Russell and Jenkins’s (1954) word association norms. In one study, for example, 
Stadler et al. (1999) summarised and analysed 36 15-word lists constructed from the Russell 
and Jenkins norms. They found that there was a considerable difference between the word 
lists in terms of generating false memories. For example, the false recall rate for the list 
where king was the critical lure was only .10, but for the list where window was the critical 
lure, the false recall rate was .65. The Russell and Jenkins’s (1954) word association norms 
were subsequently modified by Nelson et al. (2004), and the Nelson et al. (2004) word 
association norms are now commonly used in research (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2010; Budson et 






Critical Lures of the 19 Word Lists From Gallo and Roediger (2001) 
Beautiful Citizen Lamp Trouble 
Bitter Command Long Whiskey 
Butterfly Cottage Mutton Whistle 
Cabbage Health Stove Wish 
Carpet Justice Swift  
 
Although it is easy to directly compile DRM word lists based on Nelson et al.’s 
(2004) word association norms, most of the time, the normed data were not sufficient; 
researchers have had to collect their own norms for some missing words by drawing on the 
procedures outlined by Nelson et al. For example, Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) explored 
the seven factors that influence the magnitude of DRM false memories. To do it, they 
investigated 55 15-word lists, 36 of which were from Stadler et al. (1999) constructed from 
the Russell and Jenkins norms and 19 of which were from an unpublished study (see Table 
4.1; Gallo & Roediger, 2001, cited in Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). The seven influential 
factors that were identified by Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) included word length, 
frequency, and concreteness of each critical lure, and Forward Associative Strength (FAS), 
Backward Associative Strength (BAS), connectivity, and the true recall rate of each list. 
Similarly to many researchers, Roediger, Watson, et al. took advantage of the word 
association norms of Nelson et al. and prior research (Gallo & Roediger, 2001; Stadler, et al., 
1999) to obtain data on the relative contribution of each of seven factors. For some lists, 
however, the BAS data were missing. For these lists, Roediger and colleagues collected their 
own norms. To do this, 75 adult participants were initially asked to write down the first word 
that came to mind when seeing a given word (i.e., a critical lure). Then, the probability that 
each reported word elicited the corresponding critical lure was calculated. Finally, Roediger 
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and colleagues obtained the mean BAS score for each list by averaging the probability of 
each word that was reported that elicited the critical lure. 
In addition to the mean BAS score, Roediger, Watson et al. (2001) also obtained data 
on connectivity ─the associative strength among list words─ for each list. There were two 
steps to calculate connectivity. First, a 15 × 15 matrix of list words for each list was 
constructed, giving 225 pairs of list words, excluding the 15 self-connections. Second, 
participants were asked to assess the possibility that they could think of the other word in a 
pair when seeing the first word in the same pair (the possibility is ranged from 0 to 1). For 
simplicity, any nonzero possibility was scored as 1 (e.g., if the possibility is 0.3, 0.4…). A 
higher connectivity score for a list reflects stronger associative strength among the 
corresponding list words.  
Using these procedures, Roediger and colleagues found that the seven factors 
accounted for approximately 68% of the variance in false recall. BAS was the strongest 
predictor compared to the other factors and was positively correlated with false recall. This 
finding indicates the importance of taking BAS into consideration is false-memory research 
using the DRM paradigm. 
Emotional DRM Word Lists 
The work by Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) not only underscored the importance of 
BAS in the generation of false memories, but it also provided the standard procedures that are 
necessary to obtain BAS and connectivity. In fact, these procedures have been widely used in 
research on emotional false memories where emotional DRM word lists are compiled. 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the emotional word lists (except neutral lists) that 
have been created thus far in the literature. There are generally two categories of emotional 
word lists. One is based on the dimensional perspective of emotion, which divides emotional 
word lists in terms of valence, such as a negative or positive list. The other category is based 
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on the discrete perspective of emotion, which divides emotional word lists in terms of 
discrete emotion, such as an anger or sad list. Compare to the second category, the first one 
has been extensively investigated in the literature so far, but in these studies, valence has 
often been confounded with arousal in the most of studies (Budson et al., 2006; Howe & 
Malone, 2011; Palmer & Dodson, 2009; Ruci et al., 2009), and only in a very limited number 
of studies has arousal been systematically controlled (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2010; for a review, 
see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016). 
Table 4.2. 
Emotional Word Lists (Except Neutral Lists) that Have Been Used in the Literature 
 
Budson et al. (2006) 
 
 
Alone Anger Cry Danger Hell 
Negative Single Mad Tears Fear Devil 
 
Isolated Rage Sad Caution Satan 
 
Solitary Annoyed Tissue Trouble Evil 
 
Apart Furious Sorrow Warning Damned 
 
Separate Bothered Eyes Risk Sin 
 
Quite Wrath Weep Hazard Demon 
 
Detached Hate Sob Alarm Heaven 
 
Self Mood Unhappy Help Judgment 
 
 
Hungry Lie Rape Sick Thief 
 
Food Fib Sex Cough Steal 
 
Starve Cheat Man Fever Robber 
 
Famine Truth Violate Ill Crook 
 
Empty False Blame Flu Burglar 
 
Stomach Mislead Struggle Vomit Money 
 
Poor Trick Date Doctor Cop 
 
Eat Fake Force Health Purse 
 
Pangs Betray Shame Dizzy Mugger 
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Palmer & Dodson (2009) 
Negative Kill Pain Sad 
  
 
Assassinate Suffer Depressed 
  
 
Slay Hurt Melancholy 
  
 
Slaughter Ouch Cheerless 
  
 
Murder Anguish Somber 
  
 
Execute Pleasure Miserable 
  
 
Massacre Harm Lonely 
  
 
Stab Distress Upset 
  
 
Behead Back Gloomy 
  
 
Homicide Death Hopeless 
  
 




Beautiful Happy Love 
  
 
Gorgeous Glad Adore 
  
 
Stunning Elated Affection 
  
 
Picturesqure Content Passion 
  
 
Breathtaking Joyful Heart 
  
 
Pretty Pleased Kiss 
  
 
Lovely Ecstatic Like 
  
 
Exquisite Laugh Attraction 
  
 
Striking Enjoyment Care 
  
 
Attractive Satisfied Devoted 
  
 
Elegant Enjoyable Admire 
  
 
Howe & Malone (2011) 
     
Negative Mislead Hell Thief 
  
 
Lie Devil Steal 
  
 
Error Satan Robber 
  
 
Trick Evil Crook 
  
 
Deceive Damned Burglar 
  
 
Follow Sin Money 
  
 
Mistake Lucifer Cop 
  
 





Wrong Heaven Rob 
  
 
Annoy Soul Jail 
  
 




Admire Excel Gentle 
  
 
Like Good Giant 
  
 
Respect Brilliant Soft 
  
 
Envy Achieve Kind 
  
 
Beauty Best Caring 
  
 
Her Exceed Lamb 
  
 
Idol Win Man 
  
 
Love Better Ben 
  
 
Them Correct Mild 
  
 
Admiral Elite Quite 
  
 




Depression Failure Alone 
  
 
Sad Success Single 
  
 
Anxiety Exam Isolated 
  
 
Sadness Pass Abandoned 
  
 
Anger Loss Solitary 
  
 
Down Break Apart 
  
 
Low Crisis Lonesome 
  
 
Blackness Degree Separate 
  
 
Boredom Fail Quiet 
  
 
Disaster Fault Detached 
  
 
End Flop Solo 
  
      
Dewhurst, Anderson, & Knott (2012) 
 
 
Sick Lie Anger Fear Evil 
Negative Ill Fib Rage Terror Wicked 
 
Flue Deceive Hostility Doubt Devil 
 
Nausea Untrue Fury Panic Villain 
 




Hospital Truth Temper Anxiety Satan 
 
Fever Rumour Tantrum Afraid Witch 
 
Disease Deception Violent Scared Corrupt 
 
Healthy Dishonest Fight Monster Sin 
 
Vomit Betray Annoy Horror Taboo 
 
Germ Deny Argument Coward Cruel 
 
Well Cheat Irritate Scream Good 
 
Cough FALSE Conflict Hide Hell 
 
 
Cry Pain Hate Alone Danger 
 
Weep Agony Despise Isolated Hazard 
 
Sob Hurt Dislike Solo Risk 
 
Tears Discomfort Love Secluded Beware 
 
Emotional Headache Revenge Lonely Caution 
 
Upset Pleasure Prejudice Single Warning 
 
Sorrow Sore Enemy Private Safe 
 
Sensitive Relief Disgust Individual Harm 
 
Grief Dentist War Withdrawn Help 
 
Sad Sharp Kill Bored Threat 
 
Misery Soothe Insult Empty Trouble 
 
Laugh Cut Condemn Together Jeopardy 
 
Tissue Cramp Shun Without Deadly 
 
Brainerd et al. (2010) 
 
 
Anger Cold Dead Hurt 
 
Negative/High arousal Mad Hot Alive Pain 
 
 
Fear Snow Gone Cut 
 
 
Hate Warm Cold Ouch 
 
 
Rage Winter Funeral Cry 
 
 
Temper Ice Asleep Injury 
 
 
Fury Wet Bury Life 
 
 
Ire Frigid End Sick 
 
 
Wrath Chilly Grave Fall 
 
 





Fight Weather Still Hit 
 
 
Hatred Freeze Animal Sore 
 
 
Hostile Air Cemetery Stop 
 
 
Calm Shiver Deceased Wound 
 
 
Emotion Arctic Die Upset 
 
 




Needle Rough Spider Thief 
 
 
Thread Smooth Web Steal 
 
 
Pin Bump Insect Robber 
 
 
Eye Road bug Crook 
 
 
Sewing Tough Fright Burglar 
 
 
Sharp Sandpaper Fly Money 
 
 
Point Jagged Arachnid Cop 
 
 
Prick Ready Crawl Police 
 
 
Thimble Coarse Tarantula Rob 
 
 
Haystack Uneven Poison Jail 
 
 
Thorn Riders Bite Gun 
 
 
Harm Rugged Creepy Villain 
 
 
Injection Sand Black window Crime 
 
 
Syringe Beard Monkey Bank 
 
 
Cloth Ground Feelers Bandit 
 
 




Sick Fat Shy Dirt 
 
 
Ill Skinny Quiet Mud 
 
 
Well Thin Outgoing Sand 
 
 
Cold Cat Timid Clean 
 
 
Hospital Ugly Bashful Soil 
 
 
Vomit Lady Scared Dirty 
 
 
Doctor Big Bold Filth 
 
 
Bed Cow Person Ground 
 
 
Flu Slim Introvert Bath 
 
 





Fever Slob Me Grime 
 
 
Nurse Boy Loud Bike 
 
 
Medicine Man Afraid Brown 
 
 
Nausea Pig Boring Grease 
 
 
Virus Diet Coy Mess 
 
 




Board Trash Glass Fall 
 
 
Wood Garbage Window Spring 
 
 
Chalk Waste Cup Leaves 
 
 
Surf Can Drink Winter 
 
 
Room Refuse Break Down 
 
 
Game Sewage Clear Autumn 
 
 
Nail Bag Jar Hurt 
 
 
Plane Junk Crystal Frosty 
 
 
School Rubbish Mug Summer 
 
 
Ship Sweep Bottle Catch 
 
 
Walk Scraps Fragile Cool 
 
 
Two-by-four Pile Plastic Trip 
 
 
Black Dump Sharp Drop 
 
 
Boat Landfill Eye Rise 
 
 
Build Debris House Stand 
 
 




God Baby Love Music 
 
 
Jesus Child Hate Note 
 
 
Heaven Cry Kiss Sound 
 
 
Love Small Like Piano 
 
 
Almighty Bottle Happy Sing 
 
 
Church Cute Heart Radio 
 
 
Lord Infant Care Bandit 
 
 
Religion Mother Admire Melody 
 
 
Creator Crib Adore Horn 
 
 





Bible Little Friendship Instrument 
 
 
Damn Boy Girl Symphony 
 
 
Devil Adult Happiness Jazz 
 
 
Faith Diaper Hug Orchestra 
 
 
Good Girl Kindness Art 
 
 




City Beach Hug Pretty 
 
 
Town Sand Kiss Ugly 
 
 
Crowded Sun Love Girl 
 
 
State Ocean Squeeze Beautiful 
 
 
Capital Water Embrace Cute 
 
 
Streets Towel Affection Adorable 
 
 
Subway Ball Hold Attractive 
 
 
Country Summer Cuddle Flower 
 
 
New York Girls Arms Gorgeous 
 
 
Village Swim Bear Hot 
 
 
Metropolis Fun Caress Model 
 
 
Big Wave Tight Pink 
 
 
Chicago Blanket Touch Appealing 
 
 
Suburb Bump Warmth Sweet 
 
 
County Coast Clinch Charming 
 
 




Soft Green Nice Sleep 
 
 
Hard Grass Mean Bed 
 
 
Light Yellow Sweet Rest 
 
 
Pillow Blue Good Awake 
 
 
Plush Color Bad Tired 
 
 
Load Red Kindness Dream 
 
 
Cotton Leaf Pleasant Wake 
 
 
Fury Arrow People Snooze 
 
 
Touch Clover Friendly Blanket 
 
 





Warm Vegetables Happy Slumber 
 
 
Furry Apple Friend Snore 
 
 
Downy Bean Pretty Nap 
 
 
Kitten Elf Nasty Peace 
 
 
Skin Go Delightful Yawn 
 
 




Bird Grass Fish River 
 
 
Nest Green Water Water 
 
 
Parrot Curt Swim Stream 
 
 
Eagle Lawn Sea Lake 
 
 
Feather Mow Scales Mississippi 
 
 
Animal Hopper Smell Boat 
 
 
Wings Pot Cod Tide 
 
 
Canary Mower Food Canoe 
 
 
Cage Weed Trout Flower 
 
 
Sing Grow Gold Run 
 
 
Dog High Ocean Barge 
 
 
Flight Roots Fry Creek 
 
 
Song Smoke Shark Brook 
 
 
Blue Jay Turf Tank Bend 
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Neutral lists are normally chosen from the typical DRM word lists described 
previously. Researchers often take advantage of the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW, Bradley & Lang, 1999) to find emotional valence and arousal data for each word or 
obtain their own data by asking participants to assess the valence and arousal of each word 
using Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM). The SAM contains 
graphic scales representing different emotional dimensions on a 9-point scale: the valence 
SAM ranges from a happy, smiling figure (1) to an unhappy, frowning figure (9), similarly, 
the arousal SAM ranges from an excited, wide-eyed figure (1) to a relaxed, calm figure (9) 





Figure 4.1. Modified versions of valence (top) and arousal (bottom) Self-Assessment 
Manikins (SAM) used in Experiment 1 of the present thesis, which were edited based on 
Bradley and Lang’s (1999) original graphic scales. 
There are two common issues with the emotional word lists that have been used in 
prior research. First, not every word on a particular list reflected the target emotion. For 
example, the negative-emotional word lists used by Knott and Thorley (2014) were taken 
from Dewhurst et al. (2012) where the word “truth” is an associate of the critical lure “lie,” 
“together” is an associate of the critical lure “alone,” and “tissue” is an associate of the 
critical lure “cry.” These list words (truth, together, and tissue) do not have a negative 
emotional valence. Second, although data from databases, such as the ANEW or from Nelson 
et al.’s (2004) word association norms, have contributed to the construction of word lists in 
many significant studies, not every word that has been used on word lists in DRM research 
can be found in the existing database and previous researchers have not collected their own 
data for the missing words on the lists (Budson et al., 2006; Howe & Malone, 2011). Where 
researchers have collected their own data for the word lists that they constructed (Palmer & 
Dodson, 2009), they usually only collected data to establish BAS values without also 
collecting data to determine the arousal and valence of the words on the lists. Given that both 
valence and arousal could influence false memories (Corson & Verrier, 2007; Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2004), to examine the effect of valence per se (i.e., happy or sad), it is important to 
hold arousal constant. 
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Taken together, in no single study have the list words shared the same emotional 
valence as the corresponding critical lure, and in no single study have both arousal and BAS 
been equated across the different emotionally-laden list words and critical lures. Given this, 
the goal of Experiment 1 in the present thesis was to construct emotional word lists that did 
not differ in level of arousal and BAS values while at the same time every word on a 

























Sixty 18- to 35-year-old undergraduate university students (30 female) from a 
moderate-sized city in New Zealand participated in the experiment. Each participant was paid 
$25 for participating. All of the participants were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and had no history of mood disorders.  
Materials  
Five positive and 7 negative critical lures that had been used in previous research 
(Brainerd et al., 2010; Budson et al., 2006; Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann et al., 2009; 
Ruci et al., 2009; Thijssen, Otgaar, Howe, & de Ruiter, 2013) and 7 neutral critical lures from 
Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001) were selected for this experiment. Any critical lures for 
which there had been any previous confusion about emotional valence were excluded. For 
example, in some studies, “sweet” and “needle” have been regarded as positive and negative 
critical lures, respectively; however in other studies, both of these critical lures have been 
regarded as neutral. Next, list words to accompany these critical lures were selected. Words 
that were part of multiple lists or words that were different in valence from the corresponding 
critical lure were avoided (e.g., “happiness” and “emotion” in the “anger” list). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to 10. They were told that they would be 
shown a series of target words, and for each word, they would be required to write down the 
first word that came to mind. If they could not think of a response, they were told to write “0” 
in the space. The basic procedure to obtain the main BAS value for each word list was 
modelled after Nelson et al. (2004) and Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001).  
MediaLab (Jarvis, 2012) was used to present participants with a total of 233 words, 
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one after the other, in a random order. After participants had typed their response to each 
target word, they were asked to assess the emotional valence and arousal of the word using 
adapted versions of Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM). The 
procedure to obtain emotional valence and arousal values for each word was modelled after 
Bradley and Lang (1999). 
          Data analysis. MediaLab recorded participants’ responses to each word. Spelling 
errors were corrected and then rules were constructed to pool items that could be put together 
using the same approach as Nelson et al. (2004). For example, fib produced lie as the 
dominant response, however, several participants also reported lies. These two responses 
were treated the same so the count for lies was pooled with the count for lie. In general, 
pooling was used very infrequently (76 times out of 7270 responses). 
For each word, a mean score for BAS, valence, and arousal was calculated. The list 
words’ mean BAS score was then averaged to get the mean BAS value for each list. 
Considering the importance of BAS values in false memory research, word lists were then 
chosen based primarily on their BAS values. As such, the 4 negative, positive, and neutral 
word lists that had the highest overall BAS values were selected and the list words were 
sorted in descending order of their BAS values (i.e., highest BAS to lowest BAS). For each 
list, the top 10 list words according to their BAS value were chosen (see Appendix B).  
Based on the selected list words, an independent group of 30 young adults (18 female; 
M age = 19.97 years, SD = 1.07) was recruited to further estimate a connectivity value for 
each list. There were 1080 pairs of studied words, excluding 120 self-connections. Each 
participant was asked to type a number from 0 to 1 to indicate how likely he or she thought of 
a target word after seeing the cue word. High connectivity scores indicate greater associative 




Results and Discussion 
Recall that the goal was to create lists in which the emotional valence varied across 
the three list types (positive, negative, neutral), but arousal and BAS did not. To examine 
whether the lists met this criteria, three separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted where 
type of word lists was the independent variable (positive, negative, neutral) and the scores for 
BAS, emotional valence, and arousal were the dependent variables. Emotional valence and 
arousal were indexed by 9-point scales. Lower scores referred to more positive valence 
(happiness) and higher arousal (excitement). Emotional valence and arousal were assessed 
using 9-point scale, As shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, there was no significant difference in 
BAS or arousal values as a function of type of word lists, F(2, 9) = .84, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16, 
power = .15, and F(2, 9) = 2.24, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .33, power = .34, respectively. In contrast, 
there was a significant difference in valence, F(2, 9) = 127.05, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝 
2 = .97. Post hoc 
tests (LSD) revealed that the negative word lists had significantly higher emotional valence 
values than did the neutral word lists and the neutral word lists had a significantly higher 
emotional valence than did the positive word lists (see Figure 4.4). 
 


















Figure 4.3. The mean emotional arousal scores (+/-1SE) as a function of type of word lists. 
 
Figure 4.4. The mean emotional valence scores (+/-1SE) as a function of type of word lists. 
The emotional arousal and valence of the critical lures were also compared as a 
function of word list; there was no significant difference in arousal values between the three 
types of critical lures, F(2, 9) = 3.55, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2= .44, power = .51, however, there was a 
significant difference in valence values, F(2, 9) = 40.35, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .90. Post hoc tests 
(LSD) revealed that the negative critical lures had significantly higher emotional valence 
values (M = 6.20, SD = .22) than did the neutral critical lures (M = 4.26, SD = .22), and the 
neutral critical lures had significantly higher emotional valence than did the positive critical 
lures (M = 3.46, SD = .22). 








































of emotional word list, F(2, 11) = 2.19, p = .168. The connectivity mean scores (and SD) of 
the negative, positive, and neutral word lists were .66 (.03), .59 (.04), and .60 (.07), 
respectively. 
Taken together, the results indicate that the new word lists satisfied the criteria; that is, 
every word on the lists had the assigned emotional content (positive, negative, neutral), and 
the lists were matched in terms of arousal, BAS, and connectivity. This set of standard word 
lists provided an opportunity to better explore emotional false memories in the studies to 
follow. In the next Chapter, I initially compared the false memory generated by these “pure” 
emotional lists and that generated by previous ones (Experiment 2), and then investigated the 

















False Memories for the Emotional DRM Word Lists 
In many real-life situations when people are required to report their memories (e.g., in 
the courtroom or the clinic), the to-be remembered information is usually emotionally 
charged (i.e., negative). Given this, it is important to understand how the emotional content of 
information influences the generation of false memories. Although a few researchers have 
used emotional pictures as experimental materials (e.g., Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017), the 
most common method in this area of research has been to use emotional word lists in the 
DRM paradigm.  
Table 5.1 summarises the representative studies using the emotional DRM word lists. 
Budson and colleagues (2006) originally modified some of the typical DRM word lists, 
which are neutral, by adding several negative list words and negative critical lures into the 
lists (e.g., mad, rage, annoyed, furious, and hate were the list words associated with the 
critical lure anger). They compared the false recognition rate generated by the negative lists 
with that generated by the neutral lists in younger adults, older adults, and patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease. Considering the younger adults, in particular, there was an increase in 
true recognition for the negative lists relative to the neutral lists. False recognition, on the 
other hand, did not differ as a function of list valence. It should be noted, however, the 
negative lists used by Budson et al. (2006) were more arousing than were the neutral lists. 
That is, the negative lists were different from the neutral lists in not only valence, but also 
arousal. In addition, the sample size in the study was small (only 19-20 per group), which 
may result in a smaller effect size compared to other relevant studies (for review, see 
Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016). 
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Table 5.1.  
Studies Regarding the Effect of Emotional DRM Word Lists on False Memories 
Author(s) Valence comparisons Arousal Memory test Main results (false memories) 
 







Palmer & Dodson (2009) 
 
 
















Brainerd et al. (2010) 
 




Negative vs neutral  
 
 
Negative vs positive vs neutral 
 
 










































































Negative ≈ neutral lists 
 
 
Recall: negative < neutral lists 
Recognition: negative > neutral 
 
 
Negative ≈ positive < neutral lists 
 
 
Recall: negative ≈ neutral lists 
Recognition: negative > neutral 
 
 
Recall: negative < neutral lists 
Recognition: negative > neutral 
 
 
Negative > neutral > positive 
 
 
Recall: negative ≈ positive > neutral 
Recognition (remember): 
negative > positive > neutral 
 
 
Negative > neutral > positive 
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Howe and colleagues explored the same research question with larger samples of 
children and adults, respectively (Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010). In both studies, 
recall and recognition tests were conducted and recall always preceded recognition. The 
emotional arousal of lists was not controlled. Although Howe and colleagues observed a 
significant difference in false memories for emotional versus neutral lists, the difference 
varied as function of the type of memory test. That is, false recall rates were lower for the 
negative lists than for the neutral lists. In contrast, false recognition rates were higher for the 
negative lists than for the neutral lists. 
The false recall results reported by Howe and his colleagues were not replicated in 
Sharkawy et al. (2008), although a similar experimental procedure was used. Sharkawy et al. 
found that there was no reliable difference in false recall for emotional versus neutral lists. 
Consistent with Howe, Candel et al. (2010), however, Sharkawy et al. found that false 
recognition was higher for the negative lists than for the neutral lists. But like many prior 
studies, the emotional arousal of lists was not controlled.  
What would happen if arousal was controlled across emotional word lists? Dehon et 
al. (2010) controlled arousal levels across the negative, neutral, and positive word lists and 
found a similar pattern of results for false recognition as previous studies; the false 
recognition rate for the negative lists was higher than that for the positive lists, which in turn 
was higher than the false recognition rate for neutral lists. However, the findings regarding 
false recall were totally different from those in previous studies (Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, 
et al., 2010; Sharkawy et al., 2008); false recall rates for the negative and positive lists were 
higher than (rather than lower than or similar to) the false recall rate for the neutral lists. 
Summing up, the studies reviewed thus far have shown that the effect of emotional 
word lists on false recognition is consistent and replicable, but the findings regarding the 
valence effect on false recall are mixed. The mixed findings may be due to the confounding 
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effects of valence and arousal rather than valence per se. It is very likely that false recall may 
be more sensitive to the impact of arousal, compared to false recognition. In addition, as 
noted earlier, one common issue in these studies is that the order of recall and recognition 
tests was not counterbalanced. Research has shown that recognition is influenced by prior 
recall tests. In this sense, although the finding of false recognition is consistent, we cannot 
guarantee the consistent finding is reliable in the absence of prior recall testing. In another 
two studies where arousal of emotional word lists was either controlled or factorially 
manipulated, Brainerd and colleagues reported similar, but more reliable findings, regarding 
false recognition (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008). In their studies only 
recognition tests were used. Under these conditions, the negative lists again yielded more 
false recognition than did the neutral and positive lists. 
Although a few studies have addressed the issue of controlling arousal of emotional 
word lists, in no single study have all of the list words shared the same emotional valence as 
the corresponding critical lure. It is possible that when all the list words are semantically 
related to each other, and share the same valence (i.e., “pure” emotional lists), the links 
among the list words would be much closer in mental lexicon (as suggested by the associative 
theories, such as Associative-Activation Theory; AAT) or gist retrieval for the list words 
would be better than that for “hybrid” emotional lists (as suggested by Fuzzy-trace theory; 
FTT, a review, see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016). Moreover, FTT argues that “verbatim and 
gist retrieval both support true memory for experienced items, either because the 
corresponding experiences are specifically recollected (verbatim retrieval) or because items’ 
meanings are familiar” (p.166, Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Therefore, according to both 
theories, true memories for the “pure” emotional lists should be greater than those for the 
“hybrid” emotional lists. As for false memories, the story is a bit different between AAT and 
FTT. According to AAT, “pure” emotional lists should produce more false memories than 
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did “hybrid” emotional lists because better retrieval of list words in “pure” lists than in 
“hybrid” lists may lead to greater associative activations of emotionally- and semantically-
related critical lures. Alternatively, according to FTT, better gist memories would directly 
lead to more false memories for pure lists compared to hybrid lists. However, according to 
FTT, it is also possible that better true memories of list words may serve as a cue to suppress 
false memories of critical lures, thus false memories for “pure” lists might be lower rather 
than higher than those for “hybrid” lists. 
In Experiment 2, I wanted to test these theoretical predictions by comparing the false 
recognition rate generated by “pure” emotional lists to that generated by “hybrid” emotional 
lists. Moreover, I wanted to see whether the prior finding of false recognition could also be 
replicated when using the “pure” emotional lists. In Experiment 3, I wanted to extend the 
prior studies (e.g., Dehon et al., 2010; Palmer & Dodson, 2009) to see if false recall would be 


















Sixty 17- to 23-year-old undergraduate university students (30 female) were recruited 
from an Experimental Participation Pool. They had not participated in relevant studies before. 
All of the participants were native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and had no history of mood disorders. 
Design 
A 2 (Word lists: hybrid vs pure) × 2 (List valence: negative vs positive) × 3 (Word 
type: studied words, critical lures, and unrelated words) mixed design was conducted. The 
first factor was manipulated between subjects while the other two were manipulated within 
subjects. The dependent variables were true recognition rates of studied words and false 
recognition rates of critical lures and unrelated words, respectively. 
Materials and Procedure 
Hybrid emotional lists were chosen from the Cornell/Cortland Emotional Lists (CEL; 
Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008), which is a pool of 32 emotional word lists 
with high or low valence and arousal levels. To rule out the influence of backward 
association strength (BAS) and other extraneous variables (e.g., arousal), I selected the “love” 
list which was positive valence/high arousal and the “nice” list which was positive 
valence/low arousal in CEL. Likewise, the “anger” and “sick” list were selected as a negative 
valence/high arousal list and a negative valence/low arousal list, respectively. Furthermore, I 
used the first 10 words in these lists to make the list length of the hybrid emotional lists the 
same as that of our pure emotional lists.  
Given that the goal of Experiment 2 was to compare the level of false memories 
created by the hybrid emotional lists with those created by the pure emotional lists, I held the 
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critical lures of the two word-list types constant. Therefore, the two positive lists, “love” and 
“nice”, and the two negative lists, “anger” and “sick,” which share the same critical lures to 
the hybrid lists selected from the CEL, were chosen from the emotional word lists 
constructed in Experiment 1 (see Appendix B for more details of the word lists used in the 
present experiment). 
In the both hybrid and pure emotional lists, all of the words were shown in the 
descending order of their BAS values. That is, the first word in each list was the one most 
associated with the critical lure, the second word was the one next most associated, and as on. 
The presentation order of word lists was counterbalanced across participants, with half of the 
participants learning 2 negative word lists, followed by 2 positive word lists, and the other 
half of the participants learning the word lists in the reverse order. 
Participants were tested in groups of up to 8. Each word was presented for 2 s on a 
computer monitor. After all of the words in the word list were presented, a message came up 
warning the participant that the next word list was about to appear. Between the study and 
test phase, participants completed a 5-min subtraction exercise. The recognition test 
contained 40 words in total, including 20 studied words--from serial positions 1, 2, 4, 8, and 9 
of each word list; and 4 critical lures, and 16 unrelated words—the 8 positive and 8 negative 
unrelated words were taken from Brainerd et al. (2010). The order of presentation of these 40 
test words was completely random. Participants were asked to make “old/new” judgments by 
pressing “1” if they thought that the word had been presented in the study phase or pressing 







Results and Discussion 
The data for each dependent variable was first subjected to separate 2 (word list: 
hybrid vs pure) × 2 (list valence: negative vs positive) mixed factor analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). Pairwise comparisons were then conducted to see whether negative lists would 
create more true and false memories than would positive lists, and to see whether pure 
emotional word lists would induce greater true and false memories than would hybrid 
emotional word lists. 
True recognition of studied words 
The proportion of times that participants recognised a studied word is shown in Figure 
5.1 as a function of word list and list valence. There was a main effect of list valence, F(1, 
58) = 31.19, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .35, true memories were higher for the negative word lists (M 
= .77) than for the positive word lists (M = .64). Likewise, there was a main effect of word 
list, F(1, 58) = 48.50, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .46, the true recognition rate for the pure emotional 
word lists (M = .82) was higher than that for the hybrid emotional word lists (M = .59). The 
main effects of list valence and word list was qualified by a List Valence × Word List 
interaction, F(1, 58) = 19.71, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .25.  Pairwise comparisons showed that when all 
of the words on the list shared the same emotional valence (i.e., pure emotional lists), there 
was no valence effect on true recognition; the true recognition rate for the negative lists was 
similar to that for the positive lists. However, the true recognition rate was higher for the 
hybrid negative lists than for the hybrid positive lists (p < .001). In addition, the true 
recognition rates for the pure emotional lists were higher than those for the hybrid emotional 




Figure 5.1. Proportion of true memories (+/-1SE) as a function of word list and list valence 
False recognition of critical lures 
There were main effects of list valence, F(1, 58) = 9.93, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15, the false 
recognition rates were higher for the negative lists (M = .81) than for the positive lists (M 
= .66); and word list, F(1, 58) = 10.46, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15, the false recognition rate for the 
pure emotional lists (M = .63) was lower than that for the hybrid emotional lists (M = .84), 
but no significant List Valence × Word List interaction, F(1, 58) = 1.96, p = .17, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .033, 
power = .281 (see Figure 5.2).  
 
 















































False recognition of unrelated words 
Generally the false recognition rates for unrelated words were very low (all M’s 
< .10). No significant difference in false recognition rate was found as a function of word list 
or list valence (all F’s < 1.88, ns). 
In sum, compared to the hybrid emotional lists, pure emotional lists produced more 
true recognition but less false recognition, regardless of list valence. This finding supports the 
assumptions of FTT. According to FTT, higher true memories may result in lower false 
memories because the better verbatim memories of list words may serve as a cue to suppress 
false memories of critical lures. In this sense, the lower false recognition rate for the pure 
emotional lists compared to that for the hybrid emotional lists may be due to the fact that 
participants took advantage of their better true memories to help them distinguish the words 
that had been presented from those that had not been presented. It is important to note, 
however, that because we did not collect independent arousal data for the words on the pure 
and hybrid lists used in Experiment 2, we do not know whether arousal was well controlled. 













Pilot Study for Experiment 3 
The goal of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether false recall would be influenced 
by “pure” emotional DRM word lists, when the arousal levels of emotional word lists were 
well controlled. The two neutral lists, “mountain” and “music” were selected from the new 
emotional word lists that had been constructed in Experiment 1. The negative and positive 
lists were the same as those in Experiment 2. 
To confirm that the arousal of the six selected lists was similar, an independent 
sample of participants (n = 10, 5 female) were asked to rate the emotional arousal of each list 
word and each critical lure using adapted versions of Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Self-
Assessment Manikins (SAM). Table 5.2 shows the arousal scores of list words and critical 
lures as a function of list valence. 
Table 5.2. 
The Mean and Standard Deviations (SD) of Arousal Scores of List Words and Critical Lures 
as a Function of List Valence 















Positive 5.09 .01 4.95 .21 
Neutral 4.87 .21 5.05 .21 
 
There was neither a significant difference in the arousal level of list words as a 
function of list valence, F(2, 3) = 1.74, p > .05, nor in the arousal level of critical lures, F(2, 







Thirty 17- to 26-year-old undergraduate university students (21 female) were 
recruited from an Experimental Participation Pool. They had not participated in any relevant 
studies before. All of the participants were native English speakers with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and had no history of mood disorders. 
Design 
A 3 (List valence: negative, positive, and neutral) × 2 (Word type: studied words and 
critical lures) within-subjects design was used. The dependent variables were the true recall 
rate of studied words and the false recall rate of critical lures. 
Materials and Procedure 
There were 6 word lists used in Experiment 3, including the “anger” list, “sick” list, 
“love” list, “nice” list, “mountain” list, and “music” list. The presentation order of word lists 
was partially counterbalanced across participants, with half of the participants studying 2 
negative lists, 2 neutral lists, followed by 2 positive lists, and the other half of the participants 
studying 2 positive lists, 2 neutral lists, followed by 2 negative lists.  
Each word was presented for 2 s on a computer monitor. After each list had been 
presented, participants completed a 30s distractor task and were then asked to recall as many 








Results and Discussion 
The data were analysed using a 3 (List valence: negative, positive, and neutral) × 2 
(Word type: studied words and critical lures) ANOVA with repeated measures over list 
valence. The true recall rates of the studied words and the false recall rates of the critical lures 
are shown in Table 5.3 as a function of list valence.  
Table 5.3.  

















Positive .61 .020 .13 .041 
Neutral .74 .024 .05 .028 
 
There were main effects of list valence, F(2, 58) = 10.75, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .27, the 
negative lists (M = .52) yielded a higher true recall rate than did the positive (M = .37) and 
the neutral lists (M = .40); and word type, F(1, 58) = 343.76, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .92, the true 
recall rate of the studied words (M = .70) was significantly higher than the false recall rate of 
the critical lures (M = .20); and a List Valence × Word Type interaction, F(2, 58) = 8.04, p 
= .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .22. Pairwise comparisons showed that the true recall rate was higher for the 
negative and neutral lists than for the positive lists (both p < .001), and there was no reliable 
difference in true recall between the negative and neutral lists. The false recall rate, on the 
other hand, was higher for the negative lists than for the positive and neutral lists (p = .03 and 
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p = .001, respectively), and there was no significant difference in false recall between 
positive and neutral lists (p = .13) 
The present finding replicates an earlier one (Dehon et al., 2010) by showing that 
negative lists generate more false recall than do neutral lists when the arousal of the to-be-
remembered emotional lists is well controlled. More importantly, we extended previous 
studies by using pure emotional word lists rather than hybrid emotional word lists and found 
that the false recall rate for the negative lists was not only higher than that for the neutral 





















There were two main findings in Experiment 2: (1) regardless of list valence, true 
recognition rates for the pure emotional lists were higher than those for the hybrid emotional 
lists; false recognition rates, on the other hand, were lower for the pure emotional lists than 
for the hybrid emotional lists, and (2) the valence effect on false recognition was generally 
found in Experiment 2; the negative lists yielded more false recognition than did the positive 
or neutral lists. However, this valence effect was more robust in the pure emotional lists than 
in the hybrid emotional lists. In Experiment 3, the valence effect of emotional content was 
also found for false recall when arousal of emotional content was controlled. This finding 
suggests that the valence effect of emotional content on false memories may not be restricted 
to a specific memory test.  
Both Associative-Activation Theory (AAT; Howe, 2005, 2006) and Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) can account for why true memories for the pure 
emotional lists were better than those for the hybrid emotional lists. According to AAT, when 
all of the list words are semantically related to each other, and share the same valence, the 
links among these list words should be much closer in the mental lexicon. As such, the 
retrieval of list words should be much easier making the retrieval of true memories of list 
words more likely in pure lists than in hybrid lists. Alternatively, according to FTT, because 
each list word not only shares similar meaning, but also shares the same valence in the pure 
emotional lists, gist retrieval for these list words should be better than that for the list words 
in the hybrid lists. As a result, true memories for the pure emotional list words should be 
greater than those for the hybrid emotional lists.  
Although both theories make similar predictions about true memories, AAT and FTT 
make different predictions about false memories for the pure and the hybrid lists. According 
to AAT, better retrieval of list words on the pure lists would lead to greater associative 
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activation of emotionally- and semantically-related critical lures. Thus, false memories for 
the pure lists should be higher than those for the hybrid lists. According to FTT, on the other 
hand, better true memories of list words may serve as a cue to suppress false memories of 
critical lures. Thus, false memories for the pure lists would be lower than those for the hybrid 
lists. The present findings are most consistent with FTT’s prediction; although pure lists 
generated better true memories, false memories generated by the pure lists were actually 
lower than those generated by the hybrid lists. 
In addition to the composition of the lists, the present findings also lead to 
conclusions about the effect of valence on false memories. Although a consistent finding in 
prior research is that negative lists usually generate more false recognition than do positive or 
neutral lists (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008; Dehon et al., 2010; Howe, 
2007; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010; Sharkawy et al., 2008), we have no idea whether this 
pattern is reliable because the emotional lists used in prior research are not comprised of 
purely emotional words. Experiment 2 confirmed that false recognition is higher for the 
negative lists than for the positive lists. More importantly, the valence effect was more robust 
in the pure emotional lists than that in the hybrid emotional lists. This finding indicated that 
the ideal way to investigate the valence effect of to-be-remembered information on false 
recognition is to use pure, rather than hybrid, emotional information. 
As for the valence effect on false recall, the findings have been mixed in the literature. 
Some researchers have found that the negative lists yield less false recall than do the neutral 
lists when the arousal of emotional lists is not controlled (e.g., Palmer & Dodson, 2009). In 
contrast, when other researchers controlled the arousal of emotional lists, they found that the 
negative lists yielded more false recall than did the neutral lists (e.g., Dehon et al., 2010). In 
both kinds of studies, there was no significant difference in false recall generated by the 
negative lists and that generated by the positive lists. However, as mentioned earlier, one 
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common issue in both kinds of studies is that the emotional lists used were not purely 
emotional. In Experiment 3, I took advantage of the pure emotional lists and controlled 
arousal of these lists to see how emotional valence influences false recall and found that the 
negative lists do yield more false recall than do the positive and neutral lists.  
The finding for false recall was the same as that found for false recognition, which in 
turn suggests that the valence effect of emotional lists on false memories may be not due to 
the memory test per se, but rather due to the semantic density of emotional information. 
Research has found that negative information has greater semantic density, compared to 
positive or neutral information (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 2008; Talmi & Moscovitch, 
2004). According to AAT, the greater semantic density of negative information allows the 
associative links among negative studied words to spread more easily to negative critical 
lures (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010), and according to FTT (Brainerd et al. 2010; Brainerd, 
Stein, et al., 2008), it also renders gist information easier to retrieve. Therefore, no matter 
whether memory is tested using a recognition test or a recall test, negative lists should 
generate more false memories, than do positive or neutral lists. 
So far, we have tested the effect of emotional content on false memories, and found 
that negative information tends to yield more spontaneous false memories in the DRM 
paradigm than does positive or neutral information. In many contexts (e.g., in the courtroom 
or the clinic), the to-be-remembered information is not only emotionally charged, but it is 
retrieved in a distinctive emotional context or mood. Therefore, next, I investigated the effect 










The Effect of Mood on False Memory for Emotional DRM Word Lists 
Over the past three decades, researchers have shown that human memory is often 
highly fallible. Sometimes we recall the gist of a particular event, but the details of that event 
are incorrect (Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Roediger, Jacoby, & 
McDermott, 1996; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001) and sometimes we report entirely false 
memories for an event that never occurred (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). On many occasions, our memory errors are 
of little significance, but sometimes they can have dire consequences, particularly if those 
memory errors are reported in court (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Hood et 
al., 2001; Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, & Merckelbach, 2010). 
Given the real-life consequences of some memory errors, it is important to understand 
the conditions under which they are most likely to occur. As noted earlier, the DRM 
paradigm is the most widely-used procedure to investigate false memories in the laboratory. 
Numerous studies have consistently found the DRM false memory effect: critical lures are 
often falsely recalled and recognised (see review, Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2013), and 
the effect has also been found to persist over time (Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, et al., 2002). 
In many contexts in which false memories really matter (e.g., in the courtroom or the 
clinic), the memories themselves are not only emotionally charged, but they are retrieved in a 
distinctive emotional context or mood. Given this, researchers have specifically examined the 
effect of emotional word lists and participants’ moods on false memories in the DRM 
paradigm. In one category of research, researchers have tested participants using emotionally-
laden word lists in the absence of mood induction (i.e., participants were in their natural 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is published as Zhang, Gross, & Hayne (2017a). As the paper is reproduced in its full published 
form, there is some duplication with material presented in previous chapters. 
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mood). The purpose of these studies was to examine the effect of the emotional content of the 
target material on false memories. For example, Brainerd, Stein et al. (2008) found that 
participants had higher false recognition rates for critical lures associated with negative word 
lists than those associated with positive or neutral word lists. In another category of research, 
researchers have induced a particular mood in participants and then tested them using 
traditional, non-emotional, DRM word lists. The purpose of these studies was to examine the 
effect of the emotional state of the rememberer on false memories. For instance, Storbeck and 
Clore (2005) used music to induce positive or negative moods in participants and then asked 
them to learn word lists consisting of neutral words. They found that participants in a positive 
mood falsely recalled the critical lures more often than did participants in a negative mood.  
At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile the data reported by Brainerd, Stein et al. 
(2008) and by Storbeck and Clore (2005): Brainerd, Stein et al. found that negative word lists 
yielded greater false memory, while Storebeck and Clore found that a negative mood reduced 
false memory. It is important to note, however, that the authors of each study only 
manipulated one aspect of emotion when they investigated the effect on false memories, 
making direct comparison difficult. What happens to the rate of false memories when we 
manipulate both the emotional content of the word lists and the participant’s mood? In most 
of the studies designed to answer this question, researchers have tested participants with 
depression--a naturally-occurring mood manipulation (e.g., Howe & Malone, 2011; 
Joormann et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2005). The primary finding in these studies has been that 
participants who suffer from depression have higher false memory rates for negative or 
depression-relevant word lists than they do for positive or neutral word lists, suggesting that 
they make more memory errors when their mood and the emotional valence of the word lists 
match.   
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In contrast to the body of work with clinical populations, in very few studies have 
researchers examined the effect of mood on false memories of emotional word lists in non-
depressed participants. In one study, Ruci et al. (2009) used happy or sad narratives to induce 
a positive or negative mood in normal participants and then presented them with positive, 
negative, and neutral word lists. During the test, participants were tested for both recall and 
recognition.  They were also asked to make “remember/know” judgments for the words they 
judged as “old.” When the critical lure matched the mood, participants were more likely to 
falsely recognise the lure and they were more likely to indicate that they remembered it. In 
another study, Knott and Thorley (2014) only found a mood-congruent false memory effect 
when participants were asked to make remember judgments for critical lures; they did not 
find this mood-congruent false memory effect for general recognition.   
Given that in prior research, not every word on a particular list reflected the target 
emotion (Knott & Thorley, 2014; Palmer & Dodson, 2009; Ruci et al., 2009), and the two 
important variables, arousal and BAS, have not been equated across the different 
emotionally-laden list words and critical lures, to explore the combined effect of emotional 
word lists and induced moods on false memories, I used the standard emotional word lists 
generated in Experiment 1 in the present experiment. The lists met the following criteria: 1) 
the words in a list (e.g., rage, mad, enrage) were all related to a target word (e.g., anger); 2) 
the emotional valence of the words in a given list matched (i.e., for a negative word list, all of 
the words had a negative emotional valence); and 3) the word lists did not differ in level of 
emotional arousal. I hypothesised that participants would show higher true and false 









Ninety-three 17- to 33-year-old undergraduate university students (66 female) from a 
moderate-sized city in New Zealand participated in the experiment. Participants were 
recruited from an Experimental Participation Pool and they had not participated in any other 
similar study before. All of the participants were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and had no history of mood disorders. They satisfied a small 
portion of course assessment by completing a worksheet based on the experiment.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three mood conditions (positive, 
negative, or neutral; n = 31 participants in each condition). Mood was induced using music 
combined with self-imagery. Participants in the positive and negative mood conditions 
listened to a piece of music and were asked to generate thoughts that were consistent with the 
corresponding music. Participants in the positive mood-induction group listened to 8 minutes 
of Bach’s Brandenburg Concerto No. 3 and participants in the negative mood-induction 
group listened to 8 minutes of Prokofiev’s Alexander Nevsky: Russia Under the Mongolian 
Yoke. During the imagery phase, participants were also allowed to write down any words that 
came to mind (Becker & Leinenger, 2011). This optional task was designed to maintain 
participants’ focus during the mood-induction procedure. The results from subsequent item 
analyses (see below) showed that the words that participants wrote down during the mood-
induction phase did not influence their performance on the subsequent memory tasks (see 
Results for more details). The positive (or negative) piece of music continued to play softly 
throughout the subsequent DRM procedure to maintain participants’ mood. 
Participants in the neutral group were asked to read a collection of basic facts about 
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New Zealand, including population size, gross national product, cultures, etc. This exercise 
took 8 minutes to complete based on normal reading speed. These mood-induction 
manipulations were modelled directly on those used in previous studies, in which researchers 
attempted to induce positive, negative, and neutral moods (Chepenik et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 
2011; Rowe et al., 2007). Immediately following the mood-induction phase, participants 
completed the same 9-point Self-Assessment Manikins used in Chapter 4 to assess how 
happy (1) or sad (9) and how excited (1) or calm (9) they were (i.e., valence and arousal, 
respectively). 
I used 12 word lists which were chosen based on the findings of Experiment 1. Each 
list was 10-words long and the words on each list were shown in the same serial order to all 
participants. Four of the word lists contained negative words, four contained positive words, 
and four contained neutral words. All of the words in each list were shown in the descending 
order of their BAS values. In other words, the first word in each list was the one most 
associated to the critical lure, the second word was the one next most associated, and so on. 
Participants were tested in groups of up to 6. All of the tasks were presented through 
individual headphones. The presentation order of word lists was partially counterbalanced 
across participants; that is, half of the participants in each mood group learned 4 negative 
word lists, followed by 4 neutral word lists, followed by 4 positive word lists, and the other 
half of the participants learned the word lists in the reverse order (see also, Howe et al., 2010; 
Knott & Thorley, 2014; Ruci et al., 2009). Each word was presented for 2 s on a computer 
monitor. After all the words in the word list were presented, a message came up warning the 
participant that the next word list was about to appear. Participants were asked to remember 
all 12 word lists. Between the learning phase and the test phase, participants completed a 5-
min subtraction exercise. 
The recognition test contained 36 studied words--from serial positions 1, 4, and 8 of 
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each word list; and 12 critical lures, and 24 non-related lures--the positive and negative non-
related lures were taken from Brainerd et al. (2010); the neutral ones were taken from 
Roediger, Watson, et al. (2001). The order of presentation of the 72 test words was 
completely random. If participants made an “Old” decision, they were then asked to make a 
further “Remember/Know” judgment. “Remember” judgments indicated that participants had 
a subjective feeling of having seen the words and had a vivid recollection of their details; 
“Know” judgments indicated that participants had an impression of the words but could not 
recollect their actual presentation (Rajaram, 1993). Although some researchers have also 
included a “Guess” option, Remember/Know judgments alone can reflect recollection and 
familiarity, respectively when participants are given training and instruction in the distinction 


















Mood manipulation check 
Recall that participants’ level of emotional arousal and the valence of their mood were 
indexed by 9-point scales. Lower scores referred to higher arousal (excitement) and more 
positive valence (happiness). Two separate one-way ANOVAs across the three mood groups 
were conducted using the arousal scores and valence scores as dependent variables. There 
was no significant difference in participants’ arousal scores as a function of their mood 
induction group, F(2, 90) = 1.32, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .028, power = .28. Overall, participants in the 
negative (M = 6.29, SD = 1.64), positive (M = 5.61, SD = 1.99), and neutral (M = 6.13, SD = 
1.48) mood groups had similarly moderate levels of emotional arousal. There was, however, a 
significant effect of mood induction on participants’ mood scores, F(2, 90) = 73.15, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .62.  The positive mood group (M = 3.03, SD = 1.14) reported being more happy 
than were the neutral mood group (M = 4.45, SD = .99) who in turn were more happy than 




Table 6.1 shows the mean proportions and standard errors for true and false 
recognition as a function of remember and know judgments. We used the same data analysis 
strategy for every dependent variable. First, the data for each dependent variable was 
subjected to separate 3 (participant mood: negative, positive, neutral) × 3 (word valence: 
negative, positive, neutral) mixed-factor ANOVAs with repeated measures over word valence 
(Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor). We then used a series of separate one-way ANOVAs 
to compare across participant mood and across word valence (Alpha set at .05). Any 
significant effects were examined using the Bonferroni correction for pairwise-comparisons. 
                                                          
2 We also used signal detection analyses to determine whether the negative mood-congruent false memory effect was due to discrimination 
sensitivity (A’) or response bias (C). There was no significant difference in C for any dependent variable and the results of A’ were the same 
as those obtained from mixed-factor ANOVAs. Given that the signal detection analyses did not provide any additional information, we have 
only reported results from the mixed-factor ANOVAs here. 
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True recognition of studied words 
Recall that on the recognition test, participants were first asked to indicate whether the 
word was old or new. The proportion of times that participants recognised a studied word is 
shown in Figure 6.1 as a function of participant mood and word valence. For old responses, 
there was no effect of mood, F(2, 90) = 1.81, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .039, power = .37. Thus, although 
the music continued to play softly during the DRM procedure in the negative and positive 
mood conditions, it did not interfere with participants’ ability to encode the words on the lists. 
There was a main effect of word valence, F(2, 180) = 5.93, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, and a Mood × 
Word Valence interaction, F(4, 180) = 4.33, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .088. Participants had higher true 
recognition rates for negative studied words than for positive and neutral studied words when 
they were in the negative mood, t(30) = 2.34, p < .05, and t(30) = 3.38, p < .05, respectively. 
This mood-congruent effect was not due to higher true memories for negative studied words 
in the negative mood, |t|’s ≤ 0.63, p’s > .05, but it was due to a lower true recognition rate for 
positive studied words in the negative mood than that in the positive mood,  t(60) = -2.08, p 
< .05, and a lower true recognition rate for neutral studied words in the negative mood than 














 Word valence Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Studied words 
         Remember .60 (.04) .49 (.05) .47 (.05) .54 (.04) .55 (.05) .49 (.05) .55 (.04) .50 (.05) .65 (.05) 
Know .17 (.03) .19 (.03) .10 (.02) .20 (.03) .23 (.03) .16 (.02) .23 (.03) .22 (.03) .14 (.02) 
Critical lures 
         Remember .45 (.06) .30 (.05) .25 (.05) .48 (.06) .46 (.05) .39 (.05) .33 (.06) .36 (.05) .44 (.05) 
Know .28 (.05) .26 (.05) .19 (.04) .24 (.05) .24 (.05) .23 (.04) .35 (.05) .35 (.05) .17 (.04) 
Unrelated words 
         Remember .07 (.02) .05 (.02) .05 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .04 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
Know .08 (.02) .06 (.02) .05 (.02) .08 (.02) .07 (.02) .07 (.02) .06 (.02) .05 (.02) .09 (.02) 






Figure 6.1. Proportion of true memories (+/-1SE) as a function of mood and word valence. 
For each word that participants indicated was old, we were also interested in whether 
participants had a vivid recollection of its details (remember judgments) or merely had an 
impression of it (know judgments).  For true remember judgments, there was a significant 
Mood × Word Valence interaction, F(4, 180) = 4.77, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .096. Participants in the 
negative mood condition made more correct remember judgments for negative studied words 
compared to positive and neutral studied words (both p < .05). In addition, true remember 
judgements for neutral studied words were higher in the neutral mood group compared to the 
positive and negative mood groups (both p < .05) (see Table 6.1). For true know judgments, 
there was no effect of mood and no mood × word valence interaction (both F’s < 1.11 ns), but 
there was a significant main effect for word valence, F(2, 180) = 8.97, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .091. 
Participants made more know judgments for negative (M = .20) and positive studied words 
(M = .21) than for neutral studied words (M = .13). There was no difference in know 
judgments between negative and positive studied words. 
In sum, the true recognition data reflected a selective mood-congruent memory effect. 
The effect was only observed for participants in the negative mood condition. Moreover, in 




























rates for positive and neutral studied words rather than to enhanced true recognition rates for 
negative studied words.  
False recognition of critical lures 
For old responses (see Figure 6.2), there was no effect of mood on false recognition, 
F(2, 90) = 2.04, p > .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .043, power = .41, but there was a significant main effect of 
word valence, F(2, 180) = 13.48, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, and a Mood × Word Valence interaction, 
F(4, 180) = 2.47, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .052. As shown in Figure 6.2, the false recognition rate for 
negative lures was equally high for participants in all three mood conditions, F(2, 90) = .61, 
p > .05.  In addition, participants in the negative mood condition had a significantly higher 
false recognition rate for negative critical lures than for positive and neutral critical lures,  
t(30) = 3.02, p < .01, t(30) = 5.22, p < .001, respectively. In contrast, participants in the 
positive and neutral mood conditions had a similarly high false recognition rate for all three 
kinds of critical lures (both F’s < 1.97, ns). Finally, the false recognition rate for the positive 
and neutral critical lures was lower for participants in the negative mood condition compared 
to participants in the positive and neutral mood groups (both p < .05). 
For false remember judgments, there were no effects of mood or word valence (both 
F’s < 1.73, ns), but there was a Mood × Word Valence interaction, F(4, 180) = 3.82, p 
< .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .078. Participants in the negative mood condition exhibited a higher number of 
false remember judgments for negative critical lures than for positive and neutral critical 
lures, t(30) = 2.67, p < .05, t(30) = 3.63, p < .01, respectively. Moreover, false remember 
judgements for positive and neutral critical lures were more likely for participants in the 
positive and neutral mood groups compared to participants in the negative mood group (both 
p < .05). For false know judgments, there was no effect of mood and no mood × word valence 
interaction (both F’s < 1.51, ns), but there was a significant main effect of word valence, F(2, 
180) = 5.36, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .056. Further analyses showed that, regardless of mood state, 
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participants made more false know judgments for negative (M = .29) and positive critical 
lures (M = .28) compared to neutral critical lures (M = .20). 
 
Figure 6.2. Proportion of false memories (+/-1SE) as a function of mood and word valence 
Finally, we explored whether the words that participants wrote down during the mood 
induction task influenced their memory for the studied words and the critical lures. A total of 
10 out of 31 participants in the positive mood group wrote the word “happy” during the mood 
induction procedure; “happy” was the only positive critical lure that they recorded.  A total of 
9 out of 31 participants in the negative mood group wrote the word “sad” during the mood 
induction procedure; “sad” was the only negative critical lure that they recorded. We re-
analysed the data removing the false recognition rates for the critical lures “happy” and “sad” 
as well as the true recognition rate for their corresponding list words. When we then analysed 
the data across the remaining 3 positive lists, 3 negative lists and 4 neutral lists, the results of 
this analysis were consistent with the original ones for both true and false recognition.  These 
data rule out the possibility that the mood-congruent effects reported here were due to 
proactive interference by words that were generated by participants during mood induction 
(cf. Ruci et al., 2009). 





























Consistent with the true memory data, participants in the negative mood condition had lower 
false recognition rates for positive and neutral critical lures, rather than enhanced false 
recognition rates for negative critical lures. 
False recognition of non-related words 
Overall, false recognition rates for non-related words were low and there were no 























The overarching goal of the present experiment was to examine the effect of 
participant mood on true and false recognition of emotional word lists using the DRM 
paradigm. Overall, false recognition of the critical lures was consistently high across mood 
condition. When participants were in a positive or neutral mood, their false memory rate did 
not vary as a function of the emotional valence of the words on the list. In contrast, when 
participants were in a negative mood, there was a mood-congruent effect on false memory. 
This effect was due to a decrease in false recognition of the positive and neutral lures, rather 
than to an increase in false recognition of the negative lures. A similar pattern of results was 
also found for participants’ true recognition of the words on the lists. 
Why might there be differences in the way in which positive and negative moods 
influence participants’ recognition of positive and negative words? Is there something about 
the positive and negative word lists per se rather than the relation between the word lists and 
the participants’ moods that contributed to the different pattern of results? For example, it is 
possible that there was a higher degree of semantic relatedness for the positive word lists than 
for the negative and neutral word lists that we used here. That is, “lovely” was a list word for 
the beautiful list, and “love” was a critical lure for another positive word list. Although 
greater semantic-relatedness has been used as an argument to account for enhanced emotional 
false memories (Howe et al., 2010), if differences in semantic relatedness played a role in the 
present results, we would have expected increased true and false memory for positive word 
lists compared to negative and neutral word lists. This was not the case. The effect of 
connectivity on false memories remains unresolved (McEvoy et al., 1999; Palmer & Dodson, 
2009; Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001); additional research is still required to quantify 
differences in the strength of the connections between the emotional list words to determine 
whether these differences influence emotional false memories. 
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It is also possible that the differences in the potency of either the mood manipulation 
or word lists may have influenced our results. For example, the mean difference between the 
valence scores of the negative and neutral word lists (2.05) was greater than the mean 
difference between the valence scores for the neutral and positive word lists (.80). Similarly, 
the mean difference between negative and neutral mood scores (2.16) was also greater than 
that between positive and neutral mood score (1.42). If the greater potency of either the mood 
manipulation or the word lists influenced true and false memories, then participants’ true and 
false memories for negative studied words and negative critical lures would be higher when 
participants were in negative mood than when they were in positive or neutral mood. We did 
not find this pattern of results. Instead, there was no significant difference in neither the true 
nor false memories for negative words across the three mood groups. 
Two major theories have been used to explain the development of false memories in 
the DRM paradigm and either theory could potentially account for the present data. 
According to fuzzy-trace theory, for example, there are two qualitatively different 
representations of information in memory ─ gist representation and verbatim representation. 
Gist representations are thought to increase false memory because they focus on the general 
semantic meaning of information (e.g., gist-related critical lures in the DRM paradigm), 
whereas verbatim representations of information focus on specificity of information (e.g., the 
position, pronunciation, and word length of each list word in the DRM paradigm) (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2005). According to fuzzy-trace theory, the generation of false memories in the 
DRM paradigm is due to the fact that participants rely more on gist than verbatim memory—
falsely recognising words that share the semantic meaning of the words that appear on the 
list. 
According to the spreading-activation theory, on the other hand, the production of 
false memories in the DRM paradigm is due to semantic activation of list words. This 
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activation then automatically spreads to semantically-related, but non-presented critical lures 
(Roediger, Balota, et al., 2001). For example, learning the word bed in the study phase 
activates its semantic meaning. The semantic activation of bed spreads to a semantically- 
associated, but non-presented word, sleep, so that sleep is also activated and is more likely to 
be falsely recalled and recognised in the test phase. 
How might these theories account for the differential effects of different moods on 
false recognition? According to fuzzy-trace theory, we would argue that negative moods 
selectively promote gist representation of negative information, but enhance verbatim 
representation of positive and neutral information. Consistent with a large body of prior 
research, we found that when participants were in a positive or neutral mood, they exhibited a 
high rate of false memory, irrespective of the nature of the words on the list. Apparently, 
when in a positive or a neutral mood, participants rely primarily on gist when storing and 
recognising the words on the list.  In contrast, we would argue that when participants were in 
a negative mood, they were more likely to process item-specific information, but only for 
positive and neutral word lists. When the lists were comprised of negative words, participants 
in a negative mood apparently relied on gist—which led to false memories of negative word 
lists. 
Spreading-activation theory also provides a possible explanation for the effects of 
positive and negative moods on false memories. For example, prior research has shown that 
positive moods lead to a heuristic processing mode, which is characterised by a broad 
activation of remote and weakly-associated information, whereas negative moods lead to a 
systematic processing mode, which is characterised by a relatively restricted activation of 
close and strongly-associated information (Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Schwarz, 2001). In 
the present experiment, when participants were in a positive mood, we propose that activation 
spread not only to mood-congruent information, but also to remote and weakly-associated 
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information. When in a negative mood, on the other hand, activation spread primarily to 
information that was congruent with the participant’s mood. 
One way to begin to garner evidence for one theoretical explanation over the other 
would be to examine the relation between true and false recognition rates as a function of 
word valence.  In other words, according to the spreading-activation theory, activation of the 
list (as measured by true recognition) should increase the probability that participants would 
report the critical lure associated with that list. In the present experiment, across mood 
conditions, true recognition rates for negative, positive, and neutral list words were positively 
correlated with false recognition of negative, positive, and neutral lures, respectively (i.e., r = 
.45, .32, and .34, all p’s < .05).  Although this finding does not rule out an interpretation 
based on fuzzy-trace theory, these correlations do provide some circumstantial support for the 
role of activation in the results reported here. 
The current findings set the stage for additional research. It is important to note that 
although we used the general term “negative mood,” we specifically used the music-
induction procedure to induce a “sad mood.” The question remains as to whether the present 
findings would also generalise to other negative mood states. There is some evidence to 
suggest that they might not. Some researchers have argued that different negative emotional 
states (e.g., sad, anger) lead to different modes of cognitive processing (Bolte et al., 2003; 
Corson & Verrier, 2007; Schwarz, 2001). Sadness is thought to promote a systematic 
processing mode, while anger, like positive moods, leads to a heuristic processing mode 
(Corson & Verrier, 2007). If this is the case, we would predict that anger would not result in a 
mood-congruent false memory effect in the DRM paradigm because angry participants, like 
happy participants, would rely on heuristic processing which would promote the spread of 
activation to both mood-congruent and mood-incongruent information. Further research is 
required to understand the effect of a full range of emotions on both true and false memory. 
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It is also interesting to speculate about the mechanisms responsible for the 
effectiveness of the mood induction procedure. In the present experiment, we used music and 
self-generated imagery to induce participants’ mood. Theoretically, exposure to the music and 
imagery may have generated mood-specific thoughts, mood-specific feelings, or both, which 
subsequently led to a change in mood. In practice, it is impossible to know whether the music 
and imagery altered participants’ thoughts or feelings; the key finding, however, is that the 
mood-induction procedure altered their mood. Furthermore, the mood-induction procedure 
used in the present experiment yielded larger differences in participants’ ratings of their 
positive or negative mood than has been reported previously using mood induction through 
narratives (cf. Ruci et al., 2009). The effect of different mood induction procedures on mood 
congruent memory is another important avenue for additional research, particularly as we 
attempt to induce mood states that go beyond happy and sad. 
The present findings have at least two important practical implications. First, although 
the data show that participants who are in a negative mood exhibited a high degree of true 
recognition of negative information--potentially enhancing the detailed nature of their 
accounts of negative events in some contexts--these same participants also made more 
negative errors. This finding has important implications particularly in legal contexts where it 
is generally assumed that a witness will have a better memory for emotional information than 
for neutral information (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004), 
leading jurors and judges to give more credibility to emotional testimony in court. The results 
of the present experiment suggest that emotional witnesses describing emotional events might 
provide more complete accounts, but those accounts may not be highly accurate. 
The second practical implication of the present findings is relevant to the issue of 
depression. It is noteworthy that our findings on the effect of experimentally-induced 
negative mood on participants’ false memories is identical to that reported in prior studies 
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with participants who suffer from depression, a naturally-occurring negative mood (Howe & 
Malone, 2011; Joorman et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2005). That is, when participants were in a 
negative mood, they were more likely to remember negative information—both true and false 
information. This kind of negative bias undoubtedly enhances the negative effects of 
rumination and affects retrieval of positive memories that could be used to combat 
depression. Although we recognise that the participants in a transient negative-induced mood 
in the present experiment are different from individuals with longstanding depressive mood, 
our ability to induce such a strong negatively-biased processing in the laboratory may help to 
explain how easily differences in cognitive processing can contribute to a chronic and 





















The Effect of Mood on Age-Related Differences in Emotional DRM False Memory 
Although there is ample evidence that many of our memory skills improve between 
early childhood and young adulthood (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 
2008; Gallo, 2013), there are also conditions under which they actually get worse. For 
example, in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants are presented 
with a series of word lists in which all of the words on each list (e.g., bed, rest, and pillow) 
are semantically related to a critical lure (e.g., sleep; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Adults typically exhibit a higher rate of true memory for the studied words than do 
children, but they also exhibit a higher rate of false memory for the unpresented, critical 
lures; this finding has been referred to as a developmental reversal effect (Brainerd et al., 
2002; Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008; Howe, 2005, 2006). 
The counterintuitive developmental reversal in the rate of false memory has puzzled 
researchers for decades; at least two theories have been put forward to explain it. According 
to Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005), there are two distinct traces involved 
in memory. Verbatim traces focus on item-specific information (e.g., position, pronunciation, 
or word length of each list word), which helps to reduce false memories. Gist traces, on the 
other hand, promote false memories by emphasising meaning-based information (i.e., 
information that is shared by the list words and the critical lures). According to FTT, the age-
related increase in false memories occurs because children’s ability to encode and retrieve 
gist information is inferior to that of adults (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). In essence, young 
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children’s immature gist memory protects them from false memory errors in the DRM 
paradigm. 
The second theory that has been put forward to explain the developmental reversal 
effect is Associative-Activation Theory (AAT; Howe, 2005, 2006). According to AAT, 
children’s knowledge base develops over time, resulting in more efficient and automatic 
activation of related concepts. According to AAT, children’s lower level of false memory in 
the DRM paradigm is due to the fact that they do not activate the associative links between 
the words on the DRM lists and critical lures, a process that occurs relatively automatically in 
adults (Howe, 2005, 2006; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010).  
The key question is whether developmental reversals of DRM false memories are due 
to age-related changes in gist processing or to age-related changes in the automaticity of 
associative activation. To date, no single developmental study has allowed us to differentiate 
between FTT and AAT; in fact, the bulk of the data are completely compatible with both 
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 2006; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Howe, 2005, 2006). Here, we took a 
novel approach, using what we know about the combined effect of emotional word lists and 
participants’ extant mood on false memory to generate a testable hypothesis that might allow 
us to differentiate between these theoretical explanations of the developmental reversal effect. 
In terms of the word lists used in the DRM paradigm, negative information has 
greater semantic density compared to positive or neutral information (e.g., Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2008; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). According to FTT, the greater semantic density 
of negative information renders its gist easier to encode and retrieve, thus the developmental 
reversal effect should be more pronounced for negative information relative to positive or 
neutral information. Similarly, according to AAT, the greater semantic density of negative 
information allows the associative links among negative words on the list to spread more 
easily to the negative critical lures. Overall, this might increase false memory for negative 
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word lists in all age groups, but given that adults have a more connected knowledge base than 
do children, ATT would also lead to the prediction that the developmental reversal effect 
should be more pronounced for negative information. Consistent with both theories, 
participants of all ages generally exhibit higher false memories for negative information than 
they do for positive or neutral information, and the age-related increase in false memories is 
more pronounced for negative information than that for positive and neutral information, 
particularly when arousal of the to-be-remembered information is well controlled (Brainerd et 
al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008; Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010). Thus, 
manipulating information content alone does not allow us to differentiate between FTT and 
AAT, because both theories make exactly the same prediction.   
In addition to the words on the list, another important factor that helps to determine 
what participants remember is their mood. Mood has long been thought to change the way 
that we process information, but FTT and AAT may lead to different predictions about the 
effect of mood on false memories. For example, the standard theoretical interpretation of the 
memory effects of positive and negative moods is that positive moods promote relational 
processing while negative moods impair relational processing and foster item-specific 
processing (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Hege & Dodson, 2004; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; 2011). 
Within this interpretive framework, FTT predicts that false memories will be lower when 
participants are in a negative mood and higher when they are in a positive mood. 
Furthermore, developmental studies have shown that older children and adults have greater 
item-specific (i.e., verbatim memory) and relational processing ability (i.e., gist memory) 
than do younger children (for review, see Brainerd, Reyna, et al., 2008). Thus, the 
opportunity for negative moods to increase item-specific processing is potentially greater in 
older children and adults than in younger children. As such, the decrease in false memories 
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should be greater in older children and adults than in younger children. In other words, 
developmental reversals should be reduced or eliminated in negative moods.  
Likewise, FTT also predicts that the opportunity for positive moods to promote 
relational processing is potentially greater in older children and adults than in younger 
children and in turn, should increase false memories more in the older age groups.  That is, 
according to FTT, developmental reversals should be maintained or even increased when 
participants are in a positive mood. Summing up, assuming that the standard theoretical 
interpretation of negative and positive moods is correct, FTT makes two predictions: (i) false 
memories will be lower when participants are in a negative mood compared to when they are 
in a neutral mood and higher when they are in a positive mood compared to a neutral mood, 
and (ii) developmental reversals will be smaller when participants are in a negative mood and 
will be maintained or even larger when they are in a positive mood relative to a neutral mood. 
Like FTT, AAT also yields predictions about the relation between mood and false 
memory. For example, we know that moods influence the level of automaticity needed to 
process information (Bless et al., 1996; Bolte et al., 2003; Corson, 2002; Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989). Positive moods are thought to lead to a heuristic 
processing mode, which requires fewer cognitive resources and less effort. In contrast, 
negative moods are thought to lead to a systematic processing mode, which requires more 
cognitive resources and more effort. In terms of false memory, the heuristic processing mode 
of positive moods is characterised by a broad activation of remote and weakly-associated 
information (e.g., both positive and non-positive information), whereas the systematic 
processing mode of negative moods is characterised by a relatively restricted associative 
activation of close and strongly-associated information (e.g., negative information) (Zhang et 
al., 2017a). According to AAT, the typical age-related increase in false memories should be 
reduced or even eliminated when participants are in positive moods, whereas this increase 
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should be maintained when participants are in negative moods. That is, when they are in 
positive moods, children’s false memories are more likely to be influenced by the increased 
automaticity with which associative activation occurs. Furthermore, according to AAT, the 
effect of positive moods would be obtained regardless of the emotional valence of the 
information that participants are trying to remember, while the effect of negative moods 
would be obtained for at least negative information. In contrast, FTT makes no specific 
predictions about the role of information valence. 
Taken together, given that AAT and FTT make different predictions about the impact 
of mood on the developmental reversal of false memory for emotional word lists, we took the 
opportunity to pit one theory against the other. Assuming that the standard view of memory 
effects of positive and negative moods is correct, if developmental reversals are maintained 
or enhanced when participants are in a positive mood, but developmental reversals are 
reduced or eliminated in a negative mood, this outcome would provide empirical support for 
FTT. In contrast, if developmental reversals are reduced or eliminated for all information 
when participants are in a positive mood, but developmental reversals are maintained or 
enhanced for negative information in a negative mood, this outcome would provide empirical 
support for AAT. However, it should be noted that if the standard view of memory effects of 
positive and negative moods was not supported in the present study, then FTT’s predictions 
regarding the effect of mood on developmental reversals cannot be tested directly. In the 
current experiment, we examined these predictions by assessing age-related changes in the 










Ninety 7- to 8-year-old children (M age = 7.50 years, SD = 0.46) and 90 11- to 12-
year-old adolescents (M age = 11.40 years, SD = 0.49) were recruited through a database of 
parents who had agreed to participate in studies of child development. All children were 
predominantly Caucasian and came from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds. They 
agreed to participate in the study, and their parents provided written consent. In addition, 90 
undergraduate university students (M age = 20.37 years, SD = 1.27) were recruited through a 
Research Participation Pool and were paid $15 for their participation. Half of the participants 
in each age group were female. The sample size was specified prior to data collection, based 
on typical sample sizes in the false memory literature (e.g., Howe, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 
2005; Zhang et al., 2017). All of the participants were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of mood disorders. They had not participated 
in any similar studies before. The research was reviewed and approved by the University’s 
Human Ethics Committee, which is approved by the National Health Research Council and 
whose guidelines are consistent with those of the American Psychological Association. 
Materials and Procedure 
Within each age group, participants were randomly assigned to one of three mood 
conditions (positive, negative, or neutral; n = 30 participants of each age in each condition). 
Mood was induced using a video clip that had a positive, negative, or neutral valence. This 
technique has been shown to be the effective method of mood induction with both children 
and young adults (for review, see Brenner, 2000). To ensure the reliability and validity of the 
video clips that we used, we chose emotional video clips from classic movies and children’s 
current television programs and then asked independent groups of 7- to 8-year-old children 
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(N = 12, 6 female) and 18- to 23-year-olds (N = 12; 6 female) to use a 5-point graphic scale 
(1 = happy smiling face; 5 = sad frowning face) to rate how happy or sad each clip made 
them feel. We then selected the video clips that produced the most consistent and clear-cut 
mood effects. The negative and positive video clips were from the movie “The Lion King.” 
Participants in the positive mood group watched the scene where the characters sing Hakuna 
Matata while participants in the negative mood group watched the scene about the death of 
Mufasa. Participants in the neutral mood group watched a National Geographic nature 
documentary about lions. Each video clip was approximately 4 min in duration.  
Immediately following the mood-induction phase, we asked participants to assess 
their mood using a self-report measure called A Nonverbal Scale of Emotion (ANSE; Lay, 
Waters, & Park, 1989). The ANSE consists of nine different faces that cross sad, neutral, and 
happy facial expressions with calm, neutral, and excited facial expressions. Participants were 
shown all possible pairing of the faces (N = 36) and asked to pick one face from each pair to 
indicate how they were feeling. Participants received 1 point if a chosen face showed a higher 
level of pleasure than did the other face in the pair, and/or received 1 point if a chosen face 
showed a higher level of excitement than did the other face in the pair. In this way, every 
participant received one score for valence and one score for arousal, respectively. Nine pairs 
of faces showed the same level of pleasure and excitement so the range of possible scores 
was from 0 to 27. Higher scores indicate that participants felt more positive or excited, while 
lower scores indicate that participants felt more negative or calm.  
Participants then listened to audio recordings of 12 emotional DRM word lists (4 lists 
containing words with negative valence, 4 positive, and 4 neutral) chosen from Zhang et al. 
(2017a; see also, Experiment 1 of the present thesis). Each list was 10-words long and the 
emotional valence of the words in a given list all matched and were associated with a critical 
lure. The emotional word lists were also matched in terms of arousal, backward associative 
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strength (BAS), and inter-item associative strength (connectivity). The word frequencies of 
both studied words and critical lures were also controlled across the emotional word lists, 
respectively (both F’s < 1.11 ns) (Kučera & Francis, 1967).  
The presentation order of word lists was partially counterbalanced across participants; 
that is, half of the participants in each age group and each mood condition learned 4 negative 
word lists, followed by 4 neutral word lists, followed by 4 positive word lists, and the other 
half learned the word lists in the reverse order (see also, Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2017a). Each word on each list was presented at a 3-s rate in descending order 
of their BAS values. After each list had been presented, participants completed a 30s 



















Mood manipulation check 
Table 7.1 shows the mean valence and arousal scores on the ANSE and 95% CIs as a 
function of mood. Initially, we conducted separate 3 (mood: negative, positive, neutral) × 3 
(age: adults, adolescents, children) analyses of variance (ANOVA) across valence and 
arousal scores. We then used a series of one-way ANOVAs to compare across mood and 
across age, respectively (Alpha set at .05). 
Table 7.1. 






Neutral Mood Negative Mood 
 





Children 23.00 [21.18, 24.82] 18.20 [15.47, 20.93] 5.30 [3.86, 6.74] 
Adolescents 24.43 [23.36, 25.51] 15.63 [12.37, 18.90] 4.70 [3.10, 6.30] 





Children 13.90 [12.49, 15.31] 13.47 [12.48, 14.46] 13.00 [12.10, 13.90] 
Adolescents 13.30 [11.91, 14.69] 12.87 [11.27, 14.46] 12.70 [11.55, 13.85] 
Adults 13.00 [11.82, 14.18] 11.97 [10.30, 13.63] 12.27 [11.23, 13.30] 
 
For valence, there was a main effect of mood, F(2, 261) = 296.09, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
 .694; participants in the positive mood condition felt more positive (M = 24.29) than those in 
the neutral mood condition (M = 15.92), who in turn felt more positive than participants in 




2 =  .014, power = .391, but there was a Mood × Age interaction, F(4, 261) = 3.17, p 
= .014, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .046. Adults in the positive mood condition felt more positive than did children 
in the positive mood condition, F(2, 87) = 3.93, p = .023, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .083, and adults in the 
negative mood condition felt more negative than did adolescents and children in the negative 
mood condition, F(2, 87) = 5.74, p = .005. 𝜂𝑝
2 = .117. There was no reliable difference in 
valence scores as a function of age for participants in the neutral mood condition, F(2, 87) = 
1.99, p = .142. 𝜂𝑝
2 = .044, power = .402.  
For arousal, there was no effect of mood (p > .250), age (p = .127), nor a Mood × Age 
interaction (p > .250); as shown in Table 7.1, regardless of age or mood, all participants 
reported similarly moderate levels of arousal. 
Recall 
Given that the critical test of FTT and AAT relies on the impact of each mood on the 
age-related patterns of false memory, we analysed true recall and false recall using separate 3 
(age: children, adolescents, young adults) × 3 (word valence: negative, positive, neutral) 
mixed factor ANOVAs with repeated measures across word valence (Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction factor) for each mood condition. We then used planned comparisons to explore 
age-related differences in true and false memories as a function of word valence in each 
mood condition; statistical significance was accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level 
of .017. 
True recall of studied words. An age-related increase in participants’ true recall of 
studied words was found for each mood condition (see Table 7.2). Adults recalled more 
studied words than did adolescents, who in turn recalled more studied words than did 
children (smallest F(2, 87) = 96.77, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .690). In addition, neutral studied words 
were recalled better than were negative studied words, which in turn were recalled better than 
were positive studied words (smallest F(2, 174) = 132.18, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝




The Means and 95% CIs for True Recall as a Function of Age, Word Valence, and Mood Condition 
 
Neutral Mood Positive Mood Negative Mood 
 
Negative SW Positive SW Neutral SW Negative SW Positive SW Neutral SW Negative SW Positive SW Neutral SW 
Children .78 [.75, .81] .76 [.73, .79] .78 [.74, .81] .77 [.74, .80] .75 [.72, .78] .76 [.74, .79] .80 [.77, .83] .75 [.72, .78] .77 [.74, .80] 
Adolescents .91 [.88, .94] .86 [.83, .88] .90 [.86, .93] .91 [.87, .94] .86 [.83, .89] .89 [.87, .92] .90 [.87, .93] .89 [.86, .92] .89 [.85, .92] 
Adults .93 [.90, .96] .92 [.90, .95] .93 [.90, .97] .93 [.89, .96] .93 [.90, .96] .94 [.91, .97] .92 [.89, .95] .91 [.88, .94] .91 [.88, .95] 















False recall of critical lures. Participants in the neutral mood condition (see Figure 
7.1, Top panel) exhibited the typical developmental reversal effect in false memory; there was 
a main effect of word valence, F(2, 174) = 13.96, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .138, and an Age × Word 
Valence interaction, F(4, 174) = 5.31, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .109, but no effect of age, F(2, 87) = 
4.06, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .085. Consistent with prior research, children falsely recalled fewer 
negative critical lures than did adults, t(87) = -4.11, p < .001, but there were no age-related 
differences in false recall of positive or neutral critical lures (|t|’s ≤ 1.50, p’s > .05). 
For participants in the positive mood condition (see Figure 7.1, Middle panel), there 
was no effect of age, F(2, 87) = 2.08, p = .131, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .046, power = .417, and no Age × Word 
Valence interaction, F(4, 174) = .50, p > .250, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .011, power = .168. There was, however, 
a main effect of word valence, F(2, 174) = 15.93, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .155; participants in the 
positive mood condition falsely recalled more negative critical lures (M = .31) than neutral 
(M = .19) or positive critical lures (M = .17). Planned comparisons indicated that, regardless 
of word valence, there were no reliable age-related differences in false recall (|t|’s ≤ 1.91, p’s 
> .05). 
For participants in the negative mood condition (see Figure 7.1, Bottom panel), there 
were main effects of age, F(2, 87) = 6.02, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2 = . 122, adolescents (M = .30) and 
adults (M = .23) made more false recall than did children (M = .14), and word valence, F(2, 
174) = 6.11, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .066, false recall was higher for negative critical lures (M = .28) 
than that for positive (M = .19) or neutral critical lures (M = .19), but no Age x Word Valence 
interaction, F(4, 174) = 2.53, p = .042,  𝜂𝑝
2 =  .055. Planned comparisons indicated that, for 
negative word lists, there was a developmental reversal effect: children falsely recalled fewer 
negative critical lures than did adolescents and adults, t(87) = -3.92, p < .001, and t(87) = -
2.70, p < .01, respectively. There were no age-related differences in false recall of positive or 






Figure 7.1. The false recall rate of critical lures as a function of word valence and age for 
participants in the neutral mood condition (top panel), positive mood condition (middle 









































































Although adults typically exhibit superior true memories in the DRM paradigm, they 
also exhibit more false memories. Here, we examined whether this effect is due primarily to 
adults’ superior gist-processing ability, as proposed by Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), or due to 
their superior automatic associative activation, as proposed by Associative-Activation Theory 
(AAT). Manipulating only the valence of the to-be-remembered information does not allow 
us to differentiate between these two theoretical explanations because both theories predict 
the same outcome; according to both theories, negative information tends to increase false 
memory compared to positive and neutral information and developmental reversals should be 
more pronounced for negative information than for positive and neutral information. This 
prediction has been supported by prior research (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 
2008; Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010) and again, by the current experiment, but it 
does not provide a lynchpin for one theory over the other.  
The primary goal of the present experiment was to differentiate between the two 
theoretical explanations of developmental reversals in false memories. The current findings 
directly support AAT. According to AAT, the lower level of children’s false memories 
relative to adults’ is due to the fact that children do not activate the associative links between 
words and concepts as automatically as adults. In other words, if a manipulation enhances the 
level of automaticity with which children process information, then according to AAT, 
developmental reversals should be reduced. Drawing on previous research, inducing positive 
moods is such a manipulation because positive moods lead to a heuristic processing mode 
which is relatively automatic (Bolte et al., 2003; Corson, 2002; Zhang et al., 2017a). In 
contrast, negative moods lead to a systematic processing mode which requires more cognitive 
resources and effort. Consistent with AAT’s predictions, we found that in a positive mood, 
developmental reversals were eliminated for all kinds of information, while in a negative 
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mood, developmental reversals still occurred for negative information. In addition, the 
present findings suggested that with increasing knowledge and experience, adolescents’ 
associative links among negative concepts may be as integrated as those of adults, increasing 
their false recall to an adult level. 
Although the current findings provide direct support for AAT’s explanation for the 
developmental reversal effect, they do not directly refute FTT’s explanation. Recall that 
FTT’s predictions regarding the effect of negative and positive moods on developmental 
reversals are primarily based on the standard theoretical interpretation of negative and 
positive moods (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005). However, the standard interpretation of the 
effects of positive moods was not supported in the present experiment: we found that 
participants in positive moods exhibited fewer, rather than more, false memories than did 
participants in neutral moods. In other words, positive mood, just like negative mood, appears 
to reduce rather than to enhance gist processing. From this perspective, according to FTT, 
false memories produced in a positive mood should be qualitatively similar to those produced 
in a negative mood. In addition, the age-related increase in false memories should be less for 
participants in a positive mood than for participants in a neutral mood. This pattern was 
exactly what we observed in the present experiment, especially for negative information. 
On the surface, two findings from the present research appear to be inconsistent with 
some prior research. First, it was somewhat surprising that developmental reversals were not 
obtained in the neutral mood condition for neutral and positive word lists considering that 
developmental reversals have been found when participants are in their natural (non-
manipulated) mood, which is often assumed to be neutral. The difference between the present 
findings and prior research is likely due to differences in arousal levels, which we measured 
here, but is often only assumed in other research. In the present experiment, participants in 
the neutral mood condition were moderately aroused, but we have no idea whether the 
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arousal level of participants in their natural mood in prior research was also moderate or 
whether it was consistent across age groups. This uncertainty makes direct comparison 
between the present findings and prior research impossible. In addition, the difference 
between the present findings and prior research might also be due to arousal caused by the 
emotional content of the word lists. Arousal of emotional word lists was well controlled in 
the present experiment, however, in some prior studies, arousal has often been confounded 
with valence (for review, see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016). Prior research has indicated that 
once the arousal level of emotional word lists is controlled across list valence, developmental 
reversals for positive or neutral word lists tend to be less pronounced than for negative word 
lists (Brainerd et al. 2010), a finding that is consistent with the results of the present 
experiment. 
The mechanism of the age-related changes in false memories as a function of valence 
of to-be-remembered information may be due to semantic density of information. Compared 
to positive or neutral information, negative information has greater semantic density (e.g., 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2008; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). The greater semantic density of 
negative information renders gist information easier to retrieve (as suggested by FTT) and 
also allows the associative links among negative studied words to spread more easily to 
negative critical lures (as suggested by AAT) (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 
2008; Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010). Moreover, gist retrieval or associative activation is 
better in adults than in children, which in turn leaves more room for negative information to 
show the age-related increase in false memory than for positive or neutral information. 
The second finding from the present research that appears to be inconsistent with 
some prior research is that, according to the standard theoretical interpretation of negative 
and positive moods, negative moods are thought to promote item-specific processing, which 
reduces false memories, whereas positive moods are thought to enhance gist processing, 
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which increase false memories (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Hege & Dodson, 2004; Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005, 2011). In contrast, as described earlier, our positive mood manipulation did not 
enhance false memories. Instead, participants who were in a positive mood exhibited fewer 
false memories than those who were in a neutral mood. Again, this difference is likely due to 
differences in arousal levels across studies. Prior research has shown that valence and arousal 
have different effects on false memories (Brainerd et al., 2010; Bookbinder & Brainerd, 
2016; Corson & Verrier, 2007). In the present experiment, we strictly controlled arousal 
across moods, whereas in prior research, arousal has often been confounded with valence 
(e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Therefore, it is likely that the effect of positive moods on 
false memories in prior research was due to the combined effects of valence and arousal 
rather than to valence per se.  
Overall, we found that children who were in a positive mood exhibited the same level 
of false recall irrespective of the valence of the list words, but when they were in a negative 
mood, the level of false recall for negative information was lower than that exhibited by 
adolescents and adults. These findings cannot be explained solely on the basis of age-related 
differences in mood strength. Although adults reported that they felt more positive than did 
children, and that they felt more negative than did adolescents and children, if age-related 
differences in mood strength played a role in the present results, we would have expected 
different levels of false memories between adults and children in a positive mood and 
different levels of false memories among adults, adolescents, and children in a negative 
mood. This was not the case. Additional research will be required to clearly understand any 
potential interaction between age and mood strength on false memories. 
To the best of our knowledge, the current experiment was the first to investigate the 
effect of moods on developmental reversals in false memories for emotional information. 
Although the explanatory power of FTT for the developmental reversal effect was not 
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directly tested in the present experiment, our data provides the first empirical support of 
AAT’s explanation for the effect. In future studies, this explanation could be further 
strengthened by conducting neuroimaging studies. For example, the anterolateral temporal 
lobe is thought to be involved in semantic gist memory, whereas the orbito-frontal cortex is 
thought to be involved in associative memory (Lewis, Critchley, Smith, & Dolan, 2005; 
Simons et al., 2005). In the generation of DRM false memories, both regions should be 
activated. In addition, individuals exhibit stronger amygdala activity during sad moods than 
during happy moods (Fitzgerald et al., 2011). Thus, we predict that children and adults might 
exhibit a similar degree of interaction among the amygdala, the orbito-frontal cortex, and the 
anterolateral temporal lobe in a DRM task when the activation of amygdala is relatively low 
(e.g., happy moods), but that there would be an age-related increase in the interaction among 
these areas when the activation of the amygdala is relatively strong (e.g., negative moods).  
Finally, there is also an important practical implication of our findings. When children 
are required to deploy their memory in stressful situations like in a courtroom, they are often 
attempting to recall emotionally-charged information in a negative mood. How does the 
nature of the information and the child’s mood at the time influence the accuracy of his or her 
recall? The current experiment is the first to address this question. We found that adults and 
adolescents are more likely to exhibit false memories than are children in general, and that 
mood has a significant effect on this age-related pattern. Counterintuitively, children who are 
in a negative mood may be more likely to make fewer negatively-charged errors than 
adolescents and adults. In contrast, children who are in a positive mood are likely to make a 







Mood Impedes Monitoring of Mood-Congruent False Memories 
In recent years, emotional false memories have attracted considerable experimental 
attention. Not only does this line of research offer an opportunity to better understand the 
theoretical interaction between emotion and memory, but it also has important practical 
implications for situations in which individuals are asked to remember emotionally-laden 
information outside the laboratory. For example, to avoid the development of emotional false 
memories in legal contexts, police, lawyers, and judges often specifically ask witnesses and 
victims to report only information that they remember actually happened and to avoid 
reporting information that may have come to mind, but did not take place. The key question 
is whether warnings of this kind, particularly at the time of memory retrieval, actually work 
by reducing or eliminating emotional false memories. The present experiment is the first to 
explore this question under controlled laboratory conditions. 
Empirical investigation of emotional false memories in the laboratory is often based 
on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). In the typical DRM procedure, participants learn a number of neutral word lists in 
which all the studied words (e.g., bed, rest, pillow) are semantically related to a critical lure 
(e.g., sleep) that is not presented on the original list. At test, participants often falsely recall 
critical lures, believing that these words were presented at study, which leads to robust false 
recall and/or false recognition effects.  
In research on emotional false memories using the DRM paradigm, the neutral word 
lists are replaced by emotional word lists where both studied words and critical lures are 
emotionally charged (e.g., unhappy, sorrow, and depression are list words for the critical 
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 This chapter is currently under review. References to Zhang et al. (2017a) in the current chapter refer to 




lure, sad). In addition, participants learn emotional word lists while in a particular mood, 
which is normally induced prior to study. In this way, some to-be-remembered lists are mood 
congruent while others are not. Ruci et al. (2009) initially tested whether false memories 
would be enhanced for emotional critical lures that matched participants’ mood state. 
Participants took part in a mood-induction procedure and were then asked to learn negative, 
positive, and neutral word lists. As predicted, Ruci and colleagues found a mood-congruent 
false memory effect. That is, participants in a negative mood falsely recalled and recognised 
more negative critical lures than positive and neutral critical lures, and participants in a 
positive mood falsely recalled and recognised more positive critical lures than negative and 
neutral critical lures. However, because Ruci et al. did not control arousal across mood or 
across the emotional word lists, it was impossible to determine whether the observed effect 
was due to emotional valence, arousal, or both. To address this issue, Zhang et al. (2017a) 
compiled emotional word lists in which arousal was strictly controlled, as was participants’ 
mood. Zhang et al. found a negative mood-congruent false memory effect. This effect was 
also reported in Knott and Thorley’s (2014) study where the negative mood-congruent false 
memory effect was maintained over a one-week period. 
Theoretical explanations of the mood-congruent false memory effect have often 
included network theory (Bower, 1981) and spreading-activation theory (Roediger, Balota, et 
al., 2001) (together known as associative theories). According to these associative theories, a 
given mood is represented as a node in memory which collects other attributes that are related 
to that mood, including particular words and relevant concepts. When that mood node is 
activated, all of those words and concepts are activated in the associative network. The 
activation not only spreads to emotionally- and semantically-related information that has 
been presented (i.e., studied words), but also spreads to relevant information that has not been 
presented (i.e., critical lures). According to associative theories, mood-congruent false 
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memories occur because mood acts as a source of activation, which, when combined with 
semantic activation of the studied words, spreads to emotionally- and semantically-related 
critical lures, resulting in mood-congruent false memories. 
Although one-process accounts which include these associative theories can explain 
how mood-congruent false memories occur, they cannot explain the mechanism under which 
mood-congruent false memories might be reduced or eliminated. Alternatively, activation-
monitoring theory (AMT) and fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) ─ both dual-process accounts ─ may 
provide a potential explanation. According to AMT (Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001), 
activation alone does not determine the generation of false memories; monitoring of activated 
information also plays a role. Given that presented information has more perceptual details 
than does unpresented information, the goal of monitoring is to take advantage of these 
differences to distinguish between information that has been presented (true memories) and 
that which has not been presented (false memories). Moreover, the activation process and the 
monitoring process are not independent. Strong activation leads the unpresented information 
(e.g., critical lures) to share many of the features related to the presented information (e.g., 
studied words). Under these conditions, source monitoring becomes difficult and errors may 
arise, increasing the probability that false memories will occur. Although monitoring 
processes are usually discussed with respect to retrieval, according to AMT, monitoring 
processes can also exist at encoding. For example, research has shown that warnings about 
the false memory phenomenon are more effective in reducing false memories when those 
warnings are presented prior to study (i.e., at encoding) than when they are presented after 
study, but before the test (Gallo et al., 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998).  
According to another dual-process account, FTT, there are two opponent 
representations (or traces) of information in memory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Verbatim 
traces represent the specificity of information (e.g., the position, pronunciation, and length of 
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each studied word in the DRM paradigm) (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Gist traces, on the other 
hand, refer to the general semantic meaning of information (e.g., gist-related critical lures in 
the DRM paradigm). According to FTT, DRM false memories primarily reflect a process of 
gist extraction; a critical lure can be regarded as the gist of a word list because all of the 
words in the list are semantically related to the critical lure. Thus it follows that, if a 
manipulation, like a warning, encourages verbatim processing of information, then using this 
manipulation should reduce false memories. 
Taken together, dual-process accounts (AMT and FTT) of how mood-congruent false 
memories occur predict that false memories should be reduced through enhanced monitoring 
and verbatim processing. Although the role of mood in the generation of mood-congruent 
false memories at encoding has been supported by empirical evidence (Knott & Thorley, 
2014; Ruci et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2017), to date, no empirical research has investigated 
whether mood could play a role in the retrieval of mood-congruent false memories through 
improved monitoring and verbatim processing. To our best knowledge, there is only one 
relevant study in the literature. Yang, Yang, Ceci, and Isen (2015) tested whether positive 
moods would facilitate monitoring following warnings. Participants were induced in either a 
positive or a neutral mood, and were asked to remember typical DRM word lists, which were 
neutral. Warnings were provided both before and after study. Yang and colleagues found that 
false recognition was lower when participants were in a positive mood relative to a neutral 
mood. Yang et al. concluded that, compared to neutral moods, positive moods promote 
monitoring that is initiated by warnings. However, because Yang et al. presented the 
warnings both before and after study, we cannot draw a conclusion about the effect of mood 
on the retrieval of critical lures, in particular. Moreover, because neutral rather than 
emotional (positive or negative) word lists were used in the study, we do not know whether 
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there would be any impact of positive or negative moods on retrieval of mood-congruent 
critical lures. 
In Experiment 6, I drew on prior research by using warnings to encourage monitoring 
of memory. Moreover, in the warning instructions, I explicitly asked participants to focus on 
verbatim information of each studied word in order to enhance their verbatim processing. The 
experimental design included a no-warning condition and two warning conditions: a warning 
was either presented before study (the warning-before-study condition) or after study, but 
before test (the warning-after-study condition). I tentatively assumed that (i) compared to no 
warnings, either a warning at encoding or a warning at retrieval would reduce emotional false 
memories, irrespective of whether they were mood-congruent or not, (ii) the effect of a 
warning at encoding would be more robust than that of a warning at retrieval, and (iii) based 
on Yang et al.’s (2015) findings, in the warning-after-study condition, positive and negative 
moods, compared to neutral moods, would promote monitoring processes of positive and 

















Two hundred and seventy 17- to 24-year-old undergraduate university students (135 
female) from a moderate-sized city were recruited for this experiment via an Experimental 
Participation Pool. The sample size was based on prior studies of this kind (e.g., Howe, 2007; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Zhang et al., 2017). All of the participants were native English 
speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had no history of mood disorders. 
Participants satisfied a small portion of course assessment by completing a worksheet based 
on the experiment. The research was reviewed and approved by the University’s Human 
Ethics Committee, which is approved by the National Health Research Council and whose 
guidelines are consistent with those of the American Psychological Association. 
Materials and Procedure 
        The experimental procedure was modelled after Zhang et al. (2017a). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three warning conditions (no warning, warning-before-study, 
warning-after-study; n = 90 in each condition). Participants in the no-warning condition 
(NW) were not presented with any warning instructions. Participants in the warning-before-
study condition (WB) were presented with the warning instructions before the study phase, 
while participants in the warning-after-study condition (WA) were presented with the 
warning instructions after the study phase, but prior to the test phase. We modelled the 
warning instructions
 
after McDermott and Roediger (1998) but added an additional 
instruction that, to avoid being tricked, participants should focus on the feature of each word 
itself rather than the semantic relation between the words. The warning instructions
5
 were as 
follows: 
                                                          
5
 For participants in the warning-after-study (WA) condition, the warning was presented using the past tense. 
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In this experiment, you will learn 12 word lists, with 10 words per list. Each 
list consists of related words. All of the words in each list are associated to one 
common word, but this word will not actually be presented in the study phase. 
What we are trying to do in this experiment is to trick you into saying that you 
remember learning these common words. 
For example, you might learn the following list of words: queen, England, 
crown, prince, dictator, palace, throne, monarch, royal, reign. 
In this case, king is the common word that links all the above words. In the 
memory test phase, you will be asked whether or not king was presented. You 
should make a “New” judgment for it since king was not presented in the study 
phase. So to avoid being tricked by the common words, you should ignore the 
semantic relation between the words but focus on the features of words 
themselves (e.g., pronunciation). In the test phase, you should only report the 
words that were presented at study and avoid reporting the words that were 
not actually presented. 
Within each warning condition, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral, n = 30 in each). Participants in the positive 
mood-induction group listened to 8 minutes of Bach’s Brandenburg Concerto No. 3 while 
participants in the negative mood-induction group listened to 8 mins of Prokofiev’s 
Alexander Nevsky: Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke. Participants in the neutral group were 
asked to read a collection of basic facts about New Zealand, including population size, gross 
national product, cultures, etc. This exercise took 8 minutes to complete based on normal 
reading speed. This method has been shown to effectively induce positive, negative, and 
neutral moods in young adults (Chepenik et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2011; Rowe et al., 2007; 
Zhang et al., 2017a).  
Immediately following the mood-induction phase, participants were asked to assess 
how happy (1) or sad (9) and how excited (1) or calm (9) they were using an adapted version 
of Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Self-Assessment Manikins (SAMs). These graphic scales 
represent different emotional dimensions on a 9-point scale: the valence SAM ranges from a 
happy, smiling figure (1) to an unhappy, frowning figure (9), similarly, the arousal SAM 
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ranges from an excited, wide-eyed figure (1) to a relaxed, calm figure (9) (see Bradley & 
Lang, 1999, for examples).  
     I used 12 emotional DRM word lists taken from Zhang et al. (2017a).  Four of the 
word lists contained negative words, four contained positive words, and four contained 
neutral words. The emotional word lists did not differ in level of arousal or BAS values and 
every word on a particular list reflected the target emotion. Each list was 10-words long and 
participants were presented with the words on each list in the descending order of their BAS 
values.  
     Participants were tested in groups of up to 8. All of the tasks were presented through 
individual headphones. The presentation order of word lists was partially counterbalanced 
across participants; that is, half of the participants in each warning/mood induction condition 
learned 4 negative word lists, followed by 4 neutral word lists, followed by 4 positive word 
lists, and the other half of the participants learned the word lists in the reverse order (see also, 
Howe et al., 2010; Knott & Thorley, 2014; Ruci et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2017a). Each word 
was presented for 2s on a computer monitor. After all of the words in the word list were 
presented, a message came up to inform the participant that the next word list was about to 
appear. Participants were asked to remember all 12 word lists. Between the study phase and 
the test phase, participants completed a 5-min subtraction exercise.  
     The recognition test words were also taken from Zhang et al. (2017a) and contained 
36 studied words--from serial positions 1, 4, and 8 of each word list; 12 critical lures, and 24 
unrelated words. The order of presentation of the 72 test words was completely random. 
Participants were asked to make an “Old” decision if they thought a word had been presented 
in the study phase and to make a “New” decision if they thought a word had not been 
presented in the study phase. After the recognition test, participants in the WB and WA 
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conditions were asked to write down the strategy that they used to avoid being tricked. 



























Mood manipulation check 
 Recall that participants’ level of emotional arousal and the valence of their mood were 
indexed by 9-point scales. Lower scores referred to higher arousal (excitement) and more 
positive valence (happiness). Two separate 3 (mood) x 3 (warning condition) analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted using the valence scores and the arousal scores as 
dependent variables. For valence, there were main effects of mood, F(2, 261) = 182.18, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .583, and warning condition, F(2, 261) = 22.78, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .149, and a 
Mood × Warning Condition interaction, F(4, 261) = 9.96, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .132. As shown in 
Table 8.1 (Valence), overall, participants in positive moods felt more positive than those in 
neutral moods, who in turn felt more positive than participants in negative moods. However, 
in the positive mood group, participants in the WB condition reported higher valence scores 
than did participants in the NW or WA conditions. Likewise, in the neutral mood group, 
participants in the WB condition reported higher valence scores than did participants in the 
NW or WA conditions.  
For arousal, there were also main effects of mood, F(2, 261) = 24.95, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 =  .160, and warning condition, F(2, 261) = 10.67, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .076, and a Mood × 
Warning Condition interaction, F(4, 261) = 10.49, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .138. As shown in Table 
8.1 (Arousal), the level of arousal was similar across three mood states. Only in the WB 
condition, did participants in positive moods have a higher level of arousal than participants 
in neutral or negative moods.  
True and false recognition analyses 
The data for each dependent variable was subjected to separate 3 (warning condition: 
no warning, warning before study, and warning after study) × 3 (mood: negative, positive, 
and neutral) × 3 (list valence: negative, positive, and neutral) mixed factor ANOVAs with 
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repeated measures over list valence (Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor). Any significant 
effects were examined using the Bonferroni correction for pairwise-comparisons. 
For true recognition of studied words (see Table 8.2), there was no effect of warning 
conditions, however, there was a main effect of list valence, F(2, 522) = 4.96, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
 .019, and a List Valence × Mood interaction, F(4, 522) = 5.02, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .037. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that participants recognised more negative than positive or 
neutral studied words when they were in negative moods, and participants recognised more 
positive and negative studied words than neutral studied words when they were in positive 
moods. 
Table 8.1. 
The Mean Valence and Arousal Scores and 95% CIs as a Function of Mood for Each 
Warning Condition 
  Positive Mood Neutral Mood  Negative Mood 
Warning Condition Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
 
Valence 
No warning (NW) 2.43 [1.98, 2.88] 4.53 [4.08, 4.98] 7.00 [6.55, 7.45] 
Warning before (WB) 4.70 [4.25, 5.15] 5.87 [5.42, 6.32] 6.63 [6.18, 7.08] 
Warning after (WA) 2.60 [2.15, 3.05] 4.53 [4.08, 4.98] 6.77 [6.32, 7.22] 
 
Arousal 
No warning (NW) 5.57 [4.98, 6.15] 6.07 [5.48, 6.65] 6.17 [5.58, 6.75] 
Warning before (WB) 3.17 [2.58, 3.75] 4.53 [3.95, 5.12] 7.03 [6.45, 7.62] 





The Proportion and 95% CIs of True Recognition of Studied Words as a Function of List 
Valence and Mood 
  Negative mood Positive mood Neutral mood 
Negative studied words .77 [.72, .81] .71 [.66, .75] .69 [.64, .73] 
Positive studied words .71 [.66, .75] .72 [.68, .77] .66 [.62, .70] 
Neutral studied words .67 [.62, .71] .66 [.62, .70] .71 [.66, .75] 
 
The false recognition rates are shown in Figure 8.1 as a function of warning condition, 
list valence, and mood. For false recognition of critical lures, there were three main findings. 
First, the false recognition rate was higher for negative (M = .58) and positive critical lures 
(M = .54) than it was for neutral critical lures (M = .47), F(2, 522) = 15.21, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝 
2 = .055. Second, the false recognition rate was higher in negative moods (M = .58) than it 
was in neutral moods (M = .48) or positive moods (M = .52), F(2, 261) = 3.84, p = .023, 
𝜂𝑝 
2 = .029. Finally, the false recognition rate in the NW condition (M = .66) was higher than 
that in the WA condition (M = .56), which in turn was higher than that in the WB condition 
(M = .37), F(2, 261) = 34.37, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝 
2 = .208. In sum, warnings reduced false memory 
regardless of the valence of the to-be-remembered information and participants’ mood. In 
addition, warnings provided at encoding were more effective than were warnings provided at 
retrieval. There were no interactions (all F’s ≤ 1.72, ns). 
Recall that the primary aim of the present experiment was to determine the impact of 
mood on retrieval of mood-congruent critical lures when the monitoring strategies were 
provided after encoding, but before retrieval. Hence, four additional planned comparisons 
were conducted in the WA condition. For negative critical lures, the false recognition rate 
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was lower in neutral moods than that in negative moods, t(87) = 3.04, p = .003, d = 0.83. For 
positive critical lures, the false recognition rate was lower in neutral moods than that in 
positive moods, t(87) = 2.62, p = .01, d = 0.66. Finally, for neutral critical lures, there was no 
reliable difference in the false recognition rate between neutral moods and negative moods, 
t(87) = -0.99, p > .250, nor between neutral moods and positive moods, t(87) = -1.32, p 
= .191. Taken together, these findings indicate that, compared to neutral moods, negative and 
positive moods inhibited, rather than promoted, the monitoring processes of mood-congruent 
critical lures at retrieval. 
For false recognition of unrelated words, false recognition rates were low and no main 
















Figure 8.1. Proportions of false recognition of critical lures (CL) as a function of warning 






















































































The aims of the present experiment were two-fold. First, I investigated the effect of 
warnings, particularly warnings at the time of retrieval, on the creation of emotional false 
memories. Second, I investigated the role of mood on retrieval of mood-congruent false 
memories when monitoring and verbatim processes were encouraged. To achieve these aims, 
I induced particular moods and asked participants to learn emotional DRM word lists, which 
differed in valence, but not in arousal. As in prior research (Gallo et al., 2001; McCabe & 
Smith, 2002), I provided participants with an example to illustrate the DRM false memory 
effect. Moreover, I also provided participants with a specific monitoring strategy ─ focusing 
on the verbatim information of each word. Consistent with prior research, warnings had no 
reliable effect on true recognition, but warnings provided at the time of encoding significantly 
reduced false recognition (see also, Del Prete, Mirandola, Konishi, Cornoldi, & Ghetti, 2014; 
Gallo et al., 1997; Gallo et al., 2001; McCabe & Smith, 2002; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; 
Starns, Lane, Alonzo, & Roussel, 2007; Watson, McDermott, & Balota, 2004). More 
importantly, although the effect of retrieval warnings was not as pronounced as that of 
encoding warnings, warnings provided at the time of retrieval also reduced false recognition, 
regardless of the valence of to-be-remembered information or participants’ mood. This 
finding regarding the effect of retrieval warnings on false memories is generally consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Anastasi, Rhodes, & Burns, 2000; Gallo et al., 2001; McCabe & 
Smith, 2002), however, the effect of retrieval warnings in the present experiment was more 
robust compared to that in prior studies.  
In contrast to our findings and those of others, some researchers have failed to report 
an effect of retrieval warnings on false recognition (e.g., Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, & 
Toglia, 2001). These mixed findings may be due to the type of monitoring strategies that 
participants are encouraged to employ at the time of retrieval (Gallo et al., 2001; Neuschatz et 
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al., 2001; Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). According to FTT, if participants are given a specific 
strategy that helps them to make verbatim responses, then false memories should be reduced 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). Consistent with FTT’s prediction, in the 
present experiment, we provided participants with a specific strategy that required them to 
focus on verbatim information for each word and, under these conditions, false recognition 
was significantly reduced. By comparison, although Neuschatz et al. (2001) also presented 
participants with an example to introduce the DRM false memory effect and to further 
introduce the qualitative differences between true and false memories, the warnings that they 
used in their study (e.g., “we are trying to trick you so please try to avoid reporting items that 
are consistent with the theme but were not presented,” p. 69) were not effective in reducing 
false recognition. In Neuschatz et al.’s procedure, participants had to initially deduce the 
theme of each list before judging whether or not a test item was consistent with that theme, 
leaving open the possibility that the theme that participants thought of might not have 
necessarily been the assigned theme or the critical lure. Under these circumstances, false 
recognition for the critical lure may not be reduced. In contrast, the strategy that we used in 
the present experiment was direct and clear; we asked participants to focus on verbatim 
information for each word so that participants were only required to recollect verbatim 
information of each encoded word to judge whether or not the word has been presented. 
Using this direct strategy, false recognition for the critical lures was reduced. 
The finding that retrieval warnings reduced only false recognition, but had no impact 
on true recognition indicates that a strategy that encourages participants to access verbatim 
information at retrieval may help participants experience the recollection-rejection process 
(FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). The term recollection rejection refers to the process by 
which false-but-gist-related information is rejected from memory reports when verbatim 
information of studied information is accessible (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 
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2003). For example, participants who are encouraged to focus on the verbatim information 
for each word may not make an “old” response to anger because they can recollect verbatim 
information for mad, rage, fury, but not verbatim information for anger. This same strategy 
may not necessarily facilitate the retrieval of list words because true recognition is not only 
due to verbatim processing of information, but also due to gist-related processing of 
information (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Yang et al., 2015).  
The other important finding of the present experiment was that compared to neutral 
moods, positive moods impeded retrieval monitoring of positive critical lures, and negative 
moods impeded retrieval monitoring of negative critical lures. In other words, mood 
influenced retrieval of mood-congruent false memories through improved monitoring and 
verbatim processing. Although Yang et al. (2015) also found that positive moods facilitated 
the role of warnings on reducing false memories, direct comparisons between our experiment 
and Yang et al.’s is impossible because the key manipulations are totally different. For 
example, Yang et al. did not differentiate between encoding warnings and retrieval warnings 
because warnings were presented both before and after study in their experiment. In contrast, 
in the present experiment, independent groups of participants experienced either encoding or 
retrieval warnings. Moreover, it was impossible to draw conclusions about the effect of mood 
on mood-congruent information in Yang et al. (2015) because only neutral word lists were 
used. The present experiment, however, bridged this gap by manipulating both the valence of 
the to-be-remembered word lists and participants’ mood, making it possible to explore the 
effect of mood on encoding and retrieval of mood-congruent information. 
Prior research has supported the role of mood on encoding of mood-congruent critical 
lures. That is, mood may act as a source of activation, which combines with semantic 
activation of studied words. The activation then spreads to emotionally- and semantically-
related critical lures, thus generating mood-congruent false memories (Knott & Thorley, 
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2014; Ruci et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2017a). However, no empirical study has investigated 
the role of mood on retrieval of mood-congruent critical lures. The present experiment was 
the first to find that mood may not only influence encoding of mood-congruent critical lures 
via enhanced activation (as suggested by one-process accounts), but may also influence 
retrieval of mood-congruent critical lures via impeding monitoring. This finding is consistent 
with the AMT account of false memories which argues that activation of studied words alone 
cannot ensure that false memories will occur because retrieval monitoring may also play a 
role (Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). Moreover, according to AMT, activation and the 
monitoring process are not independent. Strong activations lead the unpresented information 
to share many of the features related to presented information. Under these conditions, source 
monitoring becomes difficult and errors may arise (Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). The idea 
of monitoring in AMT was actually adapted from Johnson‘s source-monitoring framework 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). According to the source-monitoring 
framework, there are two types of decision-making processes: heuristic (automatic) and 
systematic (controlled). In the absence of additional strategies to promote monitoring, people 
typically make source judgments heuristically with little deliberation. However, when a 
monitoring strategy is encouraged, people make source judgments in a relatively controlled 
manner with more contemplation and deliberation (Gallo et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 1993; 
McCabe & Smith, 2002). 
Consistent with AMT, in the present experiment, when warnings were provided at 
retrieval, activation of the studied words remained intact. Positive or negative moods, 
compared to neutral moods, may facilitate strong activations of mood-congruent information 
at encoding. At retrieval, strong activations in turn may lead to relatively heuristic 
judgements to positive or negative information under positive or negative moods, 
respectively. Because of the familiarity-based heuristic decision strategy, unpresented words 
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that are emotionally- and semantically-related to studied words (i.e., mood-congruent critical 
lures) tend to be regarded as having been studied.  
Another explanation for the effect of mood on retrieval of mood-congruent false 
memories is based on Balota et al.’s (1999) idea that attentional control plays a role at 
retrieval when making source judgments about items with similar sources of activation. 
According to their account, the cognitive mechanism of avoiding DRM false memories is 
similar to that which occurs in the Stroop interference task. In the Stroop task, a series of 
squares in different colors are presented, each accompanied by a color word that is different 
from the color of the square. For example, a red square might be accompanied by the word 
green, yellow, or blue but not red. Participants are required to name the color of the square 
rather than to read out the word label (Stroop, 1935). To avoid interference by the word label, 
participants must focus their attention on the color, per se. According to Balota et al., when 
retrieval warnings are used in the DRM task, the activated semantic information is analogous 
to the activated word information in the square. The verbatim information that warnings 
emphasise, on the other hand, is analogous to the colour information in the Stroop task 
(Balota et al., 1999; McCabe & Smith, 2002). To avoid being tricked by the semantically-
related critical lures, participants must focus their attention on the verbatim information of 
each studied word. The present findings demonstrate that the degree to which attentional 
control is effective in helping participants to avoid interference by semantic information in 
the DRM task may be influenced by the valence of the to-be-remembered information and 
rememberers’ mood. Positive or negative moods may hamper attentional control of mood-
congruent information at retrieval, and familiarity-based judgments are made to mood-
congruent critical lures. As a result, false recognition for positive critical lures is higher in 
positive moods than in neutral moods, and false recognition for negative critical lures is 
higher in negative moods than in neutral moods.  
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Taken together, the two main findings in the present experiment may also have 
important practical implications in situations where people are asked to report emotional 
information in a particular mood. First, retrieval warnings reduced false memories, regardless 
of valence of to-be-remembered information and participants’ mood, as long as a specific 
monitoring strategy was provided prior to retrieval. This finding suggests that in real-word 
contexts, police, lawyers, and judges should offer witnesses and victims an effective 
monitoring strategy to help them avoid information that has come to mind, but that did not 
happen. For example, questioners may initially obtain some relevant information from the 
scene, and then they may take advantage of this kind of true information to encourage 
witnesses and victims to recollect or visualise the key information. Because of the 
recollection-rejection process, under this condition, witnesses and victims may be able to 
avoid reporting false information. Second, our finding that compared to neutral moods, 
negative moods impeded retrieval monitoring of negative critical lures, suggested that it is 
necessary to consider the current mood state of witnesses or victims (i.e., negative moods) 
when they are attempting to recall information. In a negative mood state, it may be difficult 
for witnesses and victims to monitor their memories for negative information, in particular. 
Consequently, they may report more negative-but-unpresented information in negative moods 











Does Directed Forgetting Reduce Emotional False Memories? 
In cases of child abuse, a perpetrator may tell a child victim to forget that the abuse 
ever happened or tell a child witness to forget what they saw. Whether these instructions 
influence children’s memory is not known, but the answer to the question has considerable 
practical importance. Given that instructions of this kind are analogous to directed forgetting, 
procedures used in laboratory studies of memory, it may be possible to use directed forgetting 
procedures to assess the effects of similar instructions on true and false memory in the DRM 
paradigm.  
When directed-forgetting procedures are used within the DRM paradigm, participants 
initially learn List 1, followed by a directed-forgetting cue where participants are asked to 
forget List 1 because it will not be tested later. Then participants learn List 2. In the 
subsequent test, participants are required to recall the words on List 1. In the control 
condition, participants only learn and recall List 3. The consistent finding is that the number 
of List 1 words recalled by participants in the directed-forgetting condition is less than the 
number of List 3 words recalled by participants in the control condition. That is, directed 
forgetting affects episodic access to the to-be-forgotten words. As a result, true memories for 
these words are reduced (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2009; 
Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsma'ny, & Frankish, 2000; Howe, 2005; Kimball & Bjork, 
2002; Wilson & Kipp, 1998). 
Does directed forgetting influence false memory in the DRM paradigm? Predictions 
regarding the effect of directed forgetting on DRM false memory builds on evidence  that 
directed forgetting affects episodic access, but not semantic activation (Howe, 2005; Kimball 
& Bjork, 2002). Evidence has shown that directed forgetting influences memory only when a 
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direct memory task (i.e., free recall) is conducted (Kimball & Bjork, 2002). To complete 
indirect memory tasks, such as stem completion and word association, semantic activation is 
needed. Directed forgetting, however, does not affect the indirect memory tasks, suggesting 
that directed forgetting does not influence semantic activation of studied words. Based on this 
idea, there are two different theoretical predictions as to whether directed forgetting 
influences false memory in the DRM paradigm. According to the spreading-activation theory 
(SAT; Roediger, Balota, et al., 2001), DRM false memory is due to semantic activation of the 
studied words. This activation then automatically spreads to semantically-related, but non-
presented critical lures, resulting in a high rate of false memory (Roediger, Balota, et al., 
2001). Inasmuch as directed forgetting does not influence semantic activation, SAT predicts 
that directed forgetting would not affect false memory in the DRM paradigm.  
Alternatively, fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) and activation-
monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001) contend that the effect of directed 
forgetting on false memory may be more complex than SAT predicts. On the one hand, 
according to FTT and AMT, the generation of false memory is not only due to semantic 
activation of studied words, but also due to the monitoring process in which verbatim traces 
(as proposed by FTT) or episodically-distinctive information (as proposed by AMT) may be 
used to hamper retrieval of related-but-unpresented critical lures. Because directed forgetting 
impairs access to verbatim traces or episodically-distinctive information (e.g., the position, 
pronunciation, and length of each studied word), it is likely that the monitoring process of 
false memory is impeded as well. According to FTT and AMT, false memories may increase 
with directed forgetting. On the other hand, AMT predicts that if strong activation of critical 
lures occurs, which leads critical lures to share many of the features related to the studied 
words, the monitoring process becomes difficult irrespective of whether verbatim or 
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distinctive information is accessible or not. As a result, directed forgetting would have no 
impact on false memory.  
In the literature, there are only a few studies that have investigated the effect of 
directed forgetting on true and false memory. Kimball and Bjork (2002), for example, in a 
study with young adults, asked participants in the experimental group to forget List 1 because 
it was just a practice list and to instead remember the next list (i.e., List 2). In the recall test, 
however, participants had to recall the words on List 1. Participants in the control group 
studied and recalled only one list. Consistent with prior research, the true recall rate for the 
control list was significantly higher than that for the to-be-forgotten list. This finding 
indicated that directed forgetting impairs the access of verbatim or distinctive information of 
studied words. But what happened to false memory of critical lures when episodic access to 
the studied words was impaired by directed forgetting? In contrast to the pattern found in true 
memory, Kimball and Bjork found that the false recall rate for the to-be-forgotten list was 
significantly higher than that for the control list. In other words, false memories increased 
with directed forgetting. This pattern of findings is consistent with FTT and AMT. 
Using the same method as Kimball and Bjork (2002), Howe (2005) recruited 5-year-
olds, 7-year-olds, and 11-year-olds to investigate the developmental pattern of directed-
forgetting effects on true and false memory. Consistent with adults’ performance, the true 
recall rate for the control list was significantly higher than that for the to-be-forgotten list. 
This pattern was consistent across ages. For false memory, 11-year-olds recalled more critical 
lures than did 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds, showing a typical developmental reversal effect. 
However, children also exhibited significantly reduced false memory for the to-be-forgotten 
list (i.e., List 1) compared to the control list. That is, unlike adults, children reported fewer 
false memories for the list that they were asked to forget. This finding suggests that there may 
be an age-related difference in the effect of directed-forgetting on false memory. 
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In addition to age, mood may also influence the directed-forgetting effects on true and 
false memory because positive moods may promote reactivation of to-be-forgotten words 
(i.e., List 1) during the encoding of List 2, compared to negative moods (Bolte et al., 2003). 
Such reactivation may eliminate forgetting the words on List 1. In one study, for example, 
Bäuml and Kuhbandner (2009) used emotional pictures to induce positive, negative, or 
neutral moods. Following the presentation of a word list (i.e., List 1), participants were 
instructed to either forget or remember that list for a later test. They were then instructed to 
remember List 2. All of the words on Lists 1 and 2 were neutral. At test, participants were 
asked to recall List 1. As predicted, the true recall rate in the forgetting condition was 
significantly lower than that in the remembering condition when participants were in negative 
moods. However, there was no significant difference in true recall between the two 
conditions when participants were in positive moods. In other words, positive moods 
inhibited the effect of directed forgetting on reducing true memories. Whether mood would 
affect directed-fogretting effects on false memories has not yet been investigated. Based on 
prior research and the relevant theories described above, specific predictions may depend on 
the emotional valence of to-be-forgotten informaiton and participant’s age.  
Although positive moods promote reactivation of to-be-forgotten words, compared to 
negative moods, as found in Bäuml and Kuhbandner (2009), the words used in that study 
were neutral. What would happen if the words were negatively charged? Evidence has shown 
that positive moods lead to a heuristic processing mode, which is characterised by a broad 
activation of not only positive but also negative information, whereas negative moods lead to 
a systematic processing mode, which is characterised by relatively restricted activation of 
negative information (Bolte et al., 2003; Schwarz, 2001; Zhang et al., 2017). In this sense, 
negative moods may promote reactivation of negative words on List 1 that is required to 
forget during the encoding of List 2, just as positive moods. Reactivation eliminates 
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forgetting the negative words on List 1. Therefore, when the words on Lists 1 and 2 are 
negatively charged, not only positive, but also negative moods may inhibit the effect of 
directed forgetting on reducing true memories. Given the reactivation of to-be-forgetton 
negative words in positive and negative moods, the access of verbatim traces or episodically- 
distinctive information may be intact. Correspondingly, the monitoring process of false 
memory may not be damaged. According to FTT and AMT, directed forgetting may not 
increase false memory when the to-be-forgotten words are negative. According to AMT, it is 
also possible that mood provides another source of activation of emotional informaton, which 
may lead to strong activation of critical lures. This strong activation may lead critical lures to 
share many of the features related to the studied words. Under this condition, the monitoring 
process becomes difficult. As a result, directed forgetting has no impact on false memory.  
There is consensus that adults typically exhibit higher true memory than do children 
because adults have a better developed knowledge base than do children so that adults are 
better at encoding and retrieving verbatim information (as suggested by FTT) or activating 
studied information (as suggested by AAT), compared to children. As described earlier, 
positive and negative moods may help reactivate the negative to-be-forgotten words, it is 
possible, however, that an ability to reactivate the negative to-be-forgotten words would be 
lower in children than in adults. Limited reactivation in children may not sufficiently 
eliminate forgetting the negative List 1 words. Therefore, unlike adults, directed forgetting 
may reduce children’s true memory for the negative to-be-forgotten words in positive and 
negative moods. Considering that directed forgetting inhibits children’s episodic access to 
studied words, and it is difficult for children to use verbatim or distinctive information of 
studied words to monitor their memory, it is possible that directed forgetting may increase 
children’s false memory. Alternatively, according to AMT, due to the additional activation of 
mood, strong activation of critical lures may happen in children, just like it happens in adults. 
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If this activation occurs, no matter whether the verbatim or distinctive information is 
accessible or not, the monitoring process itself becomes difficult. As a result, like adults, 
directed forgetting may have no impact on children’s false memory.  
The aims of Experiment 7 were two-fold. First, I wanted to investigate whether 
directed forgetting would influence children’s true and false memory for negative 
information when they were in a certain mood state (e.g., negative). Second, I wanted to 
explore age-related differences in directed-forgetting effects on true and false memory for 
negative information in a certain mood state. I tentatively predicted that directed forgetting 
would reduce children’s, but not adults’, true memory for negative information in positive 
and negative moods. As for false memory, there were two possibilities: 1) directed forgetting 
would enhance children’s, but not adults’, false memory for negative information in positive 
and negative moods, or 2) directed forgetting would not influence either children’s or adults’ 


















Sixty 6- to 8-year-old children (M age = 7.08 years, SD = 0.46) were recruited 
through a database of parents who had agreed to participate in studies of child development. 
All children were predominantly Caucasian and came from a wide range of socioeconomic 
backgrounds. They agreed to participate in this study, and their parents provided written 
consent. In addition, 60 undergraduate university students (M age = 19.45 years, SD = 1.03) 
were recruited through a Research Participation Pool. They satisfied a small portion of course 
assessment by completing a worksheet based on the experiment. Half of the participants in 
each age group were female. All of the participants were native English speakers with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of mood disorders. They had not 
participated in any similar studies before.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two mood conditions (n = 30 
participants of each age in each condition). Moods were induced using a video clip that had a 
positive or negative valence. The positive and negative video clips were the same as those 
used in Experiment 5 (i.e., the Hakuna Matata scene from The Lion King to induce positive 
mood and the scene bout the death of Mufasa to induce negative mood). Immediately 
following the mood-induction phase, participants were asked to assess their mood using the 
same self-report measure called A Nonverbal Scale of Emotion (ANSE; Lay et al., 1989) that 
was used in Experiment 5.  
   Participants then listened to audio recordings of word lists. Three 10-word lists were 
chosen from the emotional word lists compiled in Experiment 1 and all of the lists were 
negatively charged. Each word was presented for 2 s on a computer monitor. Participants 
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were told that they should remember each word carefully for the later memory test. All of the 
participants experienced the directed-forgetting and the control manipulations. Participants 
who experienced the directed-forgetting cues were initially asked to remember List 1 (i.e., the 
anger list); after learning the words on List 1, they were told to forget them because these 
words would not be tested later. After 30s, words on List 2 (i.e., the sick list) were shown. 
Immediately following the presentation of List 2, participants were required to recall the 
words on List 1. In the control condition, participants were only asked to remember List 3 
(i.e., the lie list), followed by a 30s distractor task, and then they were asked to recall as many 
of the words from the list as they could remember. The order of the directed-forgetting and 
the control manipulations were partially counterbalanced across participants; that is, half of 
the participants of each age group learned List 1 and List 2, followed by List 3, and the other 

















Mood manipulation check 
Recall that higher scores on the ANSE indicated that participants felt more positive or 
excited, while lower scores indicated that participants felt more negative or calm. I conducted 
separate 2 (mood: negative vs positive) × 2 (age: children vs adults) analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) across valence and arousal scores.  
For valence, there were main effects of mood, F(1, 116) = 1026.29, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
 .898, and age, F(1, 116) = 7.20, p = .008, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .058, and a Mood × Age interaction, F(1, 
116) = 16.41, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .124. Pairwise comparisons showed that regardless of age, 
participants in the negative mood condition felt more negative than those in the positive 
mood condition, p’s < .001. However, adults in the negative mood condition felt more 
negative than did children (M = 1.43 and 5.70, respectively, p < .001). There was no reliable 
difference in valence scores between adults and children when they were in the positive mood 
condition (M = 24.3 and 23.43, respectively, p > .250). 
For arousal, there were main effects of mood, F(1, 116) = 4.44, p = .037, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .037, 
age, F(1, 116) = 9.58 p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .076, and Mood × Age interaction, F(1, 116) = 13.45, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .104. Pairwise comparisons showed that the level of arousal did not differ 
between the negative (M = 12.53) and positive  mood condition (M = 11.53) in adults, 
p > .250, but when children in the positive mood condition (M = 15.87), their level of 
emotional arousal was higher than that when they were in the negative mood condition (M = 
12.17). Moreover, children in the positive mood felt more excited than did adults in the 
positive mood (15.87 vs 11.53, p < .001), but no reliable difference was found in arousal 
scores between children and adults when they were in the negative mood (12.17 vs 12.53, 





True and false recall were analysed using separate 2 (age: children vs young adults) × 
2 (mood: negative vs positive) × 2 (Interlist cue: forget vs control) mixed factor ANOVAs 
with repeated measures across interlist cue. Any significant effects were examined using the 
Bonferroni correction for pairwise-comparisons.  
True recall of studied words. Figure 9.1 shows the true recall rates of studied words 
as a function of age, mood, and interlist cue. There were main effects of interlist cue, F(1, 
116) = 40.89, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .261, and age, F(1, 116) = 254.59, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .687; adults 
(M = .51) had better memories for studied words than did children (M = .16). In addition to 
these main effects, there was also an Interlist Cue × Age interaction, F(1, 116) = 17.06, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .128. Regardless of interlist cue, adults had higher true recall rates for studied 
words than did children (both p’s < .001). Compared to the control group, however, the 
directed-forgetting cues were more effective in reducing children’s true memories (.08 vs .24, 
p < .001). In contrast, the directed-forgetting cues did not significantly reduce adults’ true 
memories (.50 vs .53, p = .112). There was also an Interlist Cue × Mood interaction, F(1, 
116) = 7.07, p = .009, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .057; regardless of their mood state, participants had a lower 
true recall rate of studied words when they experienced the directed-forgetting instructions 
than when they were in a control group. However, mood also had an effect on the directed-
forgetting cues; negative moods (M = .32) inhibited the effect of the directed-forgetting cues 
on reducing the true recall for studied words, compared to positive moods (M = .26). No 
significant difference in true recall between negative and positive moods was found in the 




Figure 9.1. Proportion of true recall (+/-1SE) as a function of mood, age, and interlist cue. 
False recall of critical lures. The false recall rate of the critical lures is shown in 
Figure 9.2 as a function of age, mood, and interlist cue. There was only a main effect of age, 
F(1, 116) = 57.76, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .332, adults showed higher false recall rates than did 
children (.52 vs .07). There was no reliable effect of the directed-forgetting cues on false 
recall for critical lures, regardless of age or mood (F’s ≤ 1.39 ns).  
 






























































The goal of the present experiment was to investigate the effect of directed forgetting 
on children’s and adults’ true and false memory for negative information in either positive or 
negative moods. Although the words used in the present experiment were negatively charged, 
which was different from those used in prior research (Basden et al., 1993; Bäuml & 
Kuhbandner, 2009; Conway et al., 2000; Howe, 2005; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Wilson & 
Kipp, 1998), the present findings are consistent with prior research, showing that directed 
forgetting reduced the true recall rate for the words on the to-be-forgotten list (i.e., List 1) 
compared to the true recall rate for the words on the control list (.29 vs .38). More 
importantly, there was an age-related difference in the effect of directed forgetting on true 
memory for negative information, regardless of mood. That is, directed forgetting reduced 
children’s, but not adults’, true memory for negative words. This age-related difference may 
be due to the fact that adults’ knowledge base is better developed than children’s. A better 
developed knowledge base may help adults encode and retrieve verbatim information or 
activate studied information much better than children. Consistent with this idea, we found 
that adults generated a higher true recall rate for studied words than did children. Moreover, 
when children and adults were induced in either positive or negative moods, mood may help 
reactivate the to-be-forgotten words. Compared to adults, however, children may exhibit 
limited ability to reactivate the to-be-forgotten words. Limited reactivation of the to-be-
forgotten words may make it difficult for children to inhibit the effect of directed forgetting 
on reducing true memory. As a result, directed forgetting impaired children’s, but not adults’, 
true memory for negative words. Given that negative moods promote verbatim memory, 
which increases true memories, another reason for why directed forgetting only reduced 
children’s, but not adults’ true memory may be that adults in the negative mood felt more 
negative than did children in the negative mood. 
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The effect of directed forgetting on true memory may be qualified by not only age, 
but also by mood because negative moods inhibited the effect of the directed-forgetting cues 
by reducing the true recall for the negative studied words, compared to positive moods (.32 
vs .26). As described earlier, positive moods lead to a heuristic processing mode, which is 
characterised by a broad activation of not only positive but also negative information, 
whereas negative moods lead to a systematic processing mode, which is characterised by a 
relatively restricted activation of negative information (Bolte et al., 2003; Schwarz, 2001; 
Zhang et al., 2017). Although both positive and negative moods may promote reactivation of 
negative to-be-forgotten words, the magnitude of reactivation of negative to-be-forgotten 
words may be larger in negative than in positive moods because a mood-congruent memory 
effect may occur in negative moods when processing negative information. In other words, 
because the valence of the mood and the to-be-processed information was the same, 
reactivation of negative to-be-forgotten words may be more robust in negative moods than in 
positive moods. Given that reactivation of negative to-be-forgotten words may inhibit 
directed-forgetting effects on reducing true memory, the true recall rate in negative moods 
was higher than that in positive moods.  
Given that directed forgetting inhibited children’s episodic access to studied words, 
and it is difficult for children to use verbatim or distinctive information of studied words to 
monitor their memory, would directed forgetting increase children’s false memory in this 
condition? The answer is “no”; although directed forgetting reduced children’s true memory, 
it did not influence either children’s or adults’ false memory for negative information. This 
finding may be due to an additional activation of mood. In other words, mood may act as a 
source of activation, this activation combining with semantic activation lead to strong 
activation of critical lures. The strong activation may ultimately lead critical lures to share 
many of the features related to the studied words. Under this condition, irrespective of 
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whether the verbatim or distinctive information is accessible or not, the monitoring process 
itself becomes difficult. As a result, directed forgetting did not influence false memory, 
regardless of age. These findings support SAT, according to which, directed forgetting did 
not affect DRM false memory because it did not influence semantic activation. The findings 
also supported AMT, which emphasises the role of strong activation of critical lures in 
eliminating the effect of directed forgetting on false memory.  
In sum, the present experiment supported the hypothesis that directed forgetting 
reduced children’s, but not adults’, true memory for negative information in positive and 
negative moods. Moreover, negative moods inhibited the role of directed forgetting in 
reducing true memory for negative information, compared to positive moods. As for false 
memory, directed forgetting had no effect on children’ and adults’ false memory for negative 
information regardless of mood. The present findings indicate that when victims or witnesses, 
either children or adults, are in a negative mood state (i.e., sad), no matter what a perpetrator 
says to them in terms of asking them to either forget the abuse happened or forget what they 
witnessed, a perpetrator’s instructions would neither reduce victims’ or witnesses’ true 
memory for negative information that happened, nor increase victims’ or witnesses’ false 









Concluding comments and future studies 
The overarching goal of the present thesis was to use the DRM paradigm 
investigating the effects of emotion, including emotional content and emotional state, on true 
and false memories in both children and adults, and to explore the methods that might be 
used to reduce emotional false memories in laboratory settings. In this final chapter, I will 
review the main findings of each experiment contained in the thesis, discuss their theoretical 
implications, and propose new avenues for future research. 
Overview 
When I initially embarked on this research, there was no single study where 
researchers had used DRM word lists in which 1) all the list words shared the same emotional 
valence as the corresponding critical lure, and 2) arousal and BAS were equated across the 
different emotionally-laden list words and critical lures. Given this, my first step was to 
construct emotional word lists, which did not differ in level of arousal and BAS values and 
where every word on a particular list reflected the target emotion. Sixty 18- to 35-year-old 
undergraduate university students (30 female) were presented with a total of 233 words, 
which were selected from prior research (Brainerd et al., 2010; Budson et al., 2006; Howe & 
Malone, 2011; Joormann et al., 2009; Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001; Ruci et al., 2009; 
Thijssen et al., 2013). Words were shown one after the other, in a random order. Participants 
were asked to type the response to each target word, and to assess the emotional valence and 
arousal of the word using adapted versions of a 9-point SAM scale (1: happy or excited to 9: 
sad or calm). The goals of Experiment 1 were met: neither BAS nor arousal values differed as 
a function of type of word lists; however, there was a significant difference in valence; 
negative lists had higher valence values than did neutral lists, which in turn had higher 
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valence values than did positive lists. These findings suggest that every word on the compiled 
lists had the assigned emotional content (positive, negative, neutral), and the lists were 
matched in terms of arousal and BAS. This set of standard word lists provided a good 
preparation for the following experiments.  
Having compiled emotional word lists where every list word shared the same 
emotional valence with the corresponding critical lures, in Experiment 2, I compared the 
level of false recognition created by these pure emotional lists with that created by hybrid 
emotional lists used by other researchers. The hybrid lists, “love,” “nice,” “anger,” and 
“sick,” were chosen from the CEL, which is a pool of 32 emotional word lists (Brainerd et 
al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008). I used the first 10 words in these lists to make the list 
length the same as that of the pure emotional lists. The critical lures for the hybrid and the 
pure emotional lists were the same. Sixty 17- to 23-year-old undergraduate university 
students (30 female) participated in Experiment 2, in which each participant randomly 
learned either pure or hybrid emotional lists. In the test phase, participants were asked to 
judge if a word had been presented in the study phase by pressing 1 (yes) or 2 (no). 
Irrespective of list valence, pure emotional lists generated more true recognition but less false 
recognition, compared to the hybrid emotional lists. Consistent with prior research, false 
recognition was generally higher for the negative lists than for the positive lists.  
In contrast to the consistent findings regarding the effect of emotional content on false 
recognition, the findings on false recall have been mixed. The mixed findings may be due to 
the confounding effects of valence and arousal rather than to valence per se. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, I tested the effect of emotional content on false recall, while controlling the 
arousal of the emotional lists. Thirty 17- to 26-year-old undergraduate university students (21 
female) learned 2 negative, 2 neutral, and 2 positive lists. The presentation order of word lists 
was partially counterbalanced across participants. After each list had been presented, 
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participants completed a 30s distractor task and were then asked to recall as many of the 
words from the list as they could remember in 1 min. Although true recall was higher for the 
negative and neutral lists than for the positive lists, false recall was higher for the negative 
lists than for the positive and neutral lists. In other words, the valence effect of emotional 
content was not only found for false recognition, but also for false recall, especially when 
arousal of emotional content was controlled. These findings suggest that the valence effect of 
emotional content on false memories may not be restricted to a specific memory test 
(recognition or recall).  
Emotional content is only one aspect of emotion. Considering that in many contexts in 
which false memories really matter (e.g., in the courtroom or the clinic), the memories 
themselves are not only emotionally charged, but they are retrieved in a distinctive emotional 
state or mood, in Experiment 4, I explored whether false memories would be influenced by 
both the emotional content of the word lists and participant’s mood. Ninety-three 17- to 33-
year-old undergraduate university students (66 female) were randomly assigned to one of the 
three mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral; n = 31 participants in each condition). 
Mood was induced using music combined with self-imagery. Immediately following the 
mood-induction phase, participants used the 9-point SAM scales to assess how happy (1) or 
sad (9) and how excited (1) or calm (9) they were. Each participant then learned the 12 
emotional word lists which were created in Experiment 1. The 72-word recognition test was 
conducted after a 5-min subtraction exercise. Negative mood-congruent true- and false- 
recognition effects were found; participants in the negative mood condition had lower false 
recognition rates for positive and neutral critical lures than that for negative critical lures. 
This pattern of results was also found for participants’ true recognition of the words on the 
lists. These findings suggest that mood may affect the way we process emotional information 
no matter whether information has been presented or not. 
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In Experiment 5, I explored age-related differences in the effect of mood on false 
memories for emotional information. Importantly, given that FTT and AAT, two important 
theories proposed to account for the DRM false memory effect, make different predictions 
about the effect of mood on false memories and on developmental reversals in false 
memories, I took the opportunity to pit one theory against the other. Ninety 7- to 8-year-old 
children, 90 11- to 12-year-old adolescents, and 90 undergraduate university students 
participated in the experiment. Within each age group, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral; n = 30 participants of each age 
in each condition). Mood was induced using a video clip that had a positive, negative, or 
neutral valence. Immediately following the mood-induction phase, participants assessed their 
mood using A Non-verbal Scale of Emotion (ANSE). Participants then listened to audio 
recordings of the 12 emotional DRM word lists compiled in Experiment 1. After each list had 
been presented, participants completed a 30s distractor task and were then asked to recall as 
many of the words from the list as they could remember. Consistent with prior research, false 
recall was greater for negative information than for positive and neutral information. This 
finding alone does not allow us to choose one theory over the other because both theories 
predict this pattern of results. A second finding from this experiment, however, directly 
supported AAT, showing that the age-related increase in false memories was eliminated in 
positive moods, whereas this increase was maintained in negative moods for negative 
information. 
The goal of the last two experiments in the present thesis was to determine whether 
adults’ and children’s emotional false memories could be reduced, or even eliminated. 
Drawing on prior research, I used warning instructions that provided adults with a specific 
strategy to help reduce their emotional false memories in Experiment 6. Two hundred and 
seventy 17- to 24-year-old undergraduate university students (135 female) were randomly 
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assigned to one of three warning conditions (no warning, warning-before-study, warning-
after-study; n = 90 in each condition). Participants in the no-warning condition (NW) were 
not presented with any warning instructions. Participants in the warning-before-study 
condition (WB) were presented with the warning instructions before the study phase, while 
participants in the warning-after-study condition (WA) were presented with the warning 
instructions after the study phase, but prior to the test phase. Within each warning condition, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three mood conditions (positive, negative, or 
neutral, n = 30 in each). The mood-induction method was the same as that in Experiment 4 
(music combined with self-imagery). Immediately following the mood-induction phase, 
participants used the 9-point SAM scales to assess how happy (1) or sad (9) and how excited 
(1) or calm (9) they were. Participants then learned the 12 emotional word lists that were 
compiled in Experiment 1. After learning all 12 word lists and finishing a 5-min subtraction 
exercise, participants were asked to complete a 72-word recognition test.  
There were three main findings in Experiment 6. First, consistent with prior research, 
warnings had no reliable effect on true recognition, but warnings provided at the time of 
encoding (i.e., before the study phase) significantly reduced false recognition. Second, 
although the effect of retrieval warnings was not as pronounced as that of encoding warnings, 
warnings provided at the time of retrieval also reduced false recognition, regardless of the 
valence of to-be-remembered information or participants’ mood. Third, compared to neutral 
moods, positive moods impeded retrieval monitoring of positive critical lures, and negative 
moods impeded retrieval monitoring of negative critical lures. In other words, mood 
influenced retrieval of mood-congruent false memories through improved monitoring and 
verbatim processing. The findings suggest that explicit warnings, either encoding or retrieval 
warnings, can reduce adults’ emotional false memories. Moreover, mood may influence 
mood-congruent false memories both at encoding and at retrieval. At encoding, mood may 
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serve as a source of activation, combined with semantic activation to help activate 
emotionally-and-semantically-related critical lures, while at retrieval, mood may help impede 
monitoring mood-congruent critical lures. 
Considering that the warning instruction is difficult for children to understand, in 
Experiment 7, I used directed-forgetting cues instead of warning instructions to investigate 
whether children’s emotional false memories could be reduced. Sixty 6- to 8-year-old 
children and 60 undergraduate university students participated in the experiment. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two mood conditions (n = 30 participants of each age in 
each condition). The mood-induction method and mood-assessment method were the same as 
those in Experiment 5. Each participant experienced both the directed-forgetting and the 
control manipulations. In the directed-forgetting cue manipulation, participants were initially 
asked to remember List 1 (the anger list), after learning the words on List 1, they were then 
told to forget them because these words would not be tested later. After 30s, words on List 2 
(the sick list) were shown. Immediately following the presentation of List 2, participants were 
surprisingly required to recall the words on List 1 as many as possible. In control 
manipulation, participants were only asked to remember List 3 (the lie list), followed by a 30s 
distractor task, and then were asked to recall as many of the words from the list as they could 
remember.  
In Experiment 7, the directed-forgetting cues significantly reduced true recall for the 
words on the to-be-forgotten list (i.e., List 1) compared to true recall for those on the control 
list (.29 vs .38). Moreover, directed forgetting reduced children’s, but not adults’, true 
memory for negative words, showing an age-related difference in the effect of directed 
forgetting on true memory. The effect of directed forgetting on true memory was qualified by 
not only age, but also mood because negative moods inhibited the effect of the directed-
forgetting cues on reducing the true recall for the negative studied words, compared to 
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positive moods (.32 vs .26). Although directed forgetting reduced children’s true memory, 
directed forgetting had no effect on children’ and adults’ false memory for negative 
information, regardless of mood. These findings support the activation-monitoring theory 
(AMT) proposed to account for the DRM false memory effect. 
Theoretical Implications 
In general, two major theories have been proposed to account for the DRM false 
memory effect and the way it changes as a function of the age of the participant. Associative 
theorists, including those who support the Implicit Associative Response (IAR), Spreading 
Activation Theory (SAT), Associative Activation Theory (AAT), and Activation-Monitoring 
Theory (AMT), believe that DRM false memories are due to associative (e.g., semantic) 
activation processes in the mental lexicon. The fundamental assumption of these theories is 
that related concepts are organised together in the mental lexicon so that when one concept is 
activated, this activation also further activates other, related concepts. Because of their close 
links, some of these related concepts that have not been presented (e.g., critical lures), will be 
erroneously activated merely by association, resulting in false memories (for a review, see 
Gallo, 2010). In addition to the associative-activation process, AMT also emphasises the role 
of the monitoring process on false memory. The goal of monitoring is to distinguish between 
events that actually happened from those that did not so as to reduce false memories. When 
strong activation happens, which leads the unpresented information to share many of the 
features related to presented information, monitoring becomes difficult and errors may arise, 
increasing false memories (Johnson et al., 1993; Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001). Associative 
theories, especially AAT, posit that it is changes in the content and structure of children’s 
knowledge base (e.g., reorganisation of knowledge, increase of associations) that contribute 
to the age-related increase in DRM false memories. This, combined with increasing 
experience in using concepts, causes increases in the level of automaticity with which 
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children access or activate associative information. In other words, with increased knowledge 
and experience, the difference in false memories between children and adults is mainly due to 
the different degree of automaticity with which they access or activate associative 
information in the knowledge base. As children develop knowledge through learning and 
practice, they develop a better memory network in which the associative links among related 
concepts become better organised and integrated. As this happens, related concepts are easier 
to access (Howe, 2005, 2006).  
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), on the other hand, proposes that there are two 
representations of information (or traces) in memory. Verbatim traces represent the 
specificity of information (e.g., the position, pronunciation, and word length of each studied 
word in the DRM paradigm). Gist traces refer to the general semantic meaning of information 
(e.g., gist-related critical lures in the DRM paradigm). According to FTT, verbatim and gist 
traces are stored in parallel, which means people can store the gist of information irrespective 
of whether they already retain surface details of the information. Verbatim and gist traces, 
however, are retrieved separately, which means that whether verbatim or gist traces are 
finally accessed depends on the retrieval cues provided. Moreover, according to FTT, the 
generation of DRM false memories is mainly due to gist extraction because a critical lure can 
be regarded as the gist of a word list and all of the words in the list are semantically related to 
the critical lure (for a review, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). As described earlier, FTT was 
the first theory to predict the counterintuitive developmental reversals in DRM false 
memories. According to FTT, the age-related increase in DRM false memories is due to the 
ability to access and extract the gist of DRM word lists developing with age. In essence, 




One key question is whether there is a theory, either associative theories or FTT, that 
can account for all of the empirical findings in the present thesis?  The simple answer is “no.” 
In some cases, associative theories (i.e., IAR, SAT, AAT, and AMT) provide a more suitable 
explanation for the findings, in some cases, fuzzy-trace theory is better, and in other cases 
both associative theories and FTT account for the findings. Table 10.1 summarises the main 
findings of the present experiments and whether they provide empirical support for each 
theory or both. Evidence supporting associative theories over FTT includes: (1) there was a 
positive correlation between true and false recognition; (2) the age-related increase in false 
memories was eliminated in positive moods, whereas this increase was maintained in 
negative moods for negative information; (3) mood impeded monitoring of mood-congruent 
critical lures at retrieval, and negative moods inhibited the effect of directed-forgetting cues 
on reducing the true recall for the negative information; and (4) directed forgetting reduced 
only children’s true memory, but it did not influence either children’s or adults’ false 
memory.  
In contrast, evidence supporting FTT over associative theories includes: (1) pure 
emotional lists generated more true recognition but less false recognition, compared to hybrid 
emotional lists; and (2) retrieval warnings had no impact on true recognition, but reduced 
false recognition. As for the effect of emotional content on false memory, both associative 
theories and FTT make the same prediction that false memories would be higher for negative 
information than for positive or neutral information. This prediction was supported 
throughout the experiments. Moreover, the finding that explicit warnings reduced false 
memories, regardless of valence of information and participant’ mood, also supports both 
FTT and associative theories, especially AMT.  
Mixed support for one set of theories over another may lead to the conclusion that the 
underlying mechanisms of the DRM false memory and its development are so complicated 
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that no single theory could account for all of the phenomena. On the other hand, the findings 
suggest that associative theories and FTT are not mutually exclusive; FTT may benefit from 
associative theories to explain how the gist information is mentally generated, while 
associative theories may benefit from FTT to explain why the same factor may have different 
impacts on true and false memories. 
Table 10.1. 




Main findings Associative theories VS FTT 
Expt.1 (Chapter 4)  Every word on the 
compiled lists had the 
assigned emotional 
content 
 The lists were matched 





Expt.2 (Chapter 5)  Irrespective of list 
valence, pure emotional 
lists generated more true 
recognition but less false 
recognition, compared to 
hybrid emotional lists 
 False recognition was 
generally higher for the 
negative lists than for the 
positive lists 







 Support associative 
theories and FTT 
Expt.3 (Chapter 5)  Consistent with false 
recognition, false recall 
was higher for the 
negative lists than for the 
positive and neutral lists 
 Support associative 
theories and FTT 
Expt.4 (Chaper 6)  Participants in the 
negative mood condition 
had lower false 
recognition rates for 
positive and neutral 
critical lures than those 
for negative critical lures 
 Across mood conditions, 
true recognition rates for 
negative, positive, and 
neutral list words were 
 Support associative 






 Support associative 




with false recognition of 




Expt.5 (Chapter 7) 
 
 False recall was greater 
for negative information 
than for positive and 
neutral information 
 Age-related increase in 
false memories were 
reduced or eliminated in 
positive moods, whereas 
this increase was 
maintained in negative 
moods for negative 
information 
 
 Support associative 




 Support associative 
theories (e.g., AAT), in 
particular 
Expt.6 (Chapter 8)  Explicit warnings, either 




 Retrieval warnings 
reduced only false 
recognition, but had no 
impact on true 
recognition 
 Mood impeded 
monitoring of mood-
congruent critical lures at 
retrieval 
 Support associative 









 Support associative 
theories 
Expt.7 (Chapter 9)  Directed forgetting 
reduced children’s, but 
not adults’, true memory 
for negative words 
 Negative moods 
inhibited the effect of 
directed-forgetting cues 
on reducing true recall 
for the negative studied 
words, compared to 
positive moods 
 
 Although directed 
forgetting reduced 
children’s true memory, 
it did not influence both 
children’ and adults’ 
false memory. 












 Support associative 







Although prior research and the current experiments have primarily focused on the 
negative consequences of emotional false memories (e.g., false accusations of sexual abuse 
resulting in imprisonment of innocent people), future research is needed to investigate the 
potentially positive and adaptive functions of emotional false memories. As Bernstein and 
Loftus (2009) expressed: “In essence, all memory is false to some degree. Memory is 
inherently a reconstructive process, whereby we piece together the past to form a coherent 
narrative that becomes our autobiography. In the process of reconstructing the past, we color 
and shape our life’s experiences based on what we know about the world ” (p. 373). In brief, 
memories are prone to errors because of their constructive nature. If perceptual illusions are 
by-products of the constructive nature of the perception system given that the amount of 
sensory information varies over time, then false memories may be the by-product of the 
constructive nature of the memory system, the adaptive significance of which is to help an 
organism survive in various environments. For example, an animal with false memories about 
the presence of a predator at a cave when only paw prints of its existence were present will be 
more cautious on return to the cave than one who correctly remembers that there was no 
predator. Thanks to false memories, the animal’s behaviour may be changed correspondingly, 
such as approaching the cave at a different time, preparing a route for escaping, etc. These 
behaviours may increase the possibility that the animal with false memories will survive 
(Howe, 2011; Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011).  
In recent years, the adaptive and positive functions of false memories have been 
investigated in laboratory settings. Howe and Derbish (2010), for example, manipulated 
survival-related information and processing in experiments where all participants were asked 
to learn neutral (e.g., mountain), negative (e.g., sad), and survival-related word lists (e.g., 
death). After the study phase, half of the participants were randomly assigned to the 
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pleasantness rating condition, where they rated each word in terms of pleasantness on a 1 
(least pleasant) to 7 (most pleasant) scale. The other half of the participants were required to 
rate each word for how relevant it would be for their survival in the scenario provided on a 1 
(least relevant) to 7 (most relevant) scale. Across four experiments, Howe and Derbish found 
a consistent pattern: survival-related information and survival-related processing led to more 
true and false memories. The findings indicate that not only true memories, but also false 
memories may have been shaped by evolution with adaptation in mind.  
In another study, Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, and Ball (2010) investigated whether false 
memories would help solve a complex cognitive task, such as the compound remote associate 
task (CRAT). In this task, three words, for instance, apple, family, house, are presented. 
Participants are asked to think of a word that could link all of the three words, such as tree in 
this case. Solutions to the CRAT problems involve spreading activation in the well-organised 
associative network, where activation will continue until the correct concept is activated 
(Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). According to associative theories in false 
memories, activation may also spread to unpresented-but-related concepts, resulting in false 
memories. Therefore, Howe and colleagues predicted that false recall of a critical lure would 
prime or help solve the CRAT problems, if the critical lure is the same as the linking word in 
the CRAT.  
To test their prediction, Howe et al. asked participants to learn 4 out of 8 DRM word 
lists. After learning each list, participants completed a 30s distractor task and recalled as 
many words as they could remember from the list. Once this learning-distractor-recall 
process had been repeated for each of the 4 lists, participants were asked to solve all 8 CRAT 
problems, the solutions to which were the same as the critical lures for the DRM word lists. 
In this way, half of the CRAT problems were primed by the critical lures generated in the 
DRM procedure, while another half were not. Consistent with the prediction, Howe et al. 
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found that CRAT problems that were primed by the DRM word lists were solved more often 
and faster than problems that were not primed. This pattern, however, happened only when 
the critical lures of the corresponding DRM lists were falsely recalled. When the critical lures 
were not falsely recalled, there was no reliable difference in CRAT problem solution rates 
and times between problems with DRM priming and problems with no DRM priming. The 
findings were later replicated in adults as well as in 11-year-old children (Howe et al., 2011), 
and suggest that false memories are not simply the negative consequences that we are 
familiar with in the forensic and clinical literatures, but rather have a beneficial effect on 
human cognition.  
In the future, researchers need to draw on these prior studies to further explore 
whether emotional false memories, as false memories more generally, have a possible 
positive effect on cognition and emotion. Based on the consistent findings that negative 
information generated more false memories than did positive or neutral information, it is 
possible that CRAT problems that are primed by the DRM lists with negative valence will be 
solved more often and faster than problems that are primed by the DRM lists with positive or 
neutral valence because the greater semantic density of negative lists allows the associative 
links among negative studied words to spread more easily to negative critical lures (Howe, 
2007; Howe, Candel, et al., 2010), which are the solutions to the CRAT problems. In 
addition, mood, as a source of activation, may aid the encoding and retrieval of mood-
congruent information. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the nature of information as the 
solutions to the CRAT problems in terms of whether it is mood-congruent or mood-
incongruent. 
We now know a considerable amount about spontaneous false memories generated by 
the DRM paradigm, and the developmental reversal effect in DRM false memories. Only a 
few studies, however, have attempted to investigate spontaneous false memories using other 
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paradigms (e.g., spontaneous false memories evoked by other material, such as stories, 
pictures, videos, etc.), or explored developmental trends in different types of spontaneous 
false memories (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017; Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007; Howe 
& Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013; Otgaar, 
Verschuere, Meijer, & van Oorsouw, 2012). Using different materials to investigate 
spontaneous false memories is important because it provides an opportunity to understand the 
generalisability of spontaneous DRM false memories. Moreover, it helps us better understand 
the mechanisms behind the development of spontaneous false memories. In other words, if it 
is true that developmental reversals in spontaneous false memories are due to gist extraction 
(as suggested by FTT) or associative activation (as suggested by AAT), then a similar 
developmental trend should be observed across studies using different materials, or the 
developmental pattern should vary in predictable ways based on the tenets of AAT and FTT. 
In one study, for example, Dewhurst et al. (2007) designed several stories in which a DRM 
word list was included in each of the stories. Dewhurst et al. believed that would presenting 
stories with DRM word lists would make the themes or gist of the lists more obvious than 
presenting DRM word lists alone. According to AAT and FTT, children would benefit from 
this manipulation more than adults, whose associative networks are more established. Thus, 
Dewhurst and colleagues predicted that the developmental reversal effect would be reduced 
or even eliminated with the use of story contexts. In line with their prediction, younger 
children (5-year-olds) indeed yielded more rather than less spontaneous false memories than 
did older children (8- and 11-year-olds).  
In another study, Otgaar et al. (2013) induced children’s and adults’ spontaneous false 
memories using DRM word lists and videos. Just like stories, Otgaar et al. believed that the 
themes of the video stimuli would be more obvious than those of DRM word lists, thus 
developmental reversals would be reduced when videos were used as false memory stimuli. 
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Moreover, Otgaar and colleagues considered the emotional valence of to-be-remembered 
information. They predicted that false memories would be more produced for the negative 
than for the neutral information, regardless of the type of false memory stimuli. Finally, 
Otgaar et al. were interested in the relation between two types of spontaneous false memories 
generated by the DRM word lists and generated by videos, respectively.  
In their study, children (6-8-year-olds), adolescents (10-12-year-olds), and young 
adults were provided with negative and neutral DRM lists, as well as neutral, negative and 
positive videos in which certain key elements (themes) were removed, but were later 
presented during the recognition task. The order of the presentation of the DRM word lists 
and videos was counterbalanced. Otgaar et al. found that, when using the DRM paradigm, the 
developmental reversal effect was found in spontaneous false memories. When using the 
video false memory paradigm, however, the developmental reversal effect was eliminated; 
children exhibited more false recognition than did adults. As for false memory differences as 
a function of varying emotional stimuli, false memories generated by different paradigms 
showed different patterns. For DRM word lists, negative lists produced more false 
recognition than did neutral lists, whereas for videos, negative videos yielded less false 
recognition than did positive or neutral videos. Otgaar et al. argued that the new finding ─ 
negative videos reduced false recognition compared to positive or neutral videos ─ might be 
due to distinctiveness; the negative video about the street fight might be much more 
distinctive than the positive or the neutral video, increasing item-specific processing. 
According to FTT, unpresented information is better discriminated from presented 
information by item-specific processing, thereby reducing false memories.  
Finally, Otgaar and colleagues computed Pearson’s correlations to examine the 
possible relation between spontaneous false memories generated by the DRM word lists and 
those generated by the videos. For each age group, spontaneous false memories elicited by 
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the DRM word lists were positively correlated with spontaneous false memories elicited by 
the videos. This finding suggests that, in spite of opposing developmental patterns, different 
types of spontaneous false memories may share similar mechanisms. Taken together, extant 
data on different types of spontaneous false memories generated by various material are 
limited. Much work is needed to replicate and extend the existing studies, and to further 
investigate how emotional content and moods influence spontaneous false memories that are 
produced by different false memory stimuli. 
Although I have primarily focused on spontaneous false memories that arise because 
of internal processes, such as gist extraction or associative activation, a great deal of evidence 
has shown that false memories can also be elicited by explicit suggestions (i.e., 
misinformation). Research of this kind usually uses the misinformation paradigm where 
participants initially experience an event, then receive postevent misinformation, and finally 
complete a memory test (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; also see relevant studies reviewed in 
Chapter 1). Explanations for the misinformation effect range from retroactive interference, 
which stipulates that people make memory errors for the original information because of 
interference from the newly postevent information (e.g., Loftus, 1979), to memory trace 
impairment, in which postevent misinformation impairs access to the memory trace of the 
original event itself (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). The most widely supported explanation 
for misinformation false memories, however, is based on a source monitoring framework 
(Johnson et al., 1993). According to this framework, the misinformation effect is due to 
source monitoring errors; people wrongfully attribute the misinformation that is provided 
externally to their own memory of the original information that is generated internally. It is 
this misattribution that results in the creation of false memories in the misinformation 
paradigm (e.g., Loftus, 2003; MacLeod & Saunders, 2008; Okado & Stark, 2005; Otgaar & 
Candel, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2013; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, & 
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Dong, 2013). Because the ability to monitor the source of a memory develops significantly 
from early childhood to young adulthood (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991), adults are less 
likely to make memory errors than children in the misinformation paradigm, showing an age-
related decrease in misinformation false memories. This developmental pattern has been 
extensively supported in the literature (for reviews, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & 
Bruck, 1993). 
Although the difference between DRM and misinformation false memories is obvious 
─ one is elicited by internal processes, while the other is elicited by external suggestion, there 
have been some studies examining the relation between the two types of false memories 
given that both of them may involve one cognitive process ─ source monitoring (e.g., Ost et 
al., 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2012; Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998; Zhu et al., 
2013). Mixed findings, however, have been found in this line of research; a significant 
positive correlation between DRM and misinformation false memories has been found in 
some studies (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2013), whereas this relation has not been 
replicated in other studies  (e.g., Ost et al., 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Wilkinson & 
Hyman, 1998). One possible explanation for the mixed results is the different manipulations 
conducted in different studies. For example, the misinformation task was presented prior to 
the DRM task in Zhu et al. (2013), but the misinformation task was interrupted by the DRM 
task which was regarded as an filler task in Ost et al. (2013). Another possibility is the 
emotional nature of the to-be-remembered information used in the misinformation and DRM 
tasks. Three sub-points are worth considering here and in future studies. First, in no single 
study has the emotional valence and arousal of the material (e.g., events) used in the 
misinformation task been carefully assessed. For example, the event reported in Zhu et al. 
(2013) involved a man stealing things from a car. On the surface, this event should be treated 
as negative. Without a standardised assessment procedure, however, it is impossible to know 
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how negative the event is or the degree of emotional activation elicited by the event (i.e., 
emotional arousal). Moreover, we have no idea whether the emotional content of the to-be-
remembered information, either its emotional valence or emotional arousal, would influence 
false memories in the misinformation paradigm. Despite many studies investigating the effect 
of emotional content on false memories by means of the DRM paradigm, only a few studies 
have used the misinformation paradigm (Porter, Bellhouse, McDougall, Ten Brinke, & 
Wilson, 2010; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Van Damme & Smets, 2014). A consistent 
finding of these studies is that susceptibility to false memories due to misinformation was 
greater for negative than for positive or neutral events, which is consistent with DRM 
findings. More importantly, this effect depends on the nature of misinformation in terms of 
whether it is centrally-related or peripherally-related to the original information. Evidence has 
shown that when the misinformation was peripherally-related, negative events generated 
more false memories than did positive or neutral events. In contrast, when the misinformation 
was centrally-related, there was no valence effect on misinformation false memories (e.g., 
Van Damme & Smets, 2014). Finally, speaking of  the valence of emtional content, it is 
necessary to keep the valence of DRM word lists and that of events the same, especially 
when comparing false memories elicited by these two types of material. Unfortunately, in no 
single published study have researchers considered this point, leaving considerable room for 
future studies. In sum, much work remains to be done in terms of comparing DRM and 
misinformation false memories, and investigating the effect of emotional content on false 
memories elicited by the DRM and misinformation paradigms.  
In addition to the emotional nature of the to-be-rememeberd information, the effect of 
the emotional state of rememberers on DRM and misinformation false memories warrants 
further investigation for at least three reasons. First, prior research regarding how negative 
and positive moods influence false memories in the DRM paradigm has shown contradictory 
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findings. Some researchers have found that, compared to neutral moods, negative moods 
reduce false memories, while positive moods increase false memories (e.g., Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005; 2010). Other researchers have not reported this pattern, but rather found that 
positive moods yielded fewer, rather than more, false memories than did neutral moods (e.g., 
Zhang et al., 2017b). Zhang et al. argued that the mixed findings are likely due to differences 
in arousal levels across studies; when controlling the arousal level of positive, negative and 
neutral moods, positive moods would not increase false memories, but instead reduce false 
memories in the DRM paradigm. Future studies are needed to replicate Zhang et al.’s study 
and further test their assumption. 
Likewise, how negative and positive moods influence false memories in the 
misinformation paradigm is not clear because of contradictory theories and findings included 
in the literature. Some researchers have found that people in positive moods are more 
vulnerable to incorporating misinformation into their memory, thus establishing more 
misinformation false memories than people in negative moods. This finding may occur 
because of the heuristic processing mode of positive moods, which may help to notice a 
broad range of stimuli, thus allowing people to confuse information that was presented with 
similar information that was not presented (e.g., Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; Levine & 
Bluck, 2004). Other researchers, on the other hand, have argued that negative moods signal 
the need to focus on problems, narrowing people’s attention to problem-related information 
(i.e., central information) at the expense of peripheral details. Thus, negative moods would 
increase false memories for peripheral information in the misinformation paradigm (e.g., 
Berntsen, 2002; Van Damme & Smets, 2014; Waring & Kensinger, 2009).  
It is possible to reconcile these different accounts and findings in future studies by 
considering the nature of to-be-processed information in terms of whether it is centrally-
related or peripherally-related. In addition, it is of interest to consider both the emotional 
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nature of to-be-processed information as well as rememberers’ mood in a single study. As 
described earlier, misinformation false memories are due to source monitoring errors. And 
moods have found to impede monitoring of mood-congruent information (see Chapter 8). 
Therefore, it is likely that more source monitoring errors would be made for mood-congruent 
information than for mood-incongruent information in a corresponding mood state. In other 
words, misinformation false memories would be higher for positive than for negative or 
neutral information in positive moods, and misinformation false memories would be higher 
for negative than for positive or neutral information in negative moods. This specific 
hypothesis remains to be tested. 
Second, moods have been found to influence developmental reversals in DRM false 
memories. More specifically, developmental reversals were eliminated for all information in 
positive moods, but developmental reversals were maintained for negative information in 
negative moods (Zhang et al., 2017b). This finding supported AAT with regards to the 
mechanism underlying developmental reversals in DRM false memories, as described in 
Chapter 7. Importantly, this finding reflected that positive moods facilitate a relatively 
automatic processing mode (i.e., heuristic), whereas negative moods promote a systematic 
processing mode. It is very likely that a relatively automatic processing mode would impair 
monitoring of memory, which would influence adults much more than children as adults have 
better monitoring abilities than do children. Thus, source monitoring errors would increase 
more in adults than in children. As a result, adults would show similar, or even greater 
misinformation false memories than would children in positive moods. That is, an age-related 
decline in misinformation false memories would be reduced, or even eliminated, in positive 
moods. In contrast, a systematic processing mode which needs much cognitive effort would 
not impair monitoring of memory. Given that monitoring ability is still greater in adults than 
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in children, an age-related decline in misinformation false memories would be maintained in 
negative moods.  
Finally, it is important to note that in my thesis  and most of the studies reviewed so 
far, mood is generally distinguished in terms of its valence, either positive or negative, which 
may neglect potential effects of discrete emotions on false memories in the DRM and 
misinformation paradigms. Recently, some investigators have examined the effect of discrete 
emotions on false memories in the DRM paradigm (Bland et al., 2016). Instead of using 
general negative or positive moods, Bland and colleagues induced a specific mood, either 
fear or anger, and provided participants with fear-related, anger-related, and neutral word 
lists. A mood-congruent false memory effect was found; false memories were more likely to 
be elicited for fear-related lists in the fear mood state, and false memories were more likely to 
be elicited for anger-related lists in the anger mood state. 
This is a good start, but much work is needed in the future. For example, research is 
sparse on how the goals and motivations associated with specific moods affect false 
memories in the misinformation paradigm, but it is possible to make specific predictions in 
this respect by drawing on relevant research. When considering the goals and motivations 
associated with specific moods, specific moods can be divided into pregoal and  postgoal 
moods (Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & Loftus, 2016; Montagrin, Brosch, & Sander, 2013). 
Pregoal moods include desire, hope, anger, fear, and disgust, which are characterised by high 
motivational intensity. When experiencing pregoal moods, people’s attention narrows to 
information that is central to their goals at the expense of peripheral details (Kaplan, Van 
Damme, & Levine, 2012; Kaplan et al., 2016). Thus, it is predicted that greater vulnerability 
to misinformation concerning those details would occur in pregoal moods. In contrast, 
postgoal moods include happiness and sadness, which are characterised by low motivational 
intensity because their occurrance reflects the fact that the goal has already been reached or 
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not. When experiencing postgoal moods, people’s attention broadens to all kinds of 
information no matter whether it is central or peripheral to their goal, allowing peripheral 
details to be processed (Kaplan et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2016). Thus, it is likely that lower 
vulnerability to misinformation concerning those details would occur in postgoal moods. 
Final Summary 
In the present thesis, I initially compiled emotional DRM word lists, which did not 
differ in level of arousal and BAS values while every word on a particular list shared the 
same valence with the corresponding critical lure. Using these normed emotional DRM word 
lists, I investigated the effect of emotional content and emotional state on false memories, the 
age-related changes in emotional false memories, and whether adults’ and children’s 
emotional false memories could be reduced by warnings or directed forgetting, respectively. 
Generally, I found that negative lists elicited more false memories than did positive or neutral 
lists. This pattern could be strengthened by participant’ negative moods, showing a negative 
mood-congruent false memory effect. Furthermore, the age-related differences in false 
memories occurred as a function of emotional content and participant’ mood; positive moods 
eliminated the typical age-related increase in false memories for all kinds of information, 
while negative moods maintained the increase for negative information. Warnings and 
directed forgetting generally reflected the opposite effects on emotional true and false 
memories; warnings reduced emotional false memories, but had no effect on emotional true 
memories. In contrast, directed forgetting reduced emotional true memories, but had no effect 
on emotional false memories. 
Both associative theories and FTT account for some of the findings, but no single one 
can explain all of the phenomena. In fact, I believe that associative theories and FTT are not 
mutually exclusive; FTT could be further supplemented by associative theories to explain 
how the gist information is mentally generated in mind, while associative theories could be 
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supplemented by FTT to explain why the same factor can have different impacts on true and 
false memories. In the future, additional work is needed in order to understand the interaction 
between emotion and false memories. Three research directions would add to this 
understanding: (1) investigating the positive and adaptive roles of emotional false memories 
on cognition and emotion; (2) examining the effect of emotion on spontaneous false 
memories that are produced by different paradigms; and (3) exploring susceptibility to false 
memories due to misinformation as a function of the nature of misinformation (e.g., 
emotional valence or centrally-or-peripherally-related to the original information) and 
participants’ mood. In sum, research regarding the interaction between emotion and false 
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Study factors that influence the magnitude of false memories in the DRM paradigm 
Author(s) Factor Participants Main manipulation(s) Main finding(s) 
McEvoy, Nelson, & 
Komatsu (1999) 




2 experimental list groups: 
 24 lists with high BAS 
 24 lists with relatively low BAS 
 
 False recall and corrected false 
recognition rates were 
significantly higher when BAS 
from the presented words to the 
critical lure was high than when 
BAS was low. 
Gallo & Roediger 
(2002) 




28 word lists: 
 1 list from Stadler et al. (1999) 
 7 lists from Deese (1959) 
 12 lists from the Russell and 
Jenkins norms 
 The authors believed that these 20 
lists would yield relatively low 
level of false recall 
 
 The remaining 8 lists were chosen 
from Stadler et al.’s (1999) norms 
 As expected, the 20 lists yielded 
very low levels of false recall: 
the mean false recall rate was 
only .10, whereas true recall did 
not differ across lists. 
 Positive correlation between the 
current norms and previous ones 
(.90) 
 Positive correlation between 
false recall and BAS (.49) 
 Like false recall, lists with low 
BAS tended to yield lower false 
recognition. 
Brainerd & Wright BAS variations University students  16 lists; every four lists were  The false recognition rate for 
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(2005)  possessed with high/low BAS and 
high/low FAS 
 S’s listened to an audio recording 
of all 16 lists, and then they had 2 
min to read instructions of the 
conjoint-recognition 
critical lures increased when 
either BAS or FAS increased. 
 The effects of BAS and FAS on 
false recognition were 
comparable but were independent 




Expt. 1: BAS 
variations 






 4 high BAS/high FAS lists 
 4 high BAS/low FAS lists 
 4 low BAS/high FAS lists  
 
 Although FAS was important, 
especially for DRM lists, the age-
related changes were driven 
mainly by BAS. 
 False recall was positively related 
to BAS, regardless of whether 
those lists were DRM or 
category, whereas true recall was 
negatively related to BAS. 
Knott, Dewhurst, & 
Howe (2012) 















Two sets of lists; 16 typical DRM and 
16 category: 
 4 high BAS/high connectivity 
 4 high BAS/low connectivity 
 4 low BAS/high connectivity 
 4 low BAS/low connectivity 





 Lists with high BAS but low 
connectivity produced the highest 
level of false recall and 
recognition, regardless of list 
type. 
 Connectivity was more important 






 Expt. 2: 
Lists were the same as those in Expt. 1; 
BAS and connectivity were between-
subjects factors 
 
Stem completion task; 28 stems, with 
four of the stems corresponding to the 
critical lures that were related to the 
studied lists 
 
 An indirect priming effect was 
found for DRM lists regardless of 
BAS or connectivity: stems were 
more likely to be completed by 
critical lures related to the studied 
lists than those associated with 
unstudied lists. 
 Only when category lists had 
high BAS, did an indirect 
priming effect occur. 
Robinson & 
Roediger (1997) 
List length Adults Expt. 1:  
 4 lists of each list length: 0, 3, 6, 9, 
12, or 15 words, respectively 
 
Expt. 2: 
 List length kept constant but the 
number of associated words was 
varied 
 
 True recall decreased and false 
recall increased, with increasing 
list length. 
 
 Although list length was 
controlled across lists, with 
increasing the number of 
associations, true recall decreased 
but false recall increased. 
Sugrue & Hayne 
(2006) 




 Varied list length: 7 or 14 words 
 
 The effect of long lists on false 
recall was more significant for 
adults than for children: a 127% 
increase in adults’ false recall vs 




 Adults had higher false 
recognition rates than did 
children but only in the long-list 
condition, not in the short-list 
condition. 
Sugrue, Strange, & 
Hayne (2009) 




 Varied list length: 7 or 14 words 
 S’s reported any words that they had 
thought about but had not reported 
 Regardless of age, S’s recalled 
more critical lures in the long-list 
condition than in the short-list 
condition. 
 Long lists were more likely to 






Expt. 2: List 
length 




 Removal of the strongest BAS word 
or several of the weakest BAS 
words in a list to vary list length 
while keeping BAS constant 
 Intact lists elicited more false 
recall than did either the strong-
item-removed lists or the weak-
items-removed lists. 
 List length was not the decisive 
factor that results in false recall, 
compared to BAS. 




University students Expt. 1:  
 Between-subjects design 
 2s, 250ms, or 20ms per word with a 
concurrent memory load 
(“remember a 7-digit sequence”) or 
no concurrent load 
 
 
 S’s recognised critical lures (.18) 
even when they had difficulty 
recognising studied words (.12) 
 The memory load task reduced 
both true and false memory, 





 Within-subjects design 
 2s or 20ms per word; with or 
without a memory load 
affected true memory 
 
 False recognition also occurred 
when list words were presented at 
a rate of 20ms. 
 For the 2-s exposure condition, 
true recognition exceeded false 
recognition, whereas for the 20ms 
exposure condition, the reverse 
was true. 
 There was no effect of memory 





University students  Five presentation rates: 20, 250, 
1000, 3000, or 5000ms per word 
 Two types of list: semantic vs 
phonological 
 For semantically-related lists, 
false recall increased when the 
presentation rate was short (20 or 
250ms per word). In contrast, 
false recall declined when longer 
presentation rate was manipulated 
(1000, 3000, or 5000ms). 
 For phonologically-related lists, 
the pattern was different; false 
recall was high at the fastest 
duration and decreased when 
duration lengthened. 




University students  Three presentation rates: 0.5, 1, or 
3s per word 
 False recall and recognition 
decreased while true recall 
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rate increased with slower 
presentation rates. 




University students  Two presentation rates: 2s or 5s per 
word 
 Half of the S’s rehearsed silently 
while the other half rehearsed 
overtly by reporting any word 
coming to mind 
 Increasing the presentation rate 
enhanced true recall, but did not 
influence false recall or false 
recognition. 
 S’s in the 5s-presentation 
condition rehearsed more studied 
words and critical lures than did 
those in the 2s-presentation 
condition. 




University students Expt. 1:  
 Ten 5-word lists were presented 




 Six 12-word lists were presented 




 Lists and procedure were the same 
as those in Expt. 2, but in Expt. 3, 
half of S’s made pleasantness 
ratings for each studied word 
 
 True recall was not affected by 
presentation modality, but false 
recall was reduced following 
visual presentation of the lists 
relative to aural presentation. 
 
 Consistent with Expt.1, false 
recognition was higher following 
aural than visual presentation. 
 
 
 Regardless of instructional 
conditions, false recall was higher 
following aural compared to 
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 visual presentation. 
 Regardless of presentation 
modality, false recall was lower 
in the pleasantness rating 
condition. 
Kellogg (2001) Expt.1: 
presentation 
modality 
University students  List words were presented either 
visually or aurally 
 S’s wrote or spoke the words they 
just read or heard 
 False written recall was lower 
following visual compared to 
aural presentation. 
 This modality effect was 
eliminated when spoken recall 
was conducted. 
Gallo, McDermott, 




University students Expt. 1: 
 Between-subjects design 
 List words were presented either 
visually or aurally 
 S’s did either a free recall test or 











 Auditory presentation resulted in 
more false recall and false 
recognition than did visual 
presentation. 
 The modality effects on the 
recognition test were not as large 
as those found in previous 
studies. 
 
 The effect of study modality on 
false recognition was found: false 
recognition was greater following 
auditory than visual study. 






 Study and test modality were 
manipulated between-subjects. 
found when critical lures were 
aurally tested. 
 
 More false recognition resulted 
from auditory study than visual 
study. 
 S’s made more false recognition 
when the study modality was 
consistent with the test modality. 




University students Expt. 1: 
 Lists were presented aurally, 







 Same presentation conditions as in 
Expt 1, except that all of the list 
words were presented twice 
 
 False recall and recognition were 
higher following auditory study 
than visual study. 
 The level of false recall and 
recognition was similar in read-
aloud group with that in standard 
visual presentation group. 
 
 False recall and recognition were 
higher for S’s in the auditory 
condition than for S’s in the 
visual and read-aloud conditions. 
Toglia, Neuschatz, 
& Goodwin (1999) 
Expt. 1: level of 
processing 
University students 2 encoding conditions: 
 Semantic encoding: S’s rated each 
word for pleasantness 
 Non-semantic encoding: S’s made 
 
 About half the S’s recalled at 
least one critical lure. Most of the 
errors were semantic. 
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yes/no decision on whether each 
word contained the letter “a” 
 S’s in the semantic encoding 
condition had higher true and 
false recall than did those in the 
non-semantic encoding condition. 




University students Expt. 1: 
2 encoding conditions: 
 Shallow-level-of-processing: count 
and write down the number of 
vowels in each word 
 Deep-level-of-processing: 
visualize each word and make 
a concrete/abstract rating 
Expt. 2: 
 The shallow-level task was the same 
as Expt1, but the deep-level-of-
processing was changed to a 
category sorting task. 
 
 S’s in the deep-level-of-
processing condition recalled 
more studied words and critical 






 Consistent with Expt. 1, S’s in 
the deep-level-of-processing 
condition again recalled more 
studied words and critical lures 






University students Expt. 1: recall test 
Expt. 2: recognition test 
 
3 encoding conditions: 
 Write the number corresponding to 
the pleasantness rating of the word 
 
 The pattern was the same in 
Expts 1 and 2; deep processing 
(semantically processed lists) led 
to more true and false recall and 
recognition than did shallow 
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 Write the number corresponding to 
the number of vowels in the word 
 Write the name of the colour in 




Perez- Mata, Read, 
& Diges (2002) 
Divided 
attention 
University students Expt.1: 
 List type: abstract vs concrete 






 S’s saw each list alone, or while 
monitoring an auditory shadowing 
task  
 
 Abstract lists yielded more false 
recall than concrete lists. 
 S’s in the divided attention 
condition had higher false recall 
rates than did those in the full 
attention condition. 
 
 Divided attention led to less true 
recall than full attention. 
 False recall was higher with 
divided attention compared to full 
attention. 




University students  Expt. 1: 
6 study-test trials, free recall test 
 
 Expt. 2: 
5 study-test trials, recognition test 
 
In both experiments, four encoding 
conditions: 
 Compared with true recall, false 
recall was significantly affected 
by encoding condition. 
 Conditions that focused attention 
on the studied words, such as by 
either writing each word or each 
word’s second letter, reduced 
false recall, whereas the write 
261 
 
 hear word 
 write word 
 write second letter 
 write number 
 
number condition did not reduce 
false recall. 
 Encoding strategies and attention 
influenced false recognition and 
false recall similarly 




University students Expt. 1:   
 S’s instructed to ignore the word on 




 S’s instructed to respond vocally to 
the word name but to ignore its 
display colour 
 
 False memories occurred even 
when S’s processed word lists 
unintentionally. 
 
 There was a dramatic increase in 
true recognition; however, false 
recognition to critical lures 
remained robust. 
 




University students  List type: DRM vs categorised lists 
 Full vs divided attention (the 
random number generation task) 
 Divided attention was manipulated 
at study in Expt. 1, at test in Expt. 2 
 The effect of divided attention at 
encoding was the same for DRM 
and categorised lists. 
 Divided attention reduced false 
remember responses compared to 
full attention, regardless of list 
type. 
 Divided attention at retrieval 
increased false remember 
responses to critical lures but had 
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no effect on true remember 
responses. 
Payne et al. (2002) Stress University students  2 groups: stress vs non-stress 
 The Trier social stress test was used 
to elicit moderate psychological 
stress 
 Stressed S’s had significantly 
more false memories than did 
non-stressed S’s, whereas their 
true memories were comparable. 
 True recognition for non-stressed 
S’s exceeded their false 
recognition (78% vs 61%). 
 For the stress group, true 
recognition did not differ from 
false recognition (81% vs 77%). 
Wenzel et al. 
(2004) 
Expt. 1: Stress University students  3 groups of S’s: spider fearful, 
blood fearful, or non-fearful 
 4 word lists: spider, blood, river, 
and music 
 Fearful S’s did not recall more 
threat-relevant studied words or 
threat-relevant critical lures 
compared to non-fearful S’s. 
Smeets, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach (2006) 
Stress University students  Stress vs control group  The magnitude of false memories 
did not differ between the two 
groups. 
Smeets et al. (2008) Stress University students  4 groups: encoding stress, 
consolidation stress, retrieval stress 
or no-stress control group 
 List valence: emotional vs neutral  
 S’s in the consolidation stress 
group had greater true memories, 
whereas those in the retrieval 
stress group had lower true 
memories compared to the other 




 Neither emotional nor neutral 
false recall was affected by any 
stress exposure. 





 Two versions of the Trier Social 
Stress Test-Modified (TSST-M): 
high or low stress 
 List valence: neutral, negative, or 
positive  
 Adolescents in high-stress group 
had better true memories than did 
adolescents in the low-stress 
group, whereas children’s 
accuracy did not differ as a 
function of stress conditions. 
 Increases in S’s cortisol 
responses were only related to 
greater true memories but not 











Test factors that influence the magnitude of false memories in the DRM paradigm 
Author(s) Factor Participants Main Manipulation(s) Main Finding(s) 
McDermott (1996) Expt.1:   
Retention 
interval 
University students  An immediate free recall test 
after learning each list 
 Two days later, final recall test 
 The false recall rate remained 
and even exceeded the true 
recall rate after 2 days. 
Toglia, Neuschatz, 




University students  3 retention interval conditions: 
immediate, after one week, or 
after three weeks 
 S’s in the immediate testing 
condition recalled more 
studied words than those in 
the longer retention interval 
conditions. 
 Retention interval had no 






University students Expt. 1: 









 Uncorrected true recognition 
declined more significantly 
than uncorrected false 
recognition. 
 Corrected true and false 
recognition decreased by 





 A further R/K judgment for all 
words S’s recognised 
 For uncorrected data, there 
was a reliable decline for 
false R after 48 hours. But 
this pattern was not 





University students  3 retention interval conditions: 
immediate, 2-day delay, and 7-
day delay 
 Expt. 1: recall test 
Expt. 2: recognition test 
 Regardless of test type, false 
memories decreased across 
retention interval. 
 The decline in false memories 
was not as significant as that 
for true memories. 




University students Expt. 1: 
 3 conditions: no delay, a 2-week 





Expt. 2: 2-day delay. 
 
 True recall decreased faster 
than did false recall. 
 False recall after a 2-week 
delay was as strong as it was 
after an immediate test. 
 
 True and false recognition 
decreased over retention 
interval. 
 False recognition was only 
marginally more persistent 
than true recognition. 
Howe et al. (2010) Expts 3-5: 
Retention 
Expt. 3:  
Young adults 
 Recognition test: immediate vs 
1-week later 
 True and false recall was 














Expt. 4:  
5- and 8-year-olds 
Expt. 5:  
7- and 11-year-olds 
 













for negative lists. 
 For neutral lists, true 
recognition decreased but 
false recognition did not 
change significantly across 
the retention interval. 
 For negative lists, false 
recognition increased and true 
recognition decreased across 
the retention interval. 
 
 For both younger and older 
children, the pattern was the 
same: their true memories 
declined with time but their 
false memories remained 
stable for neutral information, 
and even increased for 
negative information over a 1-
week delay. 




University students  Mood condition: negative vs 
neutral 
 List valence: negative vs neutral 
 Recognition test: immediate vs 
1-week later 
 Regardless of immediate or 
one-week later test, S’s in 
negative mood were more 
likely to remember negative 




Brainerd & Reyna 
(1998) 
Expts 1 & 2: 
Test instructions 
University students Expt. 1:  
 2 conditions: standard 
recognition test vs meaning 
recognition test: accept all 






Expt. 2: 5 types of test words 
 Studied words 
 List-associate distractors  
 Missing-exemplar distractors  
 Critical lures 
 Additional distractors 
 
 For the standard recognition 
test, false recognition rates 
were the same as true 
recognition rates, whereas for 
the meaning recognition test, 
false recognition rates were 




 In standard recognition, true 
and false recognition rates for 
studied words and critical 
lures did not differ but were 
higher than false recognition 
rates for other distractors. 
 In meaning recognition, false 
recognition rates for critical 
lures were higher than true 
recognition and others. 
McKelvie (1999) Test instructions University students  2 conditions: free recall vs 
forced recall (i.e., fill all recall 
spaces)  
 Forced instructions increased 
false recall for critical lures 
but not true recall for studied 
words. 




 Rated each recalled word for 
confidence using 6-point scale 
were higher with forced than 
with free retrieval 
instructions. 
 Confidence was lower with 
forced than with free retrieval 
instructions for only false 
recall but not for false 
recognition. 
Brainerd, Wright, 
Reyna, & Mojardin 
(2001) 
Expts 1 & 2: 
Test instructions 
University students Expt. 1: three conjoint recognition 
conditions: 
 V condition: S’s only accepted 
studied words 
 M condition: S’s only accepted 
meaning-related words 
 VM condition, S’s accepted 







Expt. 2:  
 Studied words were presented 
either forward or backward 
order 
 Adding a recall or math task 
 
 
 65% of false recognitions of 
critical lures in the V 
condition were based on 
phantom recollection. 
 Critical lures and studied 
words were accepted at a 
similar rate across three 
conditions, and other related 
lures were accepted more 
often in the M and VM 
condition compared to V 
condition. 
 
 Manipulation presentation 
order decreased true 
recognition rates after recall 
and increased the rates after 
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before doing the conjoint 
recognition 
math problems. 
 Critical lures were more 
likely to be accepted in V 
condition than in M 
condition. 
 The false recognition rate for 
critical lures was higher than 
the true recognition rate for 
studied words in V condition. 
Seamon, Luo, 
Shulman, Toner, & 
Caglar (2002) 
Test instructions University students  8 vs 12 word lists 
 Instructions: remember-
remember vs forget-remember  
 S’s in remember-remember 
group recalled more studied 
words than those in forget-
remember group. 
 Directed forgetting 
instructions had no effect on 




Test instructions University students Expt. 1: recall the words under 3 
conditions 
 A standard free recall condition 
 A part-list cuing condition 








 Retrieval practice and part-list 
cuing decreased recall of 
critical lures. 
 Low false-recall levels 
corresponded to larger effects 
of retrieval practice and part-
list cuing, while high false-










Expt 2:  
 The same as Expt.1 but here the 
critical lures were not part of the 
studied lists 
accompanied by no effects of 
retrieval practice and part-list 
cuing. 
 Retrieval practice and part-list 
cuing induced the same 
qualitative and quantitative 
effects on recall. 
 
 Part-list cuing and retrieval 
practice reduced false recall 
of critical lures. 
 
Starns & Hicks 
(2004) 
Test instructions University students Expt. 1: 
 Studied word lists in the form of 
paired associates 
 Retrieval practice for half of the 








 Cued-recall test 
 
 There was a reduction in the 
level of false recognition for 
list themes that received 
retrieval practice. 
 Recognition rates were lower 
for all U-P words (words that 
were not individually 
practiced but were from, or 
related to practiced lists) 
related to the list theme. 
 
 Consistent with Expt.1, 
retrieval-induced forgetting 
was found for both true and 
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false memories in the form of 
cued recall. 
Reysen & Nairne 
(2002) 
Part-list cuing University students Expt. 1: 




Expt. 2: 3 conditions 
 Free recall 
 Cued recall tests with random 
cues 
 Cued recall tests with the even 





 S’s recalled more studied 
words and critical lures on 
free recall tests than on cued 
recall tests. 
 
 S’s recalled more critical 
lures and studied words in the 
free recall condition than in 
either the consistent cue 
condition or the random cue 
condition. 
Kimball & Bjork 
(2002) 
Expt. 2: Part-list 
cuing 
University students 3 manipulations: 
 Cuing (was or was not provided 
at test) 
 Number of cues (four or eight) 
 Cue associative strength 
(strongest or weakest associates) 
 
 The effect of part-list cuing 
was the same as that of 
directed forgetting in terms of 
reducing true memory rates. 
 Part-list cuing also declined 
false memories, which were 
retained as a function of 
directed forgetting. 
Kimball, Bjork, Part-list cuing University students 3 manipulations in Expts 1 &2:  
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Bjork, & Smith 
(2008) 
 Cue serial position (either the 
eight earliest or eight latest 
studied words) 
 Cue associative strength 
(forward strength in Expt. 1; 
backward strength in Expt. 2) 
 Cue recall permissibility 
 Irrespective of forward 
association strength or 
backward association 
strength, cue associative 
strength did not affect false 
recall. 
 Presenting part-list cues 
reduced false recall but it only 
happened when cues were 
early-studied words and their 
recall was prohibited. 
Kawasaki-Miyaji, 
Inoue, & Yama 
(2003) 
Language shifts Japanese university 
students who had 
learned English for 
at least seven years 
 Lists were studied and tested in 
either English or Japanese 
 When the study language and 
the test language matched, 
true recognition rates were 
higher. 
 When the test language was 
Japanese, false recognition 
rates were higher. 
Anastasi, Rhodes, 





















 Although true memories were 
equivalent between 
monolingual English speakers 
and bilinguals, the former 
generated more false 






















 Spanish word lists combined 
with originally English version 






 S’s who had extensive 
experience with Spanish but 





 Native English speakers but 
tested in both English and 
Spanish with which they had 
little experience. 
 Native Spanish speakers did 
not differ in their true 
recognition for English and 
Spanish words. 
 Native Spanish speakers 
made more false memories in 
English than in Spanish. 
 
 Spanish speakers were more 
likely to make true and false 
recognitions when studied 
words were presented in 
Spanish compared to those 
presented in English. 
 
 Monolingual English speakers 
were more likely to remember 
studied words and critical 
lures presented in English 




Language shifts University students  English-French bilinguals 
learned and were tested with 
words presented either in 
English or in French 
 Irrespective of within-
language or across language, 




 The effect of study-test 
language shift was greater for 
studied words compared to 
that for critical lures. 
Sahlin, Harding, & 
Seamon (2005) 
Language shifts University students  English-Spanish bilinguals 
learned and were tested with 
words presented either in 
English or in Spanish 
 Bilingual S’s false recognised 
critical lures no matter 
whether the words were tested 
in the same language or not. 
 False memories were greater 
for same-language than for 
different-language critical 
lures. 
Howe, Gagnon, & 
Thouas (2008) 
Language shifts 6- to 12-year-olds  
and university 
students 
 All English-French bilinguals 
 Within-language (i.e., the study 
and test language were the 
same) vs between-language 
conditions (i.e., the study and 
test language were different) 
 An age-related increase in 
true and false recall was 
found both in within-language 
conditions and between-
language conditions. 
 Fewer false memories in the 
between-language condition 
than in the within-language 
conditions for youngest 
children, no difference for 8- 
to 12-year-olds, and more 
false recall in between than in 
within conditions for adults. 
 As for recognition, false 
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recognition was greater in 
between- than in within-





Language shifts University students  Spanish-English bilinguals 
learned and were tested with 
word lists in either English or in 
Spanish.  
 True and false memories were 
higher in English than in 
Spanish. 
 False recall and recognition 
were higher across languages 















The normed emotional word lists 
Negative word lists 
Critical lure: anger Critical lure: sick Critical lure: lie Critical lure: sad 
List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence 
List 
word 
BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence 
rage 0.617 4.517 6.367 ill 0.683 5.100 6.617 fib 0.667 5.167 6.117 unhappy 0.550 5.567 6.717 
mad 0.600 4.417 6.350 illness 0.617 5.117 6.933 deceive 0.317 4.933 6.467 sorrow 0.433 5.683 7.033 
enrage 0.483 4.450 6.117 flu 0.450 5.167 6.600 deception 0.317 5.000 6.400 depression 0.400 5.367 7.500 
fury 0.350 4.550 5.867 nausea 0.417 5.083 6.583 cheat 0.283 4.783 6.750 cry 0.400 5.400 6.550 
wrath 0.233 4.383 5.717 cough 0.350 5.333 6.167 untruthful 0.283 5.150 6.717 upset 0.367 5.333 6.917 
hatred 0.233 5.033 7.050 virus 0.300 4.300 6.567 dishonest 0.267 5.050 6.883 tears 0.293 5.345 6.741 
hate 0.183 4.683 7.050 fever 0.267 4.783 6.383 mislead 0.183 4.917 6.567 down 0.117 5.433 5.433 
annoy 0.117 4.833 6.083 vomit 0.250 4.650 6.917 FALSE 0.133 5.117 5.800 suicide 0.100 4.667 7.900 
fight 0.100 4.333 5.967 cold 0.017 5.150 5.800 betray 0.067 4.617 7.100 low 0.033 5.450 5.900 
fear 0.017 4.483 6.517 hurt 0.017 5.033 6.700 trick 0.050 4.483 4.717 distress 0.033 4.300 6.767 





Positive word lists 
Critical lure: beautiful Critical lure: nice Critical lure: love Critical lure: happy 
List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence 
stunning 0.417 4.217 3.467 pleasant 0.433 5.400 3.817 affection 0.533 4.600 3.550 glad 0.517 4.917 3.833 
gorgeous 0.350 4.200 3.283 polite 0.317 5.133 4.000 adore 0.483 4.683 3.417 pleased 0.483 4.900 3.517 
pretty 0.217 4.183 3.267 
complime
nt 
0.317 4.583 3.533 passion 0.383 4.000 3.683 joyful 0.433 4.433 3.433 
attractive 0.167 4.217 3.333 
considerat
e 
0.167 5.467 3.750 kiss 0.350 3.767 3.267 content 0.350 5.633 3.750 
elegant 0.133 4.767 3.533 genial 0.083 5.167 4.783 heart 0.233 4.667 3.917 elated 0.300 4.333 3.900 
breathtakin
g 
0.117 3.583 3.050 sweet 0.067 4.500 4.033 care 0.217 5.317 3.733 satisfied 0.250 5.050 3.550 
lovely 0.100 4.750 3.367 thoughtful 0.050 5.383 4.117 devoted 0.183 4.600 3.800 laugh 0.217 3.550 3.133 
exquisite 0.100 4.867 3.567 friend 0.033 4.300 3.250 friendship 0.150 4.283 3.433 enjoyment 0.217 4.317 3.633 
striking 0.050 4.300 3.950 amiable 0.033 5.383 4.483 embrace 0.133 4.867 3.500 ecstatic 0.200 3.850 3.317 
appealing 0.033 4.533 3.633 smile 0.000 4.533 3.233 like 0.100 4.983 4.100 enjoyable 0.183 4.317 3.433 







Neutral word lists 
Critical lure: foot Critical lure: car Critical lure: mountain Critical lure: music 
List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence List word BAS Arousal Valence 
toe 0.567 5.433 5.133 sedan 0.650 5.367 4.833 peak 0.483 4.567 4.267 band 0.500 4.500 4.183 
shoe 0.367 5.267 4.533 
automobil
e 
0.567 5.150 4.600 climber 0.350 4.817 4.367 instrument 0.433 4.567 3.967 
ankle 0.250 5.250 5.117 vehicle 0.517 5.083 4.600 summit 0.317 4.417 3.917 concert 0.383 4.067 3.583 
sock 0.200 5.417 4.817 garage 0.450 5.167 4.633 climb 0.267 4.467 4.200 piano 0.367 5.250 3.983 
hand 0.183 5.150 4.417 drive 0.433 4.900 4.417 hill 0.167 5.033 4.750 jazz 0.367 4.867 3.817 
sandals 0.167 5.117 4.300 van 0.317 5.383 4.767 steep 0.100 4.683 5.017 melody 0.350 5.333 4.050 
boot 0.117 5.317 4.783 jeep 0.283 4.650 4.383 ski 0.100 4.217 3.917 rhythm 0.317 4.517 3.750 
kick 0.100 4.583 4.867 highway 0.183 5.117 4.700 top 0.083 5.133 4.617 sound 0.267 4.767 4.183 
knee 0.050 5.383 5.083 truck 0.083 5.350 5.017 valley 0.067 5.350 4.300 symphony 0.267 4.883 3.850 
walk 0.033 5.200 4.233 bus 0.050 5.583 4.717 range 0.050 5.033 4.583 radio 0.250 4.833 4.100 
Mean 0.203 5.212 4.728 Mean 0.353 5.175 4.667 Mean 0.198 4.772 4.393 Mean 0.350 4.758 3.947 
 
